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FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE IN WAR TIME: WORLD WAR I
AND THE LIMITS OF CIVIL LIBERTIES†
Laura M. Weinrib∗
This Article examines the relationship between expressive freedom and
freedom of conscience as the modern First Amendment took shape. It focuses
on efforts by the American Union Against Militarism and National Civil
Liberties Bureau—the organizational precursors to the ACLU—to secure
exemptions from military service for conscientious objectors whose opposition
to American involvement in the First World War stemmed from socialist or
radical labor convictions rather than religious scruples. Although such men
asserted secular, ethical objections to war, advocates strained to expand the
First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause to encompass them. Concurrently,
they sought to import a generalized theory of freedom of conscience into
constitutional constructions of freedom of speech and press, within and outside
the courts. The conception of liberty of conscience that they advanced, which
they linked to an “Anglo-Saxon tradition” of individual rights, clashed with
progressive understandings of democratic citizenship and failed to gain broadbased traction.
Civil liberties advocates consequently reframed their defense of political
objectors in terms that emphasized democratic dissent rather than individual
autonomy. Sympathetic academics and a few judges embraced this progressive
theory of free speech, which celebrated discursive openness as a prerequisite
for democratic legitimacy and justified, rather than cabined, the exercise of
state power. Even in the interwar period, however, the proponents of this
vision remained deeply ambivalent about the courts and generally suspicious
of individual rights. Although some accepted a limited role for judicial
enforcement of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, most declined to
† This Article originated as a contribution to the 2015 Randolph W. Thrower Symposium, “The New
Age of Communication: Freedom of Speech in the 21st Century.” The Thrower Symposium was held on
February 5, 2015, at Emory University School of Law, and the other symposium articles are available in
Volume 65, Issue 2 of the Emory Law Journal.
∗ Assistant Professor of Law and Herbert and Marjorie Fried Teaching Scholar, University of Chicago
Law School. I thank Mary Anne Case, Hendrik Hartog, Aziz Huq, Jeremy Kessler, Martha Nussbaum, and
Geoffrey Stone for helpful comments. I am grateful to the Thrower family and to the Roger Levin Faculty
Fund for their generous support, and to the Emory Law Journal, especially Matt Johnson and Matt Bailey, for
invaluable assistance.
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endorse a court-centered and constitutional right to exemption from generally
applicable laws.
INTRODUCTION
In his seminal account of the First Amendment and the First World War,
Freedom of Speech in War Time, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., described an
“unprecedented extension of the business of war over the whole nation.”1 On
Chafee’s telling, the sweeping scope of the wartime propaganda campaign had
transformed the United States into a “theater of war.”2 Public officials and
mainstream Americans lost sight of the tradeoff between order and freedom
and denounced all criticism of the country’s cause as a threat to public safety.
Hundreds of prosecutions ensued, and the cessation of hostilities in Europe
failed to check the demand for censorship at home.3 The new speech-restrictive
climate, in Chafee’s assessment, made it “increasingly important to determine
the true limits of freedom of expression,” as a matter of national policy as well
as the First Amendment.4
Almost a century after Chafee published his influential tract, scholars
continue to trace the emergence of the “modern First Amendment” to the
enforced conformity of the war.5 When the wartime hysteria receded, they
explain, prominent officials and intellectuals recognized the high toll of
repression and awoke to the value of countermajoritarian constitutionalism in
the domain of free speech.6 Although it would take another decade for a

1

Zechariah Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 937 (1919).
Id.
3 Id. at 932–33.
4 Id. at 933–34.
5 For example, GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1038–39 (7th ed. 2013), describes
“speech that ‘causes’ unlawful conduct” as the “first issue of first amendment interpretation to capture the
Court’s sustained interest,” and traces the Court’s engagement with the issue to “a series of cases concerning
agitation against the war and the draft during World War I.” See also DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS
FORGOTTEN YEARS 1 (1997) (noting that the majority of scholars locate “the creation of the modern First
Amendment” during the period beginning with the passage of the Espionage Act of 1917). On Chafee’s
influence, see MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL
LIBERTARIANISM 2 (1991) (describing Chafee as “the early twentieth-century jurist most responsible for
developing the modern interpretation of the First Amendment”); id. at 122 (summarizing literature).
6 E.g., PAUL L. MURPHY, THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS FROM
WILSON TO FDR 8–9 (1972) (emphasizing the “World War I crisis in civil liberties” and the ensuing Red Scare
as the catalysts of interwar contestation over free speech); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE
SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 230 (2004) (“The
government’s extensive repression of dissent during World War I and its conduct in the immediate aftermath
2
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Supreme Court majority to overturn a conviction on First Amendment grounds,
the path forward purportedly was clear: the courts would prevent overzealous
legislators and administrators from abridging expressive freedom.
Of course, the modern First Amendment contains other provisions than the
one that prohibits Congress from abridging freedom of speech, and it reflects
other values than open democratic debate. During the First World War,
self-described civil libertarians endorsed these wider commitments. The very
same advocates who litigated speech claims under the Espionage Act also
invoked the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to defend an
asserted right of conscientious objectors to refuse military service. And yet,
though the scholarship on wartime civil liberties advocacy has thoroughly
canvassed contestation over dissenting speech,7 it rarely dwells on the
consequences of patriotic repression for freedom of conscience,8 either as a
species of religious freedom or as a secular concept justifying civil
of the war had a significant impact on American society. It was at this moment, in reaction to the country’s
excesses, that the modern civil liberties movement truly began.”).
7 E.g., CHRISTOPHER CAPOZZOLA, UNCLE SAM WANTS YOU: WORLD WAR I AND THE MAKING OF THE
MODERN AMERICAN CITIZEN (2008); GRABER, supra note 5; THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS MIND AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA
(2013); PAUL MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1979);
STONE, supra note 6; JOHN FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN HISTORIES OF AMERICAN
LAW (2007).
8 An important exception is Jeremy Kessler’s recent article, The Administrative Origins of Modern Civil
Liberties Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1083 (2014). Kessler demonstrates that key War Department officials,
including Felix Frankfurter and Newton Baker, were sympathetic to conscientious objectors and sought to
accommodate their claims despite contrary legislative language and substantial resistance from military
personnel. Id. at 1088, 1095. Their efforts to implement administrative accommodations were a crucial
antecedent of one strand of interwar civil libertarianism. Id. at 1090. As Kessler acknowledges, however, many
government officials opposed their lenient attitude toward objectors. Id. This Article highlights the dominant
sentiment among Progressives—including many of Frankfurter and Baker’s own allies—that exemption from
military service threatened social interests. It also emphasizes that the War Department considered
conscientious objection to the taking of human life to raise special concerns, not implicated by moral and
political objection to other government policies. See also CAPOZOLLA, supra note 7, at 55–82 (concluding,
after discussion, that “the objectors were some of twentieth-century America’s first modern citizens” and that
“[w]hat made them distinctive was their assertion of individual rights against the modern state”); RICHARD
POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH (1987)
(discussing Harry Weinberger’s work on behalf of the No-Conscription League). There is, of course, a
substantial literature on conscientious objectors during the First World War that explores issues other than
legal categories and rights claims. See, e.g., GEORGE Q. FLYNN, CONSCRIPTION AND DEMOCRACY: THE DRAFT
IN FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN, AND THE UNITED STATES (2002); GEORGE Q. FLYNN, THE DRAFT, 1940–1973
(1993); H. C. PETERSON & GILBERT C. FITE, OPPONENTS OF WAR, 1917–1918 (Greenwood Press, 1986)
(1957); LILLIAN SCHLISSEL, CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTION IN AMERICA, 1757–1967 (1968); LOUISA THOMAS, CONSCIENCE (2011); R.R. Russell,
Development of Conscientious Objector Recognition in the United States, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 409 (1952);
U.S. Selective Service System, Conscientious Objection (Special Monograph No. 11, 1950).
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disobedience or counseling legislative restraint.9 Nor does the expansive
literature on demands for exemptions from generally applicable laws—an issue
that has recently assumed increased significance10—devote much attention to
the failure of such claims during these formative years of the modern First
Amendment.11
The most intuitive explanations for the divergence in emphasis will not
hold up to scrutiny. One might assume, for example, that the literature has
discounted wartime claims for exemption because they were unsuccessful in
the courts.12 On the whole, however, claims for free speech were just as
unavailing.13 Similarly, one might emphasize that the Free Exercise Clause
was not formally incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus made
applicable to the states, for over two decades after the Armistice.14 But the
9 For example, Samuel Walker attributes “[t]he idea of personally confronting government power
through nonviolent direct action” to the efforts of conscientious objectors during the Second, rather than First,
World War. SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU 151 (2d ed.
1999). On the distinction between secular and religious understandings of freedom of conscience, see infra
note 169 and accompanying text.
10 For discussion of the growth and transformation of exemption claims, see Mary Anne Case, Why
“Live-And-Let-Live” Is Not a Viable Solution to the Difficult Problems of Religious Accommodation in the
Age of Sexual Civil Rights, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 463, 480–82 (2015) (emphasizing shift from accommodation of
beliefs and modes of worship to “religiously motivated differences in how to live”); Douglas NeJaime & Reva
B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J.
2516 (2015) (discussing new prevalence of claims involving complicity in the putatively sinful conduct of
others).
11 In general, scholars have devoted relatively little consideration to legal arguments for exemption
during the years between Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), the 1879 Supreme Court decision
denying Mormons’ First Amendment claim to exemption from a federal anti-bigamy statute, and Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the 1940 case in which the Supreme Court incorporated the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thus rendering
it binding on the states. For example, Kent Greenawalt discusses Reynolds v. United States and then jumps to
Cantwell v. Connecticut after noting, in a single sentence, that “[i]n a series of cases in the 1920s and 1930s,
the Supreme Court rejected claims that conscientious objectors had a free exercise right to avoid military
service.” KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 28 (2006).
Given the stakes of Founding-era “historical understanding,” there is considerably more scholarship on
eighteenth century statutes, debates over constitutional provisions, and early judicial opinions—though
perhaps less than in other areas of constitutional law. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1415 (1990) (“Even opponents of
originalism generally agree that the historical understanding is relevant, even if not dispositive.”); id. at 1414
(noting dearth of historical scholarship on the early understandings of “free exercise,” in contrast to the
Establishment Clause, at the time of publication).
12 See, e.g., 12 WILLIAM WIECEK, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT, 1941–1953, at 213, 220 (2006) (concluding that the Supreme Court “hand[ed] down no
significant religion-clause cases before 1940”).
13 STONE, supra note 6, at 170–82.
14 Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303.
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Selective Service Act (like the Espionage Act) was federal legislation.15 And if
incorporation matters because it enhanced or reflected the perceived
importance of religious liberty, it bears emphasis that the Free Speech Clause
was not incorporated until 1925 (and even then only in dicta)16—two years
after the Court counted the freedom “to worship God according to the dictates
of [one’s] own conscience” among the rights undoubtedly denoted by the term
liberty in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.17
It is tempting, but insufficient, to attribute the disproportionate focus on
expressive freedom to the supposed aberration of wartime speech and press
restrictions, which so troubled Chafee.18 Certainly the scale of official
investment in homogenizing public opinion during World War I produced new
challenges for minorities and dissenters.19 At the same time, there was ample
precedent for suppression of free speech as well as freedom of conscience.
Although both were consistently touted as central features of American
democracy throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, both faced
significant limitations in practice.20 State constitutions often included
protective provisions, but enforcement was left to local discretion, and public
officials routinely policed perceived threats to state security, religious customs,
or social norms. In the domain of religious practice, exemptions were
permitted and occasionally required, but only for influential religious sects and
only under state law.21 Lawyers sometimes defended both radical expression

15

Selective Service Act, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76 (1917); Espionage Act, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1917).
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). The Supreme Court reversed a conviction under a
state criminal syndicalism law based on insufficiency of the evidence in Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
In Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931), which set aside a conviction under California’s red flag
law, the Court reiterated its position that “the conception of liberty under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment embraces the right of free speech.” The Free Press Clause was incorporated in Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931).
17 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
18 Chafee, supra note 1, at 951–52 (arguing that “only once in our history prior to 1917 ha[d] an attempt
been made to apply these doctrines” of bad tendency and presumptive intent, and that “[t]he revival of those
doctrines is a sure symptom of an attack upon the liberty of the press”).
19 See generally CAPOZZOLA, supra note 7; DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR
AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (1980).
20 See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985) (describing weak speechprotective tradition during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries); RABBAN, supra note 5, at 8
(describing the “restrictive prewar judicial tradition”).
21 McConnell, supra note 11, at 1492–503. Philip Hamburger has argued that McConnell overstates the
extent to which Founding-era theorists and judges anticipated the availability even of these limited
exemptions. See also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 120–26 (2008) (reviewing McConnell and Hamburger’s arguments and
evidence and concluding that “accommodations were seen as a good thing, and perhaps in many cases, by
16
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and incursions on conscience by reference to the U.S. Constitution, in terms
that resembled, anachronistically, the understanding of civil liberties that
emerged after the war.22 Such efforts, however, rarely succeeded in the
courts.23 Indeed, the continuity of oppression was a theme of a 1918
conference on American Liberties in War Time.24 “Summarize the outrages
showing that this suppression of liberty is no new affair in American life,” a
conference circular advised.25
In retrospect, of course, the Espionage Act prosecutions, which singled out
speakers for their disfavored viewpoints, present core violations of the First
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. By contrast, the political objectors who
challenged the draft demanded exemption from a generally applicable law on
the basis of ethical disagreement with its objectives—a peripheral free exercise
claim at best. Still, that both sets of claims were doctrinally implausible when
they were raised and both anticipated future advocacy and analysis suggests
that something more than hindsight bias is at work.
In the end, the puzzle may stem primarily from the sources upon which the
modern First Amendment is presumed to rest: the agonized debates among
Progressive theorists and a few esteemed judges over the legitimacy of
majoritarian oppression and the role of the courts. The justification for
constitutional insulation of expressive freedom that emerged after World War I
among liberal academics and some judges imagined free speech as a
prerequisite for democratic legitimacy, essential to robust public debate and to
the informed formulation of government policy.26 It emphasized pluralism in
place of individual autonomy and endorsed free speech to buttress rather than
undermine state power.27 The proponents of this vision remained deeply
ambivalent about the courts and generally hostile to individual rights, though
some accepted a limited role for judicial enforcement of the First
Amendment’s Speech Clause.28 I argue elsewhere that these post-Progressive
many people, as implicit in the notion of religious liberty”). See generally Philip A. Hamburger, The
Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992).
22 See RABBAN, supra note 5, at 26–76.
23 See id. (describing free speech advocacy by the National Defense Association and Free Speech
League, among other groups).
24 Nat’l Civil Liberties Bureau, Circular (Dec. 29, 1917), microformed on American Civil Liberties
Union Records, The Roger Baldwin Years (1917–1950), Reel 1, Vol. 3 [hereinafter ACLU Papers].
25 Id. at 4. It continued, “Refer to the negro, radical movements and labor in the past.” Id.
26 See generally GRABER, supra note 5.
27 I develop this argument in Laura Weinrib, From Public Interest to Private Rights: Free Speech,
Liberal Individualism, and the Making of Modern Tort Law, 34 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 187 (2009).
28 GRABER, supra note 5, at 66–86.
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advocates of expressive freedom were only one component of an interwar civil
liberties coalition that also included conservative defenders of individual
liberty and labor radicals hostile to all manifestations of state power. It was the
Progressives, however, who most cogently articulated their views and who
have therefore dominated subsequent analysis. And those Progressives
declined to endorse a constitutional defense of exemption from generally
applicable laws.
This Article interrogates the relationship between expressive and religious
freedom by shifting our lens to the advocates who resisted wartime repression
on the ground and, occasionally, in the courts. It demonstrates the extent to
which the modern understanding of free speech was bound up, at its inception,
with claims by conscientious objectors for exemption from military service. At
the same time, it argues that these two components of the First Amendment
were understood in starkly different terms, even if they served similar ends. It
focuses on efforts by the American Union Against Militarism (AUAM) and
National Civil Liberties Bureau (NCLB)—the organizational precursors to the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)—to secure exemptions for so-called
“political objectors,” whose opposition to American military involvement in
the First World War stemmed from socialist or radical labor convictions rather
than religious scruples.
Given the formative role played by the interwar ACLU in fashioning the
modern understanding of civil liberties, the NCLB has figured prominently in
histories of the First Amendment, and rightly so. Generations of scholars have
painstakingly documented the NCLB’s early engagements with restrictive
wartime laws and the officials that enforced them.29 Most, however, have read
the vision of the mature ACLU into the operations of its wartime precursor.
They have emphasized the NCLB’s appeal to neutral constitutional principles,
its steadfast defense of the rights of dissenters, independent of its own policy
preferences.30 In so doing, they have exaggerated the continuities between the
NCLB and its interwar heir. They have also inflated the influence of the
29 On the origins of the ACLU, see ROBERT C. COTTRELL, ROGER NASH BALDWIN AND THE AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (2000); DONALD JOHNSON, THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN FREEDOMS: WORLD WAR I
AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (1963); PEGGY LAMSON, ROGER BALDWIN:
FOUNDER OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (1976); WALKER, supra note 9; WITT, supra note 7.
30 E.g., WALKER, supra note 9, at 19–20 (“The dispute that had produced the Civil Liberties Bureau
defined the basic terms of the free speech fight. The principled defense of civil liberties was a two-sided
struggle: It fought the suppression of free speech by government officials and conservative superpatriots, but at
the same time, it rejected liberal pragmatism. The temptation to ignore violations of civil liberties in the name
of pursuing some other worthy social objective was a constant theme in ACLU history.”).
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organization’s wartime work, even as they have understated or misconstrued
the effect of the war on the ACLU’s foundational commitments. The NCLB
had few successes in the courts. Between the spring of 1917 and the following
winter, its leadership drew on a broad range of prewar arguments in its effort to
defend dissenters.31 The classical liberal language of individual rights and the
Progressive commitment to robust public discussion of social problems found
a few sporadic supporters, but both proved inadequate to disrupt the forces of
wartime repression.
Still, amidst all the false starts and dead ends, there was one strand of
argument that proved especially unavailing. Even before American troops
entered combat in Europe, the organizers of the NCLB sought to shield
conscientious objectors from compulsory military service.32 They represented
objectors of all type, but their particular concern was those draftees whose
opposition to military service stemmed from political objections to a capitalist
war. Although such men asserted secular, ethical objections to war, the NCLB
strained to expand the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause to encompass
them. Concurrently, it sought to import a generalized theory of freedom of
conscience into constitutional concepts of freedom of speech and press. The
NCLB claimed that conscripting its clients would impede their liberty of
conscience, and the state was bound to exempt them from forced service to the
state. During the First World War, that was not a tenable position.
The stakes of under-examining exemption claims during the First World
War come more sharply into focus when one observes that scholars have not
ignored wartime advocacy on behalf of conscientious objectors altogether. On
the contrary, histories of civil liberties regularly mention the NCLB’s efforts to
publicize and curtail the military’s mistreatment of conscientious objectors.
But they tend to collapse such endeavors into a broader campaign against the
authoritarian tendencies of the wartime state—a “modern civil liberties
movement” to match the modern First Amendment.33 On this view, religious
freedom may be a core component of the modern First Amendment, but World
War I figures in its lineage only as a precursor to subsequent expansion—the
31
32

II.

LAURA M. WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH (forthcoming 2016).
For elaboration of the NCLB’s attempts to shield conscientious objectors from service, see infra Part

33 E.g., COTTRELL, supra note 29, at 49–50 (“As the United States officially entered the war, the
AUAM . . . . became most concerned about protecting the rights of conscientious objectors and safeguarding
the civil liberties of those who opposed Wilson’s policies. . . . In the process the modern civil liberties
movement was spawned. This was the first sustained effort to safeguard the personal liberties guaranteed
under the Bill of Rights against encroachments by federal or state agents.”).

WEINRIB GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

4/18/2016 2:23 PM

FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE IN WAR TIME

1059

first step along a continuous path curtailing state incursions on the rights of
minorities and dissenters.
In descriptions of the NCLB, there is a pervasive slippage between its
advocacy on behalf of conscientious objectors and its defense of expressive
freedom.34 But while both failed, the former was particularly maligned.
Distaste for the NCLB’s theory among even the founders’ own colleagues
demarcates the boundaries of pluralistic tolerance as a basis for personal rights.
The Progressive theorists who pressed sympathetic judges and liberal scholars
to expand the reach of the First Amendment in the immediate aftermath of the
war had encountered claims to conscience as well as expressive freedom. That
their defense of a countermajoritarian First Amendment extended only to the
latter was a deliberate choice, not a historical accident, and it warrants more
careful attention than the existing literature has afforded it.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I describes the founding and early
operations of the Conscientious Objectors’ Bureau of the AUAM and the
Progressive sympathies of its early leadership. Part II examines the deep
divisions among Progressives with respect to conscientious objection, which
eventually precipitated the creation of the NCLB as an independent entity. Part
III explores the NCLB’s legal and policy arguments and the treatment of its
claims by judges and government officials. Part IV canvases the attitudes
toward liberty of conscience and religious exemptions among liberals and
conservatives during the interwar period and gestures toward the limits of the
Progressive theory of conscience espoused by the NCLB.
The conception of liberty of conscience that the Conscientious Objectors’
Bureau advanced, which it linked to an “Anglo-Saxon tradition” of individual
rights, clashed with Progressive understandings of democratic citizenship and
failed to gain broad-based traction.35 The organization consequently reframed
its defense of political objectors (along with its own title) in terms that
emphasized democratic dissent rather than individual autonomy. Over time,
sympathetic academics and a few judges embraced this Progressive theory of
free speech, which celebrated discursive openness as a mechanism of social
change and justified, rather than cabined, the enlistment of state power on
behalf of social welfare.36
34

See, e.g., POLENBERG, supra note 8, at 79–80.
Infra note 163 and accompanying text.
36 See GRABER, supra note 5, at 2 (describing Zechariah Chafee’s reconceptualization of free speech “as
a functional requirement of democratic government, rather than as an aspect of a more general right of
35
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Despite its central role in promoting the Progressive vision of expressive
freedom to the public and in the courts, the early ACLU largely abandoned it.
Chastened not only by the wartime prosecution of labor radicals but also by
federal involvement in crushing the great coal and steel strikes of 1919, the
ACLU’s founders lost their confidence in state power.37 During the 1920s and
1930s, they engineered the civil liberties consensus reflected in the New Deal
settlement, which melded Progressive enthusiasm for democratic deliberation
with conservatives’ state-skepticism and commitment to judicial review.38 For
decades, however, they failed to convince their Progressive allies to
countenance claims for exemption from generally applicable laws.39 The
implications of their choices are apparent in controversies over the First
Amendment and democratic legitimacy in the context of both expressive and
religious freedom today.40
I. LIBERTY IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
In the fall of 1914, a group of social workers and settlement house directors
gathered informally in New York City to discuss strategies for keeping
America out of the war in Europe.41 Although they came to few definite
conclusions, they sensed a need for an organization uniting the various forces
opposed to American military intervention abroad. First known as the Henry
Street Group, the new body tested a variety of names before settling on the
American Union Against Militarism (AUAM), a label that reflected its twin
goals of “guard[ing] against militarism” and “build[ing] toward world
federation.”42

individual liberty”); RABBAN, supra note 5, at 4 (arguing that “the postwar civil libertarians based their
emerging concern about free speech on its contribution to democracy rather than its status as a natural right of
autonomous individuals”).
37 WEINRIB, supra note 31.
38 Id.; see also Laura Weinrib, Civil Liberties Outside the Courts, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 297.
39 Infra Part IV.
40 Proponents of accommodations have linked their project to the First Amendment. For example, the
“First Amendment Defense Act,” proposed in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), has the stated purpose of “prevent[ing] discriminatory treatment of any
person on the basis of views held with respect to marriage” as a means of “remedying, deterring, and
preventing Government interference with religious exercise in a way that complements the protections
mandated by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” H.R. REP. NO. 2802 (2015).
41 C. ROLAND MARCHAND, THE AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENT AND SOCIAL REFORM, 1898–1918, at
223–25 (1973).
42 Am. Union Against Militarism, Pamphlet, microformed on American Union Against Militarism
Records, 1915–1922, Reel 10:1 (Am. Union Against Militarism) [hereinafter AUAM Papers]. The records are
available in the Swarthmore College Peace Collection.
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The AUAM quickly grew into a large national organization with fifteen
hundred active members.43 Its principal constituency was social workers, but it
also included academics, clergy members, writers, and newspaper editors.
Notable members included Lillian Wald, director of New York’s Henry Street
Settlement House; Paul Kellogg, editor of the social work periodical the
Survey; Jane Addams, founder of Hull House in Chicago; Rabbi Stephen Wise;
Unitarian minister John Haynes Holmes; Oswald Garrison Villard, publisher of
the New York Evening Post and the Nation; and Crystal Eastman, a leader of
the Woman’s Peace Party and future co-founder of the NCLB.44 The
organization’s anti-war message, while by no means universally endorsed, was
a respectable one, and it attracted considerable support within and outside
government.45
In its first years of operation, the AUAM orchestrated a national campaign
against preparedness—a movement that President Woodrow Wilson embraced
in 1915 despite earlier assurances that he would avoid military engagement.46
Mass meetings throughout the country drew huge crowds.47 Organizers
lambasted preparedness but were careful not to criticize the president.48 In fact,
the AUAM exercised considerable influence with both the Wilson
Administration and Congress, and Wilson received an AUAM delegation.49 In
May 1916, Germany pledged to provide adequate warning before attacking
merchant and passenger vessels.50 The following month, Wilson signed the
National Defense Act.51 Although it provided for a significant expansion of the
National Guard, the statute was limited in scope, and the AUAM was gratified
that it did not authorize conscription.52 Meanwhile, diplomatic developments
appeared promising. By the summer of 1916, the AUAM was satisfied with its
successes and considered its work largely accomplished.53

43

JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 5.
Id. at 5–6.
45 Id. at 5.
46 MARCHAND, supra note 41, at 239–45.
47 JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 7.
48 Id.
49 Id. In January 1916, Jane Addams (officially on behalf of the Woman’s Peace Party) addressed the
House Committee on Military Affairs. To Increase the Efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United
States, Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Military Affairs, 64th Cong. 201–12 (1916) (statement of Jane
Addams, Woman’s Peace Party).
50 JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 8.
51 National Defense Act of 1916, ch. 134, 39 Stat. 166.
52 JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 7.
53 In fall 1916, the Board considered disbanding. Id. at 8.
44
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All that changed in February 1917, when Germany resumed unrestricted
submarine warfare on vessels carrying supplies to Britain.54 Suddenly, the
United States was hurtling toward war, and many within the AUAM approved
of the new trajectory. Over the ensuing weeks, the organization scrambled to
redefine its position. Some, like Rabbi Stephen Wise and Oswald Garrison
Villard, thought the change of circumstances warranted reconsideration of the
desirability of war.55 Others, though horrified at the new German policy, were
resolutely against a military solution.56
Norman Thomas, a Presbyterian minister and future leader of the Socialist
Party, proposed a possible strategy. Falling back on a time-worn Progressive
tactic, he urged the AUAM to organize a campaign for a war referendum in
order to persuade government officials that ordinary Americans continued to
oppose intervention.57 As with the suffrage and Prohibition movements, the
“combination of agitation with direction” would arouse the people to action.58
The AUAM pursued the suggestion, apparently unconcerned that popular
support might favor nationalist militancy. Later that month, the executive
committee discussed the agenda for an upcoming meeting with President
Wilson.59 In addition to soliciting the president’s support for a national
referendum, the AUAM delegation would argue that conscription undermined
the national interest.60 But the organization’s efforts were fruitless, and the
march toward war continued.
A few weeks later, an important new recruit joined the AUAM board.
Roger Nash Baldwin arrived in New York City in March 1917 as Crystal
Eastman recovered from a complicated pregnancy.61 Baldwin appeared to be a
perfect replacement. Like Eastman, he had substantial experience in
Progressive reform movements. He had spent ten years in St. Louis, where he
was an active municipal reformer and a leader of myriad Progressive
54

MARCHAND, supra note 41, at 249.
JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 8–9; MARCHAND, supra note 41, at 252.
56 See, e.g., Am. Union Against Militarism, Minutes (Feb. 20, 1917), microformed on AUAM Papers,
supra note 42, Reel 10 (describing Amos Pinchot’s statement, “with the apparent agreement of the committee,
that . . . if anything could stop [Germany], it would be the realization that further provocation might lose her
the friendship of a great neutral power”).
57 Letter from Norman Thomas to the Exec. Comm., Am. Union Against Militarism (Feb. 10, 1917),
microformed on AUAM Papers, supra note 42, Reel 10:1.
58 Id.
59 Am. Union Against Militarism, Minutes (Feb. 27, 1917), microformed on AUAM Papers, supra note
42, Reel 10:1.
60 Id.
61 WITT, supra note 7, at 197.
55
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organizations, including a settlement house, the National Probation Officers
Association, the Civic League, and the St. Louis Committee for Social Service
Among Colored People, the city’s first interracial organization.62 Through
these activities, Baldwin embedded himself in a network of nationally known
social workers whose most prominent representatives, including Jane Addams,
Paul Kellogg, and Lillian Wald, invited him to join the AUAM.63
In his early career, Baldwin had worked to improve rather than
revolutionize existing social and economic conditions. Increasingly, however,
he began to flirt with radical causes. He embarked on a decades-long
correspondence with Emma Goldman and warmed to her anarchist aspirations,
namely, “a society with a minimum of compulsion, a maximum of individual
freedom and of voluntary association, and the abolition of exploitation and
poverty.”64 Inspired by the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), he helped
to create municipal lodging and open a soup kitchen in St. Louis.65 He also
began reading the Masses, a socialist magazine whose editor, Max Eastman,
was Crystal Eastman’s brother.66
As much as his Progressive credentials, his new concern for industrial
inequality fitted Baldwin for the anti-militarism of the AUAM. The leaders of
the AUAM attacked the war effort as a conscious industrial campaign to
undercut domestic reform and to increase international trade.67 Like them,
Baldwin believed that economic interests were responsible for the war; without
the profit motive, American industry would be far less invested in
preparedness.68
In March 1917, Baldwin accepted the AUAM’s invitation to take over
Eastman’s duties.69 When he arrived in New York, the organization lacked a
clear sense of its wartime goals. Working with Norman Thomas,70 Baldwin

62

On Baldwin’s early life, see COTTRELL, supra note 29, at 1–30.
Id. at 48–49.
64 Id. at 31.
65 Id. at 44.
66 Id.
67 MARCHAND, supra note 41, at 45–46.
68 Civil Liberty Def. League, Proposed Press Release, microformed on AUAM Papers, supra note 42,
Reel 10:1; see also MARCHAND, supra note 41, at 244–48.
69 COTTRELL, supra note 29, at 48–49. He had rejected an earlier offer to become the organization’s
secretary, but had headed the St. Louis branch. Id. at 47–48.
70 On the Protestant roots of Thomas’s commitment to individual conscience, see THOMAS, supra note 8,
at 163–78.
63
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focused on securing a statutory exemption for conscientious objectors.71 The
practice of excusing members of the historic peace churches (such as the
Quakers and Mennonites) from military service, generally conditioned on
paying a fine or procuring a substitute, was well established in the United
States.72 What Baldwin and Thomas advocated was, however, far bolder. As
Thomas explained in an August article in the Survey, “the phrase ‘religious
liberty’ [had] come to have meaning and value to mankind,” and religious
objectors were therefore afforded a measure of understanding.73 But in
Thomas’s view, other rationales—including “humanity, respect for personality,
economic considerations of the capitalistic exploitation at the root of all
wars, . . . or ‘common sense’ observation of that failure of war as an efficient
means to progress”—deserved just as much consideration.74
AUAM representatives met with Newton D. Baker, Wilson’s Secretary of
War, who expressed interest in the organization’s position.75 In its
communications with Baker and, subsequently, with members of Congress, the
AUAM cast its defense of conscientious objectors as a “matter not of corporate
but of individual conscience.”76 The organization consistently expressed
concern for the rights of non-religious objectors, including members of “the
Socialist Party, and other political, industrial and pacifist groups,” as well as
unaffiliated individuals who espoused antiwar views.77 It argued that objectors
should be sorted according to their attitudes toward service—that is, whether a
given objector was willing to provide non-combatant service or no service at
all—rather than by motivation, be it religious, economic, or otherwise. For
those who were willing to accept it, the AUAM urged the government to offer
alternative service. Even for the so-called “absolutists,” it pled tolerance,
71

COTTRELL, supra note 29, at 49.
For discussion of military exemption and its limits during the founding period, see McConnell, supra
note 11, at 1500–03; see also Hamburger, supra note 21, at 929–30.
73 Norman M. Thomas, War’s Heretics: A Plea for the Conscientious Objector, SURVEY, Aug. 4, 1917,
at 391, 391–94. On Christian pacifism during World War I, see JOSEPH KIP KOSEK, ACTS OF CONSCIENCE:
CHRISTIAN NONVIOLENCE AND MODERN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 16–48 (2009). The Christian conscientious
objectors emphasized “the freedom of the Christian conscience to follow God wherever he might direct.” Id. at
37.
74 Thomas, supra note 73, at 392.
75 JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 16. On Baker’s service as Secretary of War, see DANIEL R. BEAVER,
NEWTON D. BAKER AND THE AMERICAN WAR EFFORT, 1917–1919 (1966); C.H. CRAMER, NEWTON D. BAKER:
A BIOGRAPHY (1961).
76 E.g., Letter from Lillian Wald, Jane Addams & Norman Thomas to Newton D. Baker, Sec’y, U.S.
Dep’t of War (Apr. 12, 1917), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 3, Vol. 16.
77 Suggestions for Dealing with Men of Conscription Age Who Are Conscientious Objectors to War
(June 28, 1917), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 3, Vol. 16.
72
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“especially if their own normal or voluntary employment is socially
valuable.”78
At Baker’s urging, the Selective Service Act included an exemption from
combatant service for clergy and for members of well-recognized religious
sects opposed to participation in war.79 It authorized local draft boards to
determine whether an individual had established a qualifying religious
affiliation and was therefore eligible for non-combatant service.80 This was a
significant, and unpopular, concession.81 To Baldwin and Thomas, however,
an exemption confined to well-recognized religious sects was worse than no
exemption at all.82 “If the interests of the state are so great that she cannot
permit conscience or conviction to hold sway in the matter of participation in
war, then she should conscript everyone,” they argued.83 By conflating
conscience with sectarian affiliation, the conscription bill misunderstood the
term. “Conscience is individual or it is nothing,” they insisted.84
A few years after the war, Roger Baldwin offered an overview of the
nonsectarian objectors who refused to comply with conscription and who
sought the assistance of the AUAM.85 First, there were “a handful of
religiously minded men imbued with the ‘early Christian’ or Tolstoian faith,”
most of whom also held radical political and economic views.86 Unlike other
political objectors, these men evinced an “inherent reverence for human life”
and opposed physical violence for any purpose, including class war.87 The
majority, however, “accepted the state as an institution,” and (unlike the
anarchists) acknowledged its power to “order them to do what they did not
78

Letter from Lillian Wald et al. to Newton D. Baker, supra note 76.
Selective Service Act of 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 76, 78–80, repealed by Act of June 15, 1917, ch.
29, § 4, 40 Stat. 217, 217; Kessler, supra note 8, at 1097.
80 Selective Service Act of 1917, ch. 15, § 4.
81 CAPOZOLLA, supra note 7, at 55–56 (“With few exceptions, Americans actively opposed draft
exemptions for conscientious objectors.”); see also NAT’L CIVIL LIBERTIES BUREAU, THE FACTS ABOUT
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN THE UNITED STATES 27 (1918) (noting, based on “a considerable mass of
clippings from all over the United States,” that the “average newspaper man” and thus the “average citizen”
regarded conscientious objectors as slackers).
82 For an argument linking religious freedom to equal rights and addressing concerns of this type, see
NUSSBAUM, supra note 21.
83 Letter from Norman Thomas & Roger N. Baldwin to the Conference Comm. on the Army Bill (May 1,
1917), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 3, Vol. 16.
84 Id.
85 Memorandum from Roger N. Baldwin, Am. Civil Liberties Union, to Clarence M. Case, Professor,
State Univ. of Iowa (Apr. 1921), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 23, Vol. 163.
86 Id.
87 Id.
79
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regard as wrong.”88 The second and larger category of nonsectarian objector
comprised the class-conscious socialists, who were willing to comply with the
commands of a working-class, but not a capitalist, state.89
The AUAM’s appeals on behalf of these “political objectors” failed to
persuade either Congress or the War Department. Baker would not budge,
though he promised the AUAM administrative moderation.90 Congress
overwhelmingly rejected amendments proposed by Wisconsin Senator Robert
La Follette and Colorado Representative Edward Keating to broaden the class
of objectors, despite Norman Thomas’s assurances that most conscientious
objectors were engaged in socially useful and often dangerous work on a
voluntary basis.91 While the conscription bills were in conference, Baldwin
tried again, citing British legislation that made the distinction he
recommended.92 His efforts, however, were unsuccessful. As war fervor
intensified, claims to moderation faltered and the AUAM’s popularity “hit
bedrock.”93 On May 18, President Wilson signed the Selective Service Act into
law.94
Baldwin responded by organizing within the AUAM a Bureau for
Conscientious Objectors to assist inductees whose anti-war commitments
88

Id.
Id. Despite the internationalist orientation of many prewar pacifist groups, the “‘philosophy of
internationalism’ played almost no part in determining objection, except as reflected in the international
solidarity of the socialist movement—a purely class concept.” Id. Baldwin was aware of “only three objectors
who rested their case on a broad interpretation of international concord.” Id.
90 JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 17–18. Baldwin sent a telegram to Jane Addams advising her that the
“amendment providing for conscientious objectors will be defeated unless Baker specifically requests its
inclusion.” Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Jane Addams (Apr. 27, 1917), microformed on ACLU Papers,
supra note 24, Reel 3, Vol. 16. At Baldwin’s request, Addams sent Baker a telegram urging him to act. Letter
from Jane Addams to Roger N. Baldwin (May 5, 1917), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 3,
Vol. 16. Baker told Addams that a legislative exemption was unlikely, though he promised to express her view
to the Conference Committee. Id. The alternative he proposed was administrative moderation of the law. Id.
91 55 CONG. REC. 928 (1917) (quoting a memorandum from Norman Thomas).
92 Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to the Senate and House Conferees on the Army Bill (May 2, 1917),
microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 3, Vol. 16. On the treatment of conscientious objectors in
Britain, see JOHN RAE, CONSCIENCE AND POLITICS: THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTOR TO MILITARY SERVICE, 1916–1919 (1970).
93 Letter from C.T. Hale to Members of the Exec. Committee (May 6, 1917), microformed on ACLU
Papers, supra note 24, Reel 3, Vol. 16.
94 Selective Service Act of 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 76, 78–80, repealed by Act of June 15, 1917,
ch. 29, § 4, 40 Stat. 217, 217. The Act provided for three kinds of exemptions: absolute exemption for certain
government officials, ministers, divinity students, and persons already in the military; non-combatant for
members of well-recognized religious sects forbidding participation in war; and a large class who could be
exempted by the president or assigned to “partial military service.” Id. at 78. The law set up local and district
boards to hear claims and appeals. For Baldwin’s arguments to Congress, see THOMAS, supra note 8, at 161.
89
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prevented them from registering for the draft.95 Its board attracted radical
pacifists like Quaker activist L. Hollingsworth Wood, Norman Thomas, and
Scott Nearing, a radical economist and activist who would shortly join the
Socialist Party and lead the People’s Council of America for Democracy and
Peace.96 Some of the most established AUAM members, however, objected to
the extension of the organization’s activity. Several thought it better to
establish an independent body, formally distinct from the AUAM.97 When a
majority of the directing committee voted to endorse Baldwin’s Bureau,98
Lillian Wald and Paul Kellogg contemplated resignation from the organization
they had founded.99
Responding to Wald and Kellogg’s concerns, Eastman mounted a spirited
defense of the new bureau.100 She argued that its program was “liberal” (the
term that was replacing Progressive as the favored label for reformers101), not
“extreme radical.”102 She believed the president had signaled a similarly liberal
95

MARCHAND, supra note 41, at 254.
Id. at 254, 320.
97 Crystal Eastman, Minutes of the Special Meeting (June 1, 1917), microformed on AUAM Papers,
supra note 42, Reel 10:1.
98 Crystal Eastman, Meeting, June 4 (June 4, 1917), microformed on AUAM Papers, supra note 42, Reel
10:1.
99 Letter from Crystal Eastman to the Exec. Comm. (June 14, 1917), microformed on AUAM Papers,
supra note 42, Reel 10:1.
100 Id. Kellogg worried that “an aggressive policy against prosecution of the war” was incompatible with
“an aggressive policy for settling it through negotiation and organizing the world for democracy.” Id. (quoting
Paul Kellogg). Wald believed that the bureau’s new ventures “must inevitably lead to a radical change in the
policy of the Union” and would jeopardize the AUAM’s friendly relationship with the administration as well
as the prospects of “governmental cooperation.” Id. (quoting Lillian Wald).
101 On the shift from progressivism to liberalism, see ALAN BRINKLEY, END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL
LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR 9 (1995) (describing “reform” liberalism as an offshoot of progressivism,
skeptical of laissez-faire principles and committed, through the exercise of state power, to providing all
citizens “a basic level of subsistence and dignity” and protecting “individuals, communities, and the
government itself from excessive corporate power”); JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL
DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870–1920, at 299 (1986)
(defining the “new liberalism” that emerged during the Progressive Era as “a moral and political argument for
the welfare state based on a conception of the individual as a social being whose values are shaped by personal
choices and cultural conditions”). Gary Gerstle has argued that right-leaning Progressives touted cultural
homogeneity and reemerged during the 1920s as “reactionaries.” By contrast, left-leaning Progressives split
into two camps: one, which included the founders of the ACLU, “refused to accept the legitimacy of the war or
the use of government power to legislate conformity”; the other embraced the war effort after the Russian
Revolution and then “suffer[ed] through the disillusionment of Versailles and the domestic repression of
1919,” including the “virulent nativism” that their own efforts at moral improvement helped to spawn, and
subsequently developed a single-minded focus on industrial democracy that swallowed problems of race,
ethnicity, and culture. Gary Gerstle, The Protean Character of American Liberalism, 99 AM. HIST. REV. 1043,
1053–54 (1994).
102 Letter from Crystal Eastman to the Exec. Comm., supra note 99, at 2.
96
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attitude toward enforcement of the Selective Service Act in his appointments to
the War Department, which included Frederick Keppel, dean of Columbia
University, and Progressive ideologue Walter Lippmann.103
Eastman acknowledged that forthright opposition to recruitment would
undermine the AUAM’s influence,104 but she considered assistance for
conscientious objectors to be consistent with the administration’s goals. The
Bureau’s ambition, she concluded, was “to enlist the rank and file of the
people, who make for progressivism the country over, in a movement for a
civil solution of this world-wide conflict and fire them with a vision of the
beginnings of the U.S. of the World.”105 Her Progressive confidence convinced
her that administrative insulation and bureaucratic expertise would lead to the
just execution of the law; she believed that the bureau could in fact help the
president to execute his plan of leniency and deference to individual
conscience.106
To avoid the perception that the AUAM had eschewed its other objectives,
including its foundational ambition of “lead[ing] the liberal sentiment for
peace,” Eastman proposed a structural reorganization.107 She called upon the
AUAM to establish a “legal bureau for the maintenance of fundamental rights
in war time.” Those rights, in Eastman’s estimation, comprised “free press,
free speech, freedom of assembly, and liberty of conscience.”108 Eastman’s
plan, which the board formally enacted in early July, entailed a change in
nomenclature. Rather than a Conscientious Objectors’ Bureau, which
suggested opposition to the administration’s war policy, she suggested a
Bureau for the Maintenance of Civil Liberties.109 The reorganization also
betokened a shift in the bureau’s emphasis: the new bureau would continue to
103

Id.
Id. at 5.
105 Id. at 6 (quoting Paul Kellog).
106 Eastman conceded that if it became clear that Wilson’s underlying intentions were militaristic, “the
American Union Against Militarism must become, deliberately and obviously, the focus for the opposition,” a
turn of events that might precipitate a breakup of the union. Id. at 4. “But,” she asked,
104

[W]hy cross the bridge till we come to it? At present, taking the President at his word and
counting his War Department appointments as in some degree significant, our plans for
defending liberty of conscience, as well as our plans for maintaining free speech, free press, and
free assembly, should logically command the support of those liberal democrats whose avowed
leader the President until recently has been.
Id.

107
108
109

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
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protect conscientious objectors, but it would situate that project within a
broader commitment to personal rights.
The resulting Civil Liberties Bureau framed its wartime agenda as an
inexorable outcrop of the AUAM’s earlier activities. “A Union Against
Militarism becomes, during wartime, inevitably a Union for the Defense of
Civil Liberty,” the organization eventually explained.110 In reality, there was
nothing inevitable about the organization’s change in tack. On the contrary,
both its defense of conscientious objectors and its ensuing expansion into other
aspects of “civil liberty” advocacy were contingent and contested.
Within the AUAM, opposition to the new program stemmed from two
principal sources. The first turned on conservative opposition. The leadership
of the AUAM feared that hawks, patrioteers, and government prosecutors
would equate endorsement of dissenters’ rights with support for their cause, a
slippage that civil liberties advocates would continue to confront in later
years.111 The second obstacle, however, was in many ways more poignant.
Progressives within and outside the AUAM were reluctant even to raise the
banner of rights to undermine state policy and majority will.112
Between the turn of the century and the outbreak of hostilities in Europe,
the Progressive umbrella encompassed a wide and often conflicting array of
projects and policy commitments, from tenement housing laws and municipal
ownership of public utilities to eugenics and prohibition.113 Among the few
features that united these disparate reformers were a deep distrust of the federal
judiciary and an aversion to an individualist breed of constitutional rightsbased claims, which together had operated to defeat many of the most
important Progressive initiatives.114 In place of the autonomous individual, the
110 Am. Union Against Militarism, Proposed Announcement for Press (Sept. 24, 1917), microformed on
AUAM Papers, supra note 42, Reel 10:1.
111 Letter from Crystal Eastman to the Exec. Comm., supra note 99. The ACLU consistently emphasized
that its neutral commitment to civil liberties bore no relation to the substantive views of the speakers it
defended. See, e.g., Transcript of Testimony of Arthur Garfield Hays at 30–31, ACLU v. Casey, microformed
on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 153, Vol. 1051 (“We have defended the right of the Ku Klux Klan to
hold meetings, as well as the right of labor to hold meetings, as well as the right of people who believe in birth
control, as well as the right of negroes to hold meetings in the south. We all over the country have defended
the right of free assemblage of everybody, no matter what they believed in.”).
112 GRABER, supra note 5, at 65–66.
113 On the meaning of progressivism, see Peter Filene, An Obituary for “The Progressive Movement,”
22 AM. Q. 20 (1970); Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, REVS. AM. HIST., Dec. 1982, at 113.
114 Rodgers, supra note 113, at 124 (describing a revolt against “a particular set of formal fictions
traceable to Smith, Locke, and Mill—the autonomous economic man, the autonomous possessor of property
rights, the autonomous man of character”).
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Progressives championed the common good. Roscoe Pound, the architect of
sociological jurisprudence, was emblematic of the dominant view. Pound
believed that the crucial task of legal doctrine was to “free individual
capacities in such a way as to make them available for the development of the
general happiness or common good”;115 individual beliefs warranted protection
only to the extent that they promoted the public welfare.116
For the AUAM leadership and many other Progressives, aversion to
rights-based individualism was fundamentally bound up with the struggle
between labor and capital. In their view, classical legal thinkers and, more to
the point, judges, had defended private property because of a misguided belief
in natural rights.117 The Progressives, by contrast, regarded the allocation of
wealth as a social function and the protection of property as a political and
legal contingency.118 Under appropriate circumstances, security in property
and personal effects might serve the social welfare. But other economic
policies were equally advisable, including a living wage (which would enhance
political participation)119 and collective bargaining (which would counter the
consolidation of wealth).120
The widespread desire to moderate the class struggle and promote social
harmony was a central motivation for Progressive reform.121 Bolstered by the
high cost of workplace tragedies, including the Monongah Mining disaster and
the Triangle Shirtwaist fire, Progressive proposals proliferated during the early
twentieth century. States and, in some cases, federal laws reached such issues

115

Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality (pt. 1), 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 347 (1915).
Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality (pt. 2), 28 HARV. L. REV. 445, 453–54 (1915) (“[W]e have
been accustomed to treat the matter [of free speech] from the standpoint of the individual interest.
Undoubtedly there is such an interest, and there is the same social interest in securing it as in securing other
individual interests of personality. . . . But this feeling may have an important social interest behind it. For the
individual interest in free belief and opinion must always be balanced with the social interest in the security of
social institutions and the interest of the state in its personality.”).
117 ELDON J. EISENACH, THE LOST PROMISE OF PROGRESSIVISM 187 (1994).
118 Id.
119 Id. at 193.
120 See, e.g., HERBERT CROLY, PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY (1914). In support of labor unions, Herbert
Croly characteristically argued that the social web of industrial organization would turn individual workers
into “enlightened, competent, and loyal citizens of an industrial commonwealth.” Id. at 379; see also LEON
FINK, PROGRESSIVE INTELLECTUALS AND THE DILEMMAS OF DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENT (1997); SHELTON
STROMQUIST, REINVENTING “THE PEOPLE”: THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, THE CLASS PROBLEM, AND THE
ORIGINS OF MODERN LIBERALISM (2006); CLARENCE E. WUNDERLIN, VISIONS OF A NEW INDUSTRIAL ORDER:
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND LABOR THEORY IN AMERICA’S PROGRESSIVE ERA (1992).
121 See STROMQUIST, supra note 120, at 4 (describing Progressive emphasis on “class harmony”).
116
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as workplace safety, minimum wage, maximum hours, and workers’
compensation.122
Measures to buttress organized labor met with more resistance, but labor
advocates too managed a few successes.123 Among their notable achievements
was the Manly Report of the United States Commission on Industrial
Relations, issued in the summer of 1915, which documented a pattern of
industrial and government collusion to infringe the rights of labor—a set of
rights that advocates defined in collective rather than individual terms.124
Created at the instigation of the very same Progressive social workers who
founded the AUAM,125 the Commission was initiated under William Howard
Taft but executed under Wilson.126 Although it included industry and public
representatives in addition to labor, its overall composition skewed left, and its
two years of hearings were far friendlier to labor than industry.127 Among the
hundreds of witnesses who testified was ACLU co-founder Crystal Eastman,
who told the Commission that women “must raise their wages as men have
raised their wages, by organization.”128 When the testimony concluded, each
122 See, e.g., STROMQUIST, supra note 120; JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC (2004);
Rodgers, supra note 113.
123 President Theodore Roosevelt made a few concessions to unions, conditioned on their good behavior.
Although he countenanced neither class-consciousness nor the redistribution of wealth, his attitude satisfied
moderate labor leaders like John Mitchell, president of the United Mine Workers of America, who came to
regard the state as an essential tool of labor reform. MARC KARSON, AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS AND POLITICS,
1900–1918, at 90 (1958). The Woodrow Wilson Administration was somewhat more accommodating.
Although he harbored real reservations about organized labor, Wilson’s many pro-labor appointees ensured
union representation in policymaking and in the resolution of particular labor disputes. By most accounts,
Wilson abandoned his earlier anti-union sentiments in the interest of political expediency. See, e.g., KATHLEEN
DALTON, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: A STRENUOUS LIFE 402 (2002); ARTHUR S. LINK, WILSON: THE ROAD TO
THE WHITE HOUSE 527 (1947); JOSEPH A. MCCARTIN, LABOR’S GREAT WAR: THE STRUGGLE FOR INDUSTRIAL
DEMOCRACY AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICAN LABOR RELATIONS, 1912–1921, at 15–16 (1997).
124 U.S. COMM’N ON INDUS. RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT AND TESTIMONY SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS BY
THE COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, S. DOC. NO. 415, vol. 1, at 17 (1st Sess. 1916) [hereinafter
Manly Report] (report of Basil M. Manly).
125 See WEINRIB, supra note 31.
126 GRAHAM ADAMS, JR., AGE OF INDUSTRIAL VIOLENCE, 1910–15: THE ACTIVITIES AND FINDINGS OF THE
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 25–74 (1966).
127 Id. at 74.
128 S. DOC. NO. 415, vol. 11, at 10,782 (testimony of Crystal Eastman). Eastman appeared in her capacity
as an executive board member of the Congressional Union for Woman’s Suffrage. Id. at 10,781. Eastman was
also appointed to the Commission’s research division in 1913 to “take up the constitutional and legal aspects
of industrial relations, the courts and the workers.” Industrial Relations Statistics or a Program?, SURVEY,
Nov. 8, 1931, at 152, 152. Although Eastman’s appointment was reported, I have been unable to find any
mention of it in her papers, nor is it more than mentioned in the secondary literature. E.g., 2 Katja
Wuestenbecker, Crystal Eastman, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD WAR I: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND
MILITARY HISTORY 385, 385–86 (Spencer C. Tucker ed., 2005).
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camp issued its own findings, but the report endorsed by Commission
Chairman Frank P. Walsh was strongly pro-labor and called for “drastic”
changes in the allocation of wealth and federal protection of unions’ right to
collective bargaining as well as federal provisions for social insurance.129
Walsh boasted that it was “more radical than any report upon industrial
subjects ever made by any government agency.”130 Baldwin, who knew Walsh
from his work on juvenile justice, told him that the report would “do more to
educate public opinion to the truth of existing conditions than any other one
document in existence.”131
Accomplishments like these bolstered Progressive confidence in state
power. By the mid-1910s, even organized labor had warmed to government
intervention.132 One branch of government, however, consistently stood in the
way of progress: again and again, the judiciary undercut reformers’ most
significant gains. The most notorious example, and a powerful Progressive
rallying cry, was the Supreme Court’s decision in Lochner v. New York, which
invalidated a New York maximum-hours law because it interfered with an
implicit constitutional “right of free contract.”133 Pet Progressive projects like
the minimum wage, the eight-hour day, and workers’ compensation all died at
judicial hands.134 And yet, the invalidation of state legislation was neither the
129

See generally Manly Report, supra note 124.
MELVYN DUBOFSKY, THE STATE AND LABOR IN MODERN AMERICA 55 (1994). On the tensions within
progressivism between class-conscious labor advocates like Walsh and advocates of class reconciliation, see
STROMQUIST, supra note 120, at 165–90. On the Commission on Industrial Relations, see generally ADAMS,
supra note 126.
131 COTTRELL, supra note 29, at 45. He was especially impressed by the testimony of Theodore Schroeder
with respect to the suppression of workers’ speech. Id.
132 Unions worried that protective labor laws and state intervention in labor disputes would undermine
union power. NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 11–12 (2002).
Although the American Federation of Labor publicly championed “voluntarism”—the notion that labor
activity should and did take place outside the realm of state power—labor historians have demonstrated that
Samuel Gompers and his cohort used government adeptly when it suited their agenda. Nick Salvatore,
Introduction to SAMUEL GOMPERS, SEVENTY YEARS OF LIFE AND LABOR: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY xxii–xxiii,
xxxv (ILR Press, Nick Salvatore ed., 1984) (1925). For discussion of the deep ties between President Wilson
and organized labor, see DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR: THE WORKPLACE, THE
STATE, AND AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVISM, 1865–1925, at 363–69 (1987); Salvatore, supra, at xxxv–xxxvii.
Indeed, Wilson’s secretary of labor was a former official of the UMW and openly favored the cause of labor.
ARTHUR S. LINK, WILSON: THE NEW FREEDOM 19 (1956).
133 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905). Notwithstanding revisionist claims about popular reaction to Lochner in the
immediate aftermath of the case, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2011), it is clear that by the 1910s Progressive antipathy
toward the case had crystallized.
134 The Commission on Industrial Relations assembled a long list of statutes invalidated by courts on
constitutional grounds. Representative examples include statutes requiring statement of cause of discharge,
130
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most pervasive judicial device nor the most damaging to organized labor. In
the decades before World War I, employers (and organizations of employers,
such as the National Association of Manufacturers) justified their open shop
policies by reference to individual rights; closed shops, they argued, abridged
workers’ freedom by conditioning employment on their obligation to join the
union.135 Moreover, they argued that yellow-dog contracts prohibiting workers
from joining unions protected individual rights by linking workers’ duties to
those which they had voluntarily assumed.136 Courts agreed on both fronts, and
with a handful of exceptions, they proved ready and willing to enjoin
“coercive” labor practices—particularly efforts by workers to conduct boycotts
or to dissuade strike-breakers.137
The “labor injunction” quickly became the first line of defense for
beleaguered employers.138 Judges often issued ex parte restraining orders
unsupported by evidence of illegal behavior.139 Meanwhile, in Gompers v.
Buck’s Stove & Range Co.,140 the U.S. Supreme Court held boycotts to be
enjoinable under the Sherman Act, rejecting the AFL’s argument that
publication of its “do not patronize” list was protected by the First
Amendment.141 This ruling came just three years after the Court struck down
the Erdman Act’s prohibition on yellow-dog contracts as an unconstitutional

prohibiting blacklisting, protecting members of labor unions, restricting the power of courts to grant
injunctions, setting wages in public works, fixing time for payment of wages, and prohibiting or regulating
company stores. Manly Report, supra note 124, at 44.
135 See generally DANIEL R. ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO
CORPORATE LIBERALISM (1995); WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT (1991).
136 The Supreme Court invalidated a state anti-yellow-dog statute on that basis in Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915) (“Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private property—partaking of
the nature of each—is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of property. Chief among such contracts is
that of personal employment, by which labor and other services are exchanged for money or other forms of
property. If this right be struck down or arbitrarily interfered with, there is a substantial impairment of liberty
in the long established constitutional sense. The right is as essential to the laborer as to the capitalist, to the
poor as to the rich, for the vast majority of persons have no other honest way to begin to acquire property save
by working for money.”); see also Daniel Ernst, The Yellow-Dog Contract and Liberal Reform, 1917–1932,
30 LAB. HIST. 251, 268–70 (1989).
137 E.g., Transcript of Record at 627, Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., No. 372 (D.D.C. Dec. 23,
1908) (“[T]he labor unions and [their] officers meddle into a member’s daily affairs deeper than does the law;
restrict him in matters that the law leaves free . . . .”). For an early discussion of the dominant approach and its
exceptions, see Note, Strikes and Boycotts, 34 HARV. L. REV. 880 (1921).
138 FORBATH, supra note 135, at 59.
139 Id. at 99, 193.
140 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
141 Id. at 438–39.
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infringement on workers’ freedom of contract under the Fifth Amendment,142 a
holding that it applied to state anti-yellow-dog laws in 1915.143
The judiciary’s obstinacy on these issues, and its broader hostility to public
regulation, threatened to undermine the Progressive reform agenda—and so
Progressives railed against the judicial construction of the autonomous
individual.144 The liberty of an isolated worker to bargain over the conditions
of his (or, increasingly, her145) labor blinked the reality of the modern labor
market. By invoking formal rights in service of private property, classical
legalism exacerbated social tensions.146 According to Roscoe Pound, this
blindness to law’s practical effects was one major problem with the Lochnerera judiciary. As Roscoe Pound observed, “There may be a compulsion in fact
when there is none in law.”147 A second, related problem was the propensity of
the courts to “exaggerate private right at the expense of public interest,”
without taking social circumstances into account.148
These developments were a central presence in the lives and careers of the
members of the AUAM. Most were actively involved in some aspect of
improving workers’ lives. Jane Addams famously worked to mitigate class
injustice through social work, legislative reform, and, sometimes, union
activity.149 Lillian Wald (as well as Addams) helped to found the Women’s
142

Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172 (1908). The Commission on Industrial Relations noted
the inconsistency between the decisions in the Debs case, wherein it is held that the control of
Congress over interstate commerce is so complete that it may regulate the conduct of the
employees engaged therein to the extent of enjoining them from going on a sympathetic strike, and
the decision in the Adair case, wherein it is held that Congress has so little power over the conduct
of those engaged in interstate commerce that it can not constitutionally forbid employers engaged
therein discharging their employees merely because of membership in a labor union.

Manly Report, supra note 124, at 45.
143 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 13 (1915).
144 The phenomenon was not limited to cases affecting labor disputes and labor protections. Indeed, the
judiciary in the United States “was notorious as a graveyard for social-political initiatives.” DANIEL T.
RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE 58 (1998).
145 The Supreme Court declined to extend that liberty to women in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908), in which it upheld a maximum hour law applicable to women. In Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261
U.S. 525 (1923), however, the Court struck down federal minimum wage legislation for women on the
grounds that it unconstitutionally infringed on liberty of contract.
146 In their influential book Ethics, John Dewey and James Hayden Tufts explained, “[I]t is the possession
by the more favored individuals in society of an effectual freedom to do and to enjoy things with respect to
which the masses have only a formal and legal freedom, that arouses a sense of inequity.” JOHN DEWEY &
JAMES H. TUFTS, ETHICS 439 (1908).
147 Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 463 (1909).
148 Id. at 461.
149 LOUISE W. KNIGHT, CITIZEN: JANE ADDAMS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY 213 (2005).
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Trade Union League.150 Florence Kelley established the National Consumers’
League and drafted the brief on which the influential “Brandeis Brief” in
Muller v. Oregon was modeled.151 The list goes on. All were attentive to the
advantages of state cooperation and the pitfalls of judicial intervention.
Probably, all were skeptical of individual rights.
The experiences of Crystal Eastman, the AUAM’s executive secretary, are
illustrative. A reformist by upbringing, Eastman was trained as a lawyer but
unable, as a woman, to find work as a practicing attorney.152 Instead, she spent
her early career in sociological research. She had studied political economy at
Columbia before switching to law, and between 1908 and 1910 she applied
both sets of skills in her evaluation of industrial accidents in New York.153 Her
analysis as secretary of the Wainwright Commission, which was created by the
New York legislature to study the law of workplace accidents, steered the
state’s legislative effort to a new, no-fault compensatory system in lieu of the
outmoded tort rules of employer liability.154 But the high court of New York
struck down the workers’ compensation law Eastman helped to craft as a
violation of employers’ property rights.155
For Eastman and her colleagues, the decision to aid the cause of
anti-militarism by invoking constitutional rights to inhibit state power was a
remarkable development. The AUAM’s leadership saw the state as an ally in
the struggle against industrial inequality, and individual rights—especially
judicially enforceable ones—as threats to democracy. It is not enough to assert
that the defense of conscientious objectors grew out of the AUAM’s opposition
to war. Espousing a theory of individual autonomy threatened to prop up the
very constitutional regime that the organization’s founders habitually decried.

150 On the Women’s Trade Union League, see, for example, NANCY SCHROM DYE, AS EQUALS AND AS
SISTERS: FEMINISM, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND THE WOMEN’S TRADE UNION LEAGUE OF NEW YORK
(1980); Allen F. Davis, The Women’s Trade Union League: Origins and Organization, 5 LAB. HIST. 3 (1964);
Diane Kirby, “The Wage-earning Woman and the State”: The National Women’s Trade Union League and
Protective Labor Legislation, 1903–1923, 28 LAB. HIST. 54 (1987).
151 KATHRYN KISH SKLAR, FLORENCE KELLEY AND THE NATION’S WORK: THE RISE OF WOMEN’S
POLITICAL CULTURE, 1830–1900, at 147–48, 255–64 (1995).
152 WITT, supra note 7, at 166.
153 CRYSTAL EASTMAN, WORK-ACCIDENTS AND THE LAW (1910); WITT, supra note 7, at 170.
154 WITT, supra note 7, at 169–70.
155 Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry., 94 N.E. 431, 439 (N.Y. 1911). New York subsequently amended its constitution
to authorize workers’ compensation. 1914 N.Y. Laws 216.
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II. THE LIMITS OF CONSCIENCE
In June 1917, the AUAM announced its “war time program.”156 Its second
objective, “a just and lasting peace,” was the organization’s standard fare.157 It
called for a clear statement of America’s peace terms and publication of
international agreements, and it aspired toward “world federation” once
hostilities ceased.158 Roger Baldwin, however, had a different and more
immediate program in mind. His project, developed in cooperation with
Crystal Eastman, fell under the heading “against militarism.”159 It entailed
opposition to the permanent establishment of conscription, legal advice to
conscientious objectors, and above all, the preservation of “civil liberty in war
time.”160
In other work, I explore Progressives’ gradual embrace of
countermajoritarian constitutionalism over the course of the 1920s and 1930s. I
also examine the ACLU’s rehabilitation of the courts as a forum for
Progressive change.161 Here, I take up an antecedent question: namely, the
AUAM’s brief flirtation with exemption claims grounded in freedom of
conscience, and its subsequent retreat to other, more palatable personal rights.
The AUAM experimented with various justifications for exemption from
military service. Sometimes, it cast liberty of conscience as an individual right
(conscience is “nothing if it is not individual,” it explained162). Eschewing the
ordinary Progressive emphasis on public utility, it conjured an “Anglo-Saxon
tradition for which our ancestors fought and died.”163 It linked this
commitment to the “free exercise of religion according to the dictates of creed
and conscience,” which it cast as an “established and cherished right.”164

156 Past Programes of the American Union Against Militarism (for reference), microformed on AUAM
Papers, supra note 42, Reel 10:1.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 WEINRIB, supra note 31; Laura M. Weinrib, From Left to Rights: Civil Liberties Lawyering Between
the Wars, in LAW, CULTURE AND THE HUMANITIES (forthcoming 2016); Laura M. Weinrib, From Public
Interest to Private Rights: Free Speech, Liberal Individualism, and the Making of Modern Tort Law, 34 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 187 (2009); Laura M. Weinrib, The Sex Side of Civil Liberties: United States v. Dennett and the
Changing Face of Free Speech, 30 L. & HIST. REV. 325 (2012).
162 AM. UNION AGAINST MILITARISM, CONSCRIPTION AND THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR TO WAR (May
1917), microformed on AUAM Papers, supra note 42, Reel 10:2.
163 Id.
164 NAT’L CIVIL LIBERTIES BUREAU, supra note 81, at 3.
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The extent to which the tradition the AUAM described was respected in
practice is, of course, a contentious question.165 Certainly, appeals to freedom
of conscience had strong colonial roots, but it seems unlikely that Foundingera judges and politicians anticipated judicial carve-outs of the kind the
Supreme Court created in the twentieth century.166 As a matter of legislative
dispensation and prosecutorial non-enforcement, by contrast, exemptions from
generally applicable laws probably occurred with some regularity.167 In fact,
the principal example was exemption from military service, which many
statutes and state constitutions provided—contingent on payment or substitute
service—despite opposition from dominant religious groups.168 Still, it is
reasonably clear that the historic case for exemptions was premised on
denominational affiliation or, at least, religious belief.169 With few exceptions,
proponents of exemptions described a tension between competing spheres of
sovereignty, worldly and spiritual, not the preservation of individual autonomy
against the encroachment of state power.170
165

See Nathan S. Chapman, Disentangling Conscience and Religion, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1457, 1464–71,
for an overview of the literature.
166 See, e.g., Hamburger, supra note 21, at 918. For scholarship on the founding period, see, for example,
NUSSBAUM, supra note 21, at 84–114, 120–30; DAVID SEHAT, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
(2011); 12 WIECEK, supra note 12, at 203–49, 205 (reviewing “the ‘prehistory’ of religion-clause
jurisprudence”); McConnell, supra note 11.
167 McConnell, supra note 11, at 1468–69.
168 Hamburger, supra note 21, at 929 n.65.
169 JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT:
ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 39 (2000); Kent Greenawalt, The Significance of Conscience, 47 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 901, 901 (2010); McConnell, supra note 11, at 1492–503. A few Founding-era thinkers, and a
fair number of later ones, have sought to decouple exemptions from religion, either for policy reasons or on
Establishment Clause grounds. James Madison may have held such a view. See Sehat, supra note 166, at
31–50; see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 21, at 97–104 (describing the various drafts of the Free Exercise
Clause and observing that the Framers may have seen little difference between the terms “conscience” and
“religion”). For later examples, see DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986);
Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and Religious Exemptions, 15 LEGAL THEORY 215
(2009). Other scholars reject the favored treatment of religious claims to exemption and argue that the state
need not accommodate either religious or secular claims of conscience in the context of generally applicable,
non-persecutory laws. E.g., BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2012); Case, supra note 10;
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is
Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1994). In Liberty of Conscience, Martha Nussbaum advocates the
intermediate solution of “defend[ing] at least some accommodations as constitutionally required, and many
other legislative accommodations as permissible,” while “mitigat[ing] the unfairness to nonreligious searchers
as much as we possibly can, by extending the account of religion as far as we can, compatibly with
administrability.” NUSSBAUM, supra note 21, at 173; cf. GREENAWALT, supra note 11.
170 McConnell, supra note 11, at 1497. In fact, “[l]iberty could only be obtained by submission to the civil
laws of civil government.” Hamburger, supra note 21, at 936. On the other hand, Founding-era thinkers
typically shared a Protestant understanding of individual, not institutional, accountability with respect to
personal salvation. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U.
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And yet, by the 1910s (when references to “conscience” in the Survey were
routinely preceded by the modifier “public”171), arguments for exemption
smacked suspiciously of Lochner-style individual rights. When conservatives
denounced the administration’s incursions on civil liberty—as they did often
during the war—they cited purported abuses of property rights as distinguished
from personal rights.172 Nonetheless, their language invoked the state’s
interference with “individual freedom” and its intrusion on “intimate
concerns.”173 As Norman Thomas observed, the same conservatives who
accused conscientious objectors of antisocial attitudes were “rampant
individualists” who regularly rejected proposals for the “conscription of
wealth.”174
Conservatives were not alone in attacking state power. Over the previous
decade, anarchists and free lovers had seized on state-skeptical
constitutionalism, as well. Just months before passage of the Selective Service
Act, Margaret Sanger ambitiously if unavailingly went so far as to challenge
birth control laws for infringing her “absolute right of enjoyment of intercourse
unless the act be so conducted that pregnancy be the result”—a restriction she
deemed incompatible with “her free exercise of conscience and pursuit of
happiness.”175 Lawyers for the Free Speech League, founded in 1902, had
pursued constitutional litigation as well as publicity and political persuasion to
advance the free speech cause.176 Its head, Theodore Schroeder, championed
such “personal liberties” as Sunday regulations, public expenditures by
religious institutions, the suppression of secularists and free-thought lecturers,
L. REV. 346, 373 (2002). Recent historical work “challenge[s] the notion that institutional autonomy was a
meaningful or common concern among early Americans or their governments,” and “[g]overnment
involvement in disputes over the rights of religious institutions traditionally protected individual conscience
rather than institutional autonomy.” Sarah Barringer Gordon, The First Disestablishment: Limits on Church
Power and Property Before the Civil War, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 307, 313, 372 (2014).
171 E.g., Tariff Revision and Wage Cuts, SURVEY, May 24, 1913, at 261, 261 (“The public conscience
demands that they work under healthy conditions.”); Potlach vs. Sociology, SURVEY, July 26, 1913, at 542,
543 (“[T]he public conscience is waking up.”).
172 See WEINRIB, supra note 31. For example, the president of the American Bar Association denounced
the government’s wartime abridgment of civil liberty by reference to “fixing hours of labor and rates of
wages.” Walter George Smith, Civil Liberty in America, 4 A.B.A. J. 551, 558, 560 (1918).
173 Smith, supra note 172, at 560.
174 Thomas, supra note 73, at 393. By contrast, even the “most individualistic” of the conscientious
objectors “favor[ed] increased social control of property.” Id. He explained: “In order to defend our economic
system they are . . . more tender in their treatment of money and profit, which have no conscience, than of the
deepest convictions of men.” Id.
175 People v. Byrne, 163 N.Y.S. 682, 687 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
176 For example, in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907), it sought unsuccessfully to undermine the
common law “bad tendency” test. Id.

WEINRIB GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

4/18/2016 2:23 PM

FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE IN WAR TIME

1079

land gifts to sectarian institutions, Bible study in the public schools, and tax
exemptions for church property.177 Although it never won a significant victory
in court,178 the League pushed some Progressives to question whether a First
Amendment trump on legislative will might occasionally serve useful ends.179
Notably, it justified free speech by reference to personal autonomy as well as
social utility and the greater good.180
For most Progressives, however, democratic citizenship was ultimately a
collective endeavor, and society could not afford to countenance the selfish
exercise of individual rights. “True liberty,” according to one prominent
Progressive theologian, “mean[t] the voluntary sacrifice of self for the common
life.”181 Thus, the AUAM was hard pressed to square conscientious objection
to war with the Progressive worldview. In its pamphlets and publications, the
organization claimed that liberty of conscience was a means toward “social
progress.”182 It subsequently explained that “[p]rogress begins with unpopular
minorities, and we endanger society when we imprison heretics and
agitators.”183 It endorsed an account by British economist John A. Hobson,
who argued that state-enforced conformism would lead to “despotism” and
encourage uncritical submission to arbitrary rule.184 It also reprinted the work
177 Letter from Theodore Schroeder to Roger N. Baldwin (Dec. 4, 1917), microformed on ACLU Papers,
supra note 24, Reel 1, Vol. 3; see also Letter from Theodore Schroeder to Roger N. Baldwin (Nov. 27, 1917),
microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 1, Vol. 3 (“[Y]our proposed inviting members suggest the
possible narrowing of the issues to economic liberty with a maximum Pacifist leaning. This seems to me to
involve a possible neglect of the more personal liberties which are being very much invaded.”). On the
League’s activities, see RABBAN, supra note 5, at 64–175.
178 RABBAN, supra note 5, at 2, 25.
179 Id. at 76.
180 Id. at 23–25.
181 EISENACH, supra note 117, at 189 (quoting Samuel Zane Batten).
182 Letter from Norman Thomas & Roger N. Baldwin to the Conference Comm. on the Army, supra note
83.
183 NAT’L CIVIL LIBERTIES BUREAU, A SYMPATHETIC STRIKE IN PRISON (New York, undated) (on file
with Swarthmore College Library, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Records of American Civil Liberties
Union, Box 1). A similar impulse motivated Norman Thomas’s insistence in the New Republic that “[m]en
who are sure that this is a war for democracy and that the conscientious objector is wrong cannot so distrust
the people as to believe that the autocratic method of coercion of conscience is either necessary or defensible.”
Norman Thomas, Conscientious Objector Replies, NEW REPUBLIC, July 7, 1917, at 274, 275; see also The
Religion of Free Men, NEW REPUBLIC, May 26, 1917, at 110 (“To keep alive genuine tolerance in war time is
the greatest single achievement to which rationalists can dedicate themselves. . . . An excess of power permits
certain anti-social men to wield with utter unscrupulousness the whole machinery of anti-humanism, of which
by the sheer accident of circumstance they happen to be gaining possession at this critical time.”).
184 John A. Hobson, The World Safe for Democracy, reprinted from SURVEY, June 29, 1918 (on file with
Swarthmore College Library, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Records of American Civil Liberties
Union, Box 1).
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of Norman Angell, whose essay Why Freedom Matters justified conscientious
objection as an exercise in pluralism.185 Angell urged the interrogation of all
sacred institutions, including private property, and asked why wealth was
protected when human life was “forfeit to the safety of the State.”186 Invoking
“utility” rather than “any conception of abstract ‘right’—jus, droit, recht,” he
enjoined the state to protect the “right of individual conscience to the
expression of its convictions,” the “right of the heretic to his heresy.”187 By
exercising private judgment, Angell argued, citizens would also develop their
public judgment.188 Society as a whole would benefit by tolerating a diversity
of beliefs.
At first, the AUAM found fertile ground for such arguments in some
Progressive circles, which promoted tolerance on the basis of cultural
pluralism as well as state security (unwilling soldiers, after all, were bad for
morale and unreliable in battle). The president had assured Americans that the
draft was “in no sense a conscription of the unwilling.”189 In that spirit, the
New Republic—which, in Crystal Eastman’s estimation, was practically “the
administration’s own organ”190—emphasized the “democratic purposes”
underlying conscription.191 The draft was intended to introduce efficiency into
military organization, not to “coerc[e] unwilling minorities into the firing line”;
“show[ing] every consideration to conscientious objectors” had never been
more essential.192 Within the War Department, some important officials
agreed,193 though it bears emphasis that they promoted tolerance as a matter of
legislative or administrative accommodation, not a trump on democratic
processes imposed by judicial decree.
To a considerable extent, “lenient administration of the Conscription Act”
was what the AUAM was after.194 It is no surprise, then, that the organization
initially pursued a cooperative strategy. In an era when government lacked
information about its citizens, many men—perhaps as many as three million—
185

See NORMAN ANGELL, WHY FREEDOM MATTERS (Nat’l Civil Liberties Bureau 1919) (1918).
Id. at 15.
187 Id. at 16.
188 Id. at 6.
189 President Woodrow Wilson, Proclamation 1370 (May 18, 1917), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
?pid=65403; Letter from Crystal Eastman to the Exec. Comm., supra note 99.
190 Letter from Crystal Eastman to the Exec. Comm., supra note 99.
191 The Success of Selective Service, NEW REPUBLIC, June 9, 1917, at 148, 149.
192 Id.
193 Jeremy Kessler has connected this accommodationist strain among War Department officials to
Progressives’ endorsement of national self-determination. Kessler, supra note 8, at 1115.
194 Letter from Crystal Eastman to the Exec. Comm., supra note 99.
186
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evaded the draft by declining to register.195 Somewhat reluctantly, the AUAM
advised objectors to take a different and riskier course: to register and to state
their grounds for requesting exemption.196 As one AUAM statement put it
(somewhat ambivalently), “Obedience to law, to the utmost limit of
conscience” was “the basis of good citizenship.”197 And according to the
AUAM, conscientious objectors were model citizens. Few of them desired to
save their own souls at the expense of national security, Norman Thomas
emphasized.198 Rather, the typical objector believed “that his religion or his
social theory in the end can save what is precious in the world far better
without than with this stupendously destructive war.”199
To most Progressives, however, such judgments were properly assigned to
representative government, not the vagaries of individual preferences or the
dictates of sectarian scruples.200 By June, the esteemed historian and
philosopher Arthur O. Lovejoy expressed a view held by many Progressives
when, writing in the New Republic, he ascribed to conscientious objectors an
“anti-social attitude and mode of conduct.”201 One month later, John Dewey
chose the same forum for his article Conscience and Compulsion, in which he
indicted evangelical Protestantism for “locat[ing] morals in personal feelings
instead of in the control of social situations.”202 Consistent with the
Progressive attack on legal formalism, Dewey also blamed the American legal
tradition, which had “bred the habit of attaching feelings to fixed rules and
injunctions instead of to social conditions and consequences of action as these
are revealed to the scrutiny of intelligence.”203 A “more social and less
195 CAPOZZOLA, supra note 7, at 30. These “slackers” were not captured within the small number of
official conscientious objectors. On the ensuing “slacker raids,” see id. at 41–53. According to the NCLB, only
a “small proportion” of those who failed to register were motivated by “genuinely conscientious scruples
against participation in war.” NAT’L CIVIL LIBERTIES BUREAU, supra note 81, at 15.
196 Am. Union Against Militarism, Statement (May 23, 1917), microformed on AUAM Papers, supra note
42, Reel 10:1 (concluding “after consideration which has in some cases reversed original opinion,” that “all
conscientious objectors should register”). According to the NCLB, “No public statements advising men not to
register were made by any except a few radical organizations in the middle west,” all of which were
subsequently prosecuted by federal authorities. NAT’L CIVIL LIBERTIES BUREAU, supra note 81, at 14.
197 Am. Union Against Militarism, supra note 196; Letter from Norman Thomas & Roger N. Baldwin to
the Conference Comm. on the Army Bill, supra note 83.
198 Thomas, supra note 73, at 391.
199 Id.
200 Prominent Progressives such as Herbert Croly and Walter Lippmann rejected a role for religion in
public life. SEHAT, supra note 166, at 208.
201 Arthur O. Lovejoy, A Communication to Conscientious Objectors, NEW REPUBLIC, June 16, 1917, at
187, 189. Lovejoy nevertheless counseled “toleration” for “genuinely ‘conscientious’ objectors.” Id.
202 John Dewey, Conscience and Compulsion, NEW REPUBLIC, July 14, 1917, at 297, 298.
203 Id. at 298.
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personal and evangelical method,” he argued, would emphasize “objective
facts” instead of the “inhibitions of inner consciousness.”204
In an August 1917 article for the Survey,205 Norman Thomas responded
directly to Dewey’s position. Where Dewey attributed to conscientious
objectors a “merely personal morality,” Thomas cast their moral stand in social
terms. Compulsory service and war itself were more deeply “anti-social” than
refusal to serve.206 What conscientious objectors believed, according to
Thomas, was “that the same course of action which keeps one’s self
‘unspotted . . . within’” (Dewey’s words) would “ultimately prove the only
safe means for establishing a worthy social system.”207 And yet, while some
Progressives were willing to accept moderation as a “matter of expedience or
of sound public policy,” Thomas went too far when he insisted on “the
recognition of conscientious objection as a matter of democratic right.”208
Dewey urged the authorities to assign conscientious objectors whatever work
would “put the least heavy load possible upon their consciences,”209 and he
counseled humane treatment for those who were imprisoned.210 Moreover, he
criticized Columbia’s dismissal of Professor James M. Cattell for, among other
issues, advocating a bill to protect conscientious objectors.211 But such
concessions reflected policy concerns, not rights-balancing; even sympathetic
Progressives declined to frame their appeals to government accommodation of
conscientious objectors in the language of rights.
The AUAM’s Civil Liberties Bureau, announced on July 2, 1917, was
more palatable to the organization’s Progressive constituency.212 Eastman
maintained that the organization’s “attempt to have the conscription act
administered with due regard to liberty of conscience” was no more
antagonistic to the nation’s war effort than its “attempt to save free speech, free
press and assembly from the wholesale autocratic sweep which war-efficiency

204

Id.
Thomas, supra note 73.
206 Id. at 391, 394.
207 Id. at 391.
208 Id. at 394; see, e.g., Lovejoy, supra note 201, at 189 (“From the conclusion that genuinely
‘conscientious’ objectors should be given non-combatant duties to perform, few, I take it, will dissent. Your
number appears to be small; and of your scruples, the country may well be generously considerate.”).
209 Dewey, supra note 202, at 297.
210 Kessler, supra note 8, at 1149.
211 STEVEN ROCKEFELLER, JOHN DEWEY: RELIGIOUS FAITH AND DEMOCRATIC HUMANISM 302 (1991).
212 Press Release, Am. Union Against Militarism (July 2, 1917), microformed on AUAM Papers, supra
note 42, Reel 10:2.
205
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dictates.”213 That she felt compelled to argue the point is a telling indication of
its precariousness. In defending the rights of conscientious objectors, the
AUAM demanded special dispensation from the ordinary operations of
democratic laws. Expressive freedom, by contrast, was more easily
reconcilable than conscientious objection to the Progressive vision of the
public good.
To be sure, wartime enforcement of free speech proved almost as tepid in
practice as freedom of conscience.214 In debate over the Espionage Act, some
legislators maintained that the best way to promote the public interest was to
foster open discussion even for those with whom one disagreed.215 The final
bill neglected their concerns, and the Department of Justice and the federal
courts adopted an expansive interpretation of its scope.216 Postal censorship
was particularly intrusive, and it revealed the dangers of administrative
power.217
Nonetheless, free speech clearly enjoyed substantial support as a theoretical
matter, even among advocates of the war.218 In the early 1910s, a broad range
of thinkers, advocates, and public officials had endorsed expressive freedom at
the level of legislative drafting and executive enforcement, if not judicial
review.219 Progressives had long expressed their opposition to unjust laws,
from local anti-picketing ordinances to the repressive court decisions that they
associated with Lochner. Under peacetime conditions, they endorsed vigorous
public discussion and encouraged public officials to tolerate advocacy for
social and economic change.220 After all, the Progressive Era experienced swift
213

Letter from Crystal Eastman to the Exec. Comm., supra note 99, at 5.
GRABER, supra note 5, at 51–52, 66–86; see infra note 341.
215 RABBAN, supra note 5, at 250–55; STONE, supra note 6, at 146–53; Geoffrey R. Stone, The Origins of
the Bad Tendency Test: Free Speech in Wartime, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 411.
216 MURPHY, supra note 7, at 179–247; STONE, supra note 6.
217 See MURPHY, supra note 7, at 98–103; HARRY N. SCHEIBER, THE WILSON ADMINISTRATION AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES, 1917–1921 (1960).
218 E.g., Letter from Austin Lewis to Roger N. Baldwin (July 9, 1917), microformed on ACLU Papers,
supra note 24, Reel 5, Vol. 39 (“I am in favor of the war . . . . But I am dead against militarism, I am prepared
to offer every resistance to the wanton interference by the military with the constitutional liberties, the right of
criticism etc. and particularly am I opposed to the military forces being used to put down labor organizations
and to endeavor to destroy the right of peaceable economic agitation.”); Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to
Austin Lewis (July 1917), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 5, Vol. 39; Letter from Roger
N. Baldwin to William Woerner, (Nov. 6, 1917), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 5, Vol.
39 (“[T]here are some among our supporters who are certainly for the war but yet who believe in the right of
citizens and the right of minorities should be heard.”).
219 RABBAN, supra note 5, at 77–175.
220 GRABER, supra note 5, at 87–95; RABBAN, supra note 5, at 90–92.
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transformations in political, scientific, and cultural values.221 Theories that
were widely accepted in the 1910s had been marginal, if not repressed, a few
decades earlier. Social progress turned on the formulation and expression of
new ideas, and repression often served the interests of the established and
empowered. A 1927 history of civil liberties commissioned by the ACLU
identified a new openness to free speech during the Progressive period, arising
“partly out of a new realization of its essential value in our complex industrial
age; partly out of the common experiences of the social reformers; partly
because of the increased number of cases in which liberty was sacrificed to the
interests of powerful conservative groups.”222
The AUAM leadership hoped to parlay that constellation of interests into
support for its wartime program. “[I]n a war for democracy,” it insisted in
August 1917, “there is no more patriotic duty than to keep democracy alive at
home.”223 True, many Progressives believed the time for public debate had
passed once war was declared. Some emphasized the government’s power to
police interference with majority will.224 “As units of democracy we are bound
by the national decision,” one correspondent advised Roger Baldwin.225
Others, arguing that “the world will not be safe for free speech until it is safe
221

See supra note 113.
LEON WHIPPLE, THE STORY OF CIVIL LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 327 (1927). Signs of increased
interest in civil liberties, according to Whipple, included the incorporation of new guarantees into state
constitutions, the organization of the American Association of University Professors, the formation of various
groups for the protection of free speech, the focus of an annual meeting of the American Sociological Society
on “Freedom of Discussion,” and the attention devoted to free speech and assemblage by the Commission on
Industrial Relations. Id. Notably, Whipple rejected John Stuart Mill’s “harm principle” as inconsistent with
modern social understandings. LEON WHIPPLE, OUR ANCIENT LIBERTIES: THE STORY OF THE ORIGIN AND
MEANING OF CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (1927). According to Whipple, Mill’s
notion that interference with the liberty of others could be justified only for “self protection” was incompatible
with “the revelations of science and psychology,” which had “proved how few acts there are that do not work
at the expense of some one else, even if the someone is anonymous.” Id. For Whipple, there was no such thing
as an atomistic individual; all rights were relational. Id.
223 Letter from the Nat’l Civil Liberties Bureau to the Editor of the N.Y. Tribune (Aug. 28, 1917),
microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 3, Vol. 18.
224 Not all Progressives were majoritarian. In fact, many advocated the expansion of the regulatory state
precisely because the efficiency and autonomy of administrative agencies were shielded from popular
influence. For them, the postwar turn to civil liberties meant shifting their confidence from agencies—which,
they discovered, were more prone to political influence than they had believed—to the courts. See, e.g.,
Rodgers, supra note 113, at 122 (arguing that the Progressive appeal to “the People” was successful in part
because it “allowed those who sincerely believed in a government serving the needs of ‘the people’ to
camouflage from voters the acute distrust many of those same persons harbored of political egalitarianism”).
225 Letter from Philip Willett to Roger N. Baldwin, Dir., Civil Liberties Bureau (Aug. 21, 1917),
microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 5, Vol. 35. Baldwin stubbornly responded that “public
discussion should be unfettered.” Letter from Roger N. Baldwin, Dir., Civil Liberties Bureau, to Philip Willett
(Aug. 22, 1917), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 5, Vol. 35.
222
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for democracy,” believed the war effort justified extraordinary measures.226 “It
would be a good thing for all of us if we emphasized a little more our duties as
citizens and were less concerned about insisting upon our ‘rights,’” the general
secretary of the American Prison Association wrote to Roger Baldwin.227
Personally, I am perfectly willing to have the Government suspend
whatever may be necessary of my own civil rights during the period
of the war, if it will help win the war, and I have no fear whatever but
that when Germany and her Allies have been licked to a frazzle that I
shall be restored to the full enjoyment of all the civil rights I am
capable of appreciating.228

Some Progressives, however, were less sanguine about the wartime
suspension of civil liberties. To them, meaningful “social freedom” necessarily
entailed “the right of propaganda by speech, press, and assemblage.”229 Thus,
one eminent sociologist agreed to endorse a meeting on behalf of civil liberties
if its goal was “to secure free and adequate public discussion of every public
policy before a decision is reached on that policy.”230 By the same token, the
Nation maintained that “the right to free speech must be upheld, throughout the
country”—that “freedom of legitimate criticism” must not be denied.”231
Perhaps most famously, John Dewey made a conflicted and belated plea for
open debate in a series of essays for the New Republic.232 In September 1917,
Dewey played down the prospect of wartime repression of “liberty of thought
and speech.”233 In fact, he reflected with amusement on the irony of
“ultra-socialists rallying to the old banner of Elihu Root with its inscription to
226 Letter from William English Walling to L. Hollingsworth Wood (Jan. 7, 1918), microformed on
ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 1, Vol. 3.
227 Letter from Joseph Byers, General Sec’y, Am. Prison Ass’n, to Roger N. Baldwin (June 25, 1918),
microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 3, Vol. 26.
228 Id.
229 Floyd Hardin, Plea of a Christian Pacifist in Court, microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel
4, Vol. 29. Hardin added that a mere right to think without sharing one’s views was “the true hell of
individualism.” Id.
230 Letter from Charles Ellwood, Univ. of Mo., to Roger N. Baldwin, Sec’y, Civil Liberties Bureau (Jan.
8, 1918), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 1, Vol. 3; see also ANGELL, supra note 185, at 28
(“By suppressing the free dissemination of unpopular ideas, we render ourselves incapable of governing
ourselves to our own advantage and we shall perpetuate that condition of helplessness and slavery for the mass
which all our history so far has shown.”).
231 The Case of Columbia Professors, NATION, Oct. 11, 1917, at 388, 388.
232 See, e.g., GRABER, supra note 5, at 98–99; RABBAN, supra note 5, at 243–45.
233 John Dewey, Conscription of Thought, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 1, 1917, at 128, 128–30. Dewey
indicated in the essay that “some surrenders and abandonments of the liberties of peace time” were inevitable
during the war. Id.
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the sanctity of individual rights and constitutional guaranties.”234 To the extent
he acknowledged the cost of patriotic conformity, he focused on the futility of
repression as an instrument of “social solidarity.”235 Over the ensuing weeks,
in the face of mounting national hysteria and the pointed criticism of his
former student Randolph Bourne, Dewey acknowledged that he had misjudged
the likelihood of broad-based censorship.236 Like other speech-friendly
Progressives, he promoted pluralism in social rather than individualist terms,
and he resisted the notion that individual judgment should trump the
democratic will.237
Such arguments bore a close kinship to Zechariah Chafee’s iconic defense
of expressive freedom in the aftermath of the war, which eventually justified a
court-centered and countermajoritarian theory of free speech. According to
Chafee, the First Amendment protected two distinct kinds of interests in
expressive freedom.238 The first was an individual interest, “the need of many
men to express their opinions on matters vital to them if life is to be worth
living.” The second, by contrast, was “a social interest in the attainment of
truth, so that the country may not only adopt the wisest course of action but
carry it out in the wisest way.239 In Chafee’s view, judges mistakenly regarded
free speech as “merely an individual interest,” subject to curtailment whenever
national security was at stake.240 In fact, the social interest in expressive
freedom was more important than its individual counterpart, especially in
wartime, when courts credited it least.241 The crucial thing, for Chafee, was to
preserve open channels for democratic deliberation. In this, his position
tracked that of the New York Times, which defended as “indubitable” the right
of conscientious objectors “to disapprove,” even while it prescribed
imprisonment for those who persisted in their refusal to enter military service
after failing to persuade Congress to “change the law.”242

234

Id.
Id.
236 John Dewey, In Explanation of Our Lapse, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 3, 1917, at 17, 17. For discussion of
Bourne’s debate with Dewey, see, for example, KENNEDY, supra note 19, at 50–53, 90–92; ROBERT B.
WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 202–12 (1991).
237 See GRABER, supra note 5, at 98–103; RABBAN, supra note 5, at 243–45.
238 Chafee, supra note 1, at 958.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 959. Chafee concluded that the Espionage Act itself was probably constitutional, but he believed
the First Amendment should guide its interpretation in the judiciary as well as the political branches. Id. at 960.
By contrast, he doubted the constitutionality of the 1918 Sedition Act. Id. at 969.
241 Id.
242 Topics of the Times, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1917, at 5, 5.
235
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As the parameters of Progressive tolerance became increasingly apparent,
the Civil Liberties Bureau explored alternative avenues for pursuing its
objectives. The organization’s new methods borrowed heavily from the prewar
tactics of Theodore Schroeder’s Free Speech League, which had always been
careful to separate its advocacy for expressive freedom from the goals of the
groups it represented.243 Like the League, the Civil Liberties Bureau defended
civil liberties by reference to the Constitution as well as public policy. Like the
League, it bucked Progressive preferences by pursuing civil liberties in the
courts as well as the political branches.
By the beginning of the war, the Free Speech League was fading from
public view.244 Nonetheless, many of the League’s most important members
and allies played formative roles in the Civil Liberties Bureau. Theodore
Schroeder sent background materials on free speech to the Bureau’s Lawyers
Advisory Council early on.245 He also provided Baldwin with a complete set of
the League’s published pamphlets.246 Gilbert Roe, a League lawyer who was a
former law partner of Wisconsin Republican Robert La Follette, was actively
involved in the new organization and provided frequent legal advice.247
Harry Weinberger, an attorney who had worked closely with the Free
Speech League and would soon represent the defendant in Abrams v. United
States, was especially influential.248 Weinberger was a single-taxer, pacifist,
and radical individualist who opposed all state interference with personal
liberties.249 He had fought against compulsory vaccination in the early 1900s,
and he considered the Supreme Court’s decision upholding the practice to be
on a par with Dred Scott.250 He had also defended Emma Goldman against
charges of distributing birth control information in in 1916.251
243 RABBAN, supra note 5, at 63. Its abstract embrace of individual freedom gave the League credibility
when it defended unpopular causes like labor radicalism—which many contemporaries regarded as less
reputable than free love. See Theodore Schroeder, On Suppressing the Advocacy of Crime, MOTHER EARTH,
Jan. 1907, at 7, 16 (criticizing supporters of the League’s position on obscenity who countenanced the
censorship of Anarchist literature). There were, however, marked boundaries of respectability. Christine
Stansell notes that Progressive free speech sympathizers were alienated by the bohemian slippage from free
speech to free love. CHRISTINE STANSELL, AMERICAN MODERNS: BOHEMIAN NEW YORK AND THE CREATION
OF A NEW CENTURY 79–80 (2000).
244 RABBAN, supra note 5, at 309.
245 Id. at 307.
246 Id. at 307–08.
247 Id. at 308.
248 See id. at 72; POLENBERG, supra note 8, at 75–78; WALKER, supra note 9, at 22.
249 POLENBERG, supra note 8, at 77.
250 Id. at 78.
251 Id. at 79.
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A stalwart opponent of the draft, Weinberger eagerly joined Goldman and
Alexander Berkman’s No-Conscription League, which was “formed for the
purpose of encouraging conscientious objectors to affirm their liberty of
conscience and to make their objection to human slaughter effective by
refusing to participate in the killing of their fellow men.”252 Central to the
League’s mission was its opposition to state coercion, war-related or
otherwise. Its members opposed conscription on grounds of internationalism,
anti-militarism, and anti-capitalism.253 “We will fight for what we choose to
fight for; we will never fight simply because we are ordered to fight,” its
manifesto proclaimed.254 As Goldman explained in a public address, her
convictions as an anarchist likewise prevented her from advising draftees not
to register, because she did “not believe in force morally or otherwise” to
persuade them to betray their ideals.255 One’s own conscience, she insisted,
was the “best guide in all the world.”256
For Weinberger, freedom of conscience was part of a broader constellation
of personal rights that merited protection during war. Early on, he sensed a
need for a new organization to protect civil liberties. In April 1917, he shared
with Roger Baldwin his idea for an American Legal Defense League to “fight
all cases in the United States where free speech, free press or the right
peaceably to assemble or to petition the government is invaded.”257 Baldwin
had already expressed interest in civil liberties. On April 14, less than two
weeks after the declaration of war, he had begun soliciting prominent
signatories to request an official statement of Wilson’s position on freedom of
speech, press, and assemblage.258 But he had not yet built an organizational
apparatus for vindicating those freedoms.
Weinberger suggested that the AUAM could assist him with his plan for a
legal defense organization by referring cases to him through its local branches,
and he urged a constitutional test case of conscription.259 He also offered his
opinions on the constitutional status of dissenting speech for inclusion in an
252 Transcript of Record at 114, Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918) (No. 656) (quoting
Manifesto of the No-Conscription League (May 25, 1917)).
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 118.
256 Id. at 119.
257 Letter from Harry Weinberger to Roger N. Baldwin, Am. Union Against Militarism (Apr. 28, 1917),
microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 5, Vol. 35.
258 ROBERT C. COTTRELL, ROGER NASH BALDWIN 52 (2000).
259 Letter from Harry Weinberger to Roger N. Baldwin, supra note 257.
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AUAM pamphlet.260 He advised Baldwin that open disagreement with
government and military practices, including the publication and distribution
of pamphlets on the war, was protected by the First Amendment, and he was
adamant that “any Espionage Bill Congress may pass cannot repeal the United
States Constitution.”261 By May, he was outraged at the Administration’s
efforts to quash public opposition to military bills and concluded “that we must
re-educate the people, that they have the right to discuss and the right to
oppose conscription and ask for its repeal.”262 Advocacy of a change in law, he
insisted, could not qualify as treasonable or seditious.263
Baldwin initially supported Weinberger’s organizational aspirations. A
pamphlet issued in May by the Bureau’s short-lived Committee on
Constitutional Rights did precisely what Weinberger advised. It declared that
“[c]onstitutional rights are being seriously invaded throughout the United
States under pressure of war,” blaming the abuse on “petty officials who would
compel conformity.”264 And it referred victims of this unconstitutional abuse to
the American Legal Defense League.265 The League, in turn, attracted
substantial publicity in Progressive circles. Its notable members included
Charles C. Burlingham, Theodore Schroeder, Gilbert Roe, Clarence Darrow,
and New York Governor Charles S. Whitman, as well as several AUAM board
members.266 In May, the New Republic “gladly” printed an announcement of
260 Letter from Harry Weinberger to Roger N. Baldwin, Am. Union Against Militarism (Apr. 30, 1917),
microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 5, Vol. 35.
261 Id. Baldwin was more cautious. He told Weinberger,

We will include your statement about the spy bill in relation to constitutional rights, but I am sure
our friends will want a more explicit statement of the practical effects of this legislation later.
Most of them don’t want to go to jail or to suffer an expensive trial and they want advice as
to how far they can go without getting into trouble with the Federal authorities.
Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Harry Weinberger (May 3, 1918), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note
24, Reel 5, Vol. 35.
262 Letter from Harry Weinberger to Joy Young, Am. Union Against Militarism (May 2, 1917),
microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 5, Vol. 35.
263 Letter from Harry Weinberger to Roger N. Baldwin, Am. Union Against Militarism (May 8, 1917),
microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 5, Vol. 35.
264 AM. UNION AGAINST MILITARISM, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN WAR TIME 3 (1917), microformed on
ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 5, Vol. 44. The committee members were Amos Pinchot, Max Eastman,
Agnes Leach, Stephen Wise, Herbert Bigelow, Scott Nearing, and William Cochran. Id. With respect to the
pending Espionage Act, the committee advised that “much will depend on how such war-time legislation is
administered. The administration at Washington professes a desire to be liberal, and it is to be hoped that the
federal authorities who will enforce the provisions of this act, will not undertake seriously to interfere with
established rights.” Id. at 8.
265 Id.
266 The American Legal Defense League, NATION, May 31, 1917.
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the new organization, which was “composed of public spirited citizens
including both militarists and anti-militarists, who think it imperative that our
American liberties of free speech, free press and the right peaceably to
assemble be legally defended against any encroachment wherever made by any
public official.”267 Even Newton Baker implied approval of the League’s
agenda. In a letter, he commended its opposition to vigilante interference with
“the rights of assembly and free speech”—an endorsement that the League
publicized to good effect.268
Given the substantial support for the American Legal Defense League, it is
unsurprising that Roger Baldwin (known for his opportunism or organizational
savvy, depending on one’s perspective) quickly encroached on its agenda. On
May 11, the Conscientious Objectors’ Bureau convinced Weinberger to
relinquish all cases involving conscientious objectors—a course that
Weinberger accepted given that his advisory committee was interested only in
the rights of speech, press, and assembly.269 In addition, Baldwin secured
Weinberger’s agreement to cede any legal test of the Conscription or
Espionage Acts to the AUAM.270 In June, he pushed harder. With apologies
“that the American Union was very poorly standing by you and the American
Legal Defense League”—a fickleness that Baldwin blamed on dissension
within the AUAM—he withdrew an earlier pledge of financial assistance.271
More to the point, he advised Weinberger that the AUAM had “decided now to
take hold of the work of organizing legal defense throughout the country under
a bureau of the Union, and including conscientious objectors.”272 The new
Civil Liberties Bureau appropriated the League’s entire agenda. Its purpose,
according to the AUAM’s public announcement, was to coordinate all parties
interested in preserving “constitutional liberties” against government
incursion.273 A second edition of the AUAM’s pamphlet on constitutional
267

Defense of Free Speech, NEW REPUBLIC, May 12, 1917, at 54, 54; The American Legal Defense
League, NATION, May 31, 1917.
268 Secretary of War Denounces Military Rowdyism—Militarism the Same the World Over, LOCOMOTIVE
FIREMEN AND ENGINEMEN’S MAG., July 15, 1917, at 4 (quoting Letter from Newton Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t
of War, to Harry Weinberger, General Counsel, Am. Legal Def. League).
269 Memorandum of Conference Between Roger N. Baldwin and Harry Weinberger (May 11, 1917),
microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 5, Vol. 35.
270 Id.
271 Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Harry Weinberger (June 18, 1917), microformed on ACLU Papers,
supra note 24, Reel 5, Vol. 35.
272 Id.
273 Press Release, supra note 212. The organization had already specified the sorts of violations it had in
mind: prosecution for peaceful criticism of the government, interference with meetings and refusal of meeting
halls, and confiscation of pamphlets and literature. AM. UNION AGAINST MILITARISM, supra note 264. Peaceful
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rights, issued in July, omitted any mention of the American Legal Defense
League.274
The Civil Liberties Bureau did not abandon tested Progressive tactics
altogether. On the contrary, it pursued its program through all available means.
For the duration of the war, its leadership drew on personal and professional
connections with government officials.275 When the Bureau organized an
emergency conference on postal censorship of radical publications, its
preferred, if unsuccessful, solution was to send a delegation of lawyers to
discuss the matter with key figures in the Wilson Administration, including the
president and the postmaster general.276 Over the following months, the new
bureau tried its hand at lobbying, propaganda, and grassroots organizing in
addition to negotiation.277 Still, its principal focus was constitutional litigation,
just as Weinberger had proposed. The Bureau quickly established itself as a
national clearinghouse for information and legal aid in the domain of
constitutional rights.278 Baldwin envisioned it as a means of helping dissenters
to “get their legal rights before the courts.”279

opposition to law, the Bureau insisted, was an inviolate constitutional right, and it deserved protection even
when the nation was at war. Id.
274 NAT’L CIVIL LIBERTIES BUREAU, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN WAR TIME (rev. ed. 1917), microformed
on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 5, Vol. 44.
275 For example, John Nevin Sayre, the brother of President Wilson’s son-in-law. Baldwin hoped that
Sayre’s presence would “make things look a little more interesting to those public and private super-patriots
who would tar us with the ‘stick of pro-Germanism.’” Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to John S. Codman (May
7, 1918), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 3, Vol. 25.
276 Letter from Crystal Eastman, Exec. Sec’y, Am. Union Against Militarism, to Am. Union Against
Militarism Members, Local Comms. and Affiliated Orgs. (July 13, 1917), microformed on AUAM Papers,
supra note 42, Reel 10:2. Targeted publications included the Masses, the International Socialist Review, the
American Socialist, and the Milwaukee Leader. Id. “If we accept this Prussian mandate on the part of the
postal authorities peacefully,” Eastman said, “it will be fastened upon us as a permanent war policy.” Id.
Immediate protest, by contrast, presented a possibility for “real freedom of the press in America, war or no
war.” Id.; see also JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 58–59.
277 WALKER, supra note 9, at 23–24.
278 NAT’L CIVIL LIBERTIES BUREAU, supra note 81, at 4.
279 Letter from Roger N. Baldwin, Civil Liberties Bureau, to John S. Codman (Oct. 11, 1917),
microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 3, Vol. 25. The NCLB would assist in four types of
situation: first, and most important, constitutional test cases; second, unjust prosecutions in which defendants
were unable to secure competent counsel; third, when publicity was necessary either in advance of trial or,
afterwards, to call attention to miscarriage of justice; and fourth, assistance to underfunded local defense
committees. Nat’l Civil Liberties Bureau, The Need of a National Defense Fund (Nov. 15, 1917), microformed
on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 3, Vol. 26.
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A handful of successful cases in the summer of 1917 encouraged the
litigation strategy.280 Within a few months, the Bureau claimed 120
cooperating attorneys throughout the United States.281 At that time, a number
of important prosecutions under the Espionage and Trading with the Enemy
Acts were coming to the organization’s attention as a result of the “activity of
government agents,” and its staff was assisting “test cases under the new
legislation which must be carried to the higher courts for final decision on
constitutional points.”282 Cases were proliferating at every level, from local to
federal, and under local ordinances and state laws as well as federal statutes.283
The Bureau was also handling trial publicity to “show up miscarriage of
justice.”284 Although it operated primarily to redress repression after the fact,
its long-term hope was to discourage unlawful interference in the first place by
reminding officials that a national body was scrutinizing their actions.285 The
overarching purpose of the Civil Liberties Bureau was to “make sure that
bureaucratic officials and mob-minded judges shall not, out of sheer war
passion, trample upon the rights of free speech, free press and public assembly
during war-time.”286
III. CIVIL LIBERTIES IN PRACTICE
Despite its early achievements in the courts, the Civil Liberties Bureau
failed to attain the respectability its founders desired. The comparatively
tolerant climate of spring 1917 was rapidly eroding, and announcement of the
Civil Liberties Bureau was met with public indignation. A July 4 editorial in
the New York Times insisted that a line must be drawn between “liberty” and
“license,” and “just where it shall be drawn is and must be determined, in
countries properly called free, by public sentiment as formally expressed by
280 Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Mrs. Leo Simmons (Sept. 21, 1917), microformed on ACLU Papers,
supra note 24, Reel 5, Vol. 36 (“In regard to the ordinance passed by your city council, the obvious thing to do
is to get one of your folks to violate it so that you may take it into the courts as a test case. It is to my mind
clearly unconstitutional. A similar ordinance in Indianapolis was passed last April, and tested in the courts at
once. It was of course declared void.”).
281 Nat’l Civil Liberties Bureau, Statement to Members of the American Union Against Militarism (Nov.
1, 1917), microformed on AUAM Papers, supra note 42, Reel 10:1 (stating that the organization was “in touch
with practically all cases reported in the press, where the rights of citizens or organizations representing the
movements for peace, the conscientious objector, against war and for the cause of labor are violated at the
hands of officials acting under war hysteria”).
282 Nat’l Civil Liberties Bureau, supra note 279.
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 Nat’l Civil Liberties Bureau, supra note 281.
286 Civil Liberties Bureau, N.Y. EVENING POST, Oct. 17, 1917.
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majorities through their voluntarily chosen representatives.”287 It
unequivocally denounced the “little group of malcontents who for present
purposes have chosen to call themselves ‘The National Civil Liberties
Bureau,’” whose objective, it alleged, was to secure “for themselves immunity
from the application of laws to which good citizens willingly submit as
essential to the national existence and welfare.”288
The Bureau’s chilly reception exacerbated tensions within the AUAM. In
large part, the schism stemmed from the diverging politics of the leadership.
Much of the organization’s inner circle openly supported radical causes, and in
August, the board voted to send delegates to a conference organized by the
People’s Council of America for Democracy and Peace, a radical anti-war
group to which many of its members belonged.289 Lillian Wald worried that the
decision to participate in the conference would destroy the AUAM’s reputation
and undermine its broader program. The AUAM had “stood before the public
as a group of reflective liberals,” she pleaded, unavailingly.290 Its cooperation
with the People’s Council betrayed an “impulsive radicalism” instead.291 Other
members shared her concerns. Oswald Garrison Villard felt that the
Administration’s conscription policy had accommodated the AUAM’s
legitimate requests, and he wanted the organization to withdraw all
objectionable materials from the mail, disband its Publicity Department and
Washington office, and retreat from public view.292
In late summer, Wald threatened resignation, and Eastman responded with
a proposal to sever the Civil Liberties Bureau from the AUAM—to cull the
radicals and “leave the more conservative minority to continue the work of the
organization.”293 On September 28, 1917, the board agreed (Wald left
287

Topics of the Times: Freedom of Speech, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1917, at 8, 8.
Id.
289 MARCHAND, supra note 41, at 256–68.
290 Letter from Lillian Wald to Crystal Eastman (Aug. 26, 1917), microformed on AUAM Papers, supra
note 42, Reel 10:1. The board majority voted to send a delegation. Am. Union Against Militarism, Minutes
(Aug. 30, 1917), microformed on AUAM Papers, supra note 42, Reel 10:1. Evidently, Wald and Mussey
concurred in the vote with “deep regret.” Id. As it turned out, Wood and Thomas were unable to attend. Am.
Union Against Militarism, Minutes (Sept. 13, 1917), microformed on AUAM Papers, supra note 42, Reel
10:1. The People’s Council did not meet in Minnesota as planned; the AFL-sponsored American Alliance for
Labor and Democracy rented all available halls in Minneapolis, the Minnesota governor forbade any meeting
of the council in the state, and the meeting was ultimately held in Chicago instead. MURPHY, supra note 7, at
145–46.
291 Letter from Lillian Wald to Crystal Eastman (Aug. 26, 1917), microformed on AUAM Papers, supra
note 42, Reel 10:1.
292 Am. Union Against Militarism, Minutes (Sept. 13, 1917), supra note 290.
293 Id.
288
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anyway), and the AUAM soon withered into obsolescence.294 The Civil
Liberties Bureau, by contrast, intensified its operations;295 Norman Thomas
explained that the kind of liberal organization advocated by Villard and Wald
would “have to originate, if at all, with those who have not been so deeply
tarred with uncompromising pacifism as all our present members.”296
The leadership of the new National Civil Liberties Bureau assured
members that its program would remain “exactly the same”297: the
“maintenance in war time of the rights of free press, free speech, peaceful
assembly, liberty of conscience, and freedom from unlawful search and
seizure.”298 In reality, the NCLB leadership was especially concerned for the
rights of radicals and organized labor. As Thomas put it, “capitalistic
exploitation, militarism, [and] contempt of civil liberties” were entangled
“aspects of the wrong basis of our social life.”299 According to Baldwin, the
“underlying purpose” of the NCLB’s attempt to maintain constitutional rights
was to shield minorities in the “processes of progress,” in which “labor of
course must in the future play the biggest part.”300

294 See Am. Union Against Militarism, Minutes (Sept. 28, 1917), microformed on AUAM Papers, supra
note 42, Reel 10:1; Am. Union Against Militarism, Minutes (Oct. 29, 1917), microformed on AUAM Papers,
supra note 42, Reel 10:1.
295 Civil Liberties Bureau, N.Y. EVENING POST, Oct. 17, 1917.
296 Letter from Norman Thomas to Crystal Eastman (Sept. 27, 1917), microformed on AUAM Papers,
supra note 42, Reel 10:1.
297 Nat’l Civil Liberties Bureau, supra note 281. While the NCLB’s statement to the press was much like
a draft considered by the board, there were a few notable discrepancies. Missing from the final version was a
general indictment of the war:

We were not won over by the arguments of those liberals—in other opinions so much like us—
who believed that this war was the great exception, the one last necessary war which should bring
about world federation, disarmament and lasting peace. Nor have we been won over to that view
since April 3rd, despite the terrific pressure of a nation’s wartime psychology.
Am. Union Against Militarism, Proposed Announcement for Press (Sept. 24, 1917), microformed on AUAM
Papers, supra note 42, Reel 10:1. In the same vein, the draft statement rightly reported that most Americans
supported free speech only for those with whom they agreed—a sentiment that would long serve as the
ACLU’s justification for its viewpoint-blind defense of expression. Id. What followed, however, was not a
plea for neutrality. “It is essential for leadership in the fight of civil liberty in war time to come from the heart
of the minority itself,” the draft statement boldly proclaimed. Id. “With rare exception the minority must
depend upon itself and its own unaided efforts to maintain its right to exist.” Id.
298 NCLB Letterhead, in Letter to Members of the Committee on the Meeting (Dec. 29, 1917),
microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 1, Vol. 3.
299 Letter from Norman Thomas to Crystal Eastman, supra note 296.
300 Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Fay Lewis (Jan. 30, 1918), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra
note 24, Reel 5, Vol. 39.
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Still, the NCLB promised publicly to support the administration, which was
“doing its best under the present law.”301 By exerting “quiet pressure” on
government officials, it hoped to persuade them to exercise lenience in
administering the Selective Service Act, among other provisions.302 And to a
modest yet surprising extent, the organization achieved that objective.
The negotiations between the NCLB and the War Department with respect
to conscientious objectors are well documented.303 The organization had strong
ties to Frederick Keppel, the Third Assistant Secretary of War304—who, as
secretary of the American Association for International Conciliation, had once
said that “war and civilization can no longer go hand and hand.”305 In the
spring of 1917, Baldwin assured Keppel that the Conscientious Objectors’
Bureau would cooperate fully with his office, and Keppel graciously
acknowledged the organization’s collaborative posture.306 Bureau members
met with key personnel within and outside the War Department to urge
moderation in administering conscription.307 Felix Frankfurter, who was
serving as a special assistant to the Secretary of War, was particularly
receptive. Indeed, he authored an influential memorandum endorsing many of
Baldwin’s innovations and urging humane treatment, if not exemption, even of
absolutists and political objectors.308 Baker himself promised to give weight to
Baldwin’s recommendations in setting the Department’s policy,309 and he

301

Letter from NCLB to Citizens Registered with the Nat’l Civil Liberties Bureau (Nov. 1, 1917),
microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 5, Vol. 44.
302 Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Scott Nearing, Chairman, People’s Council (Oct. 13, 1917),
microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 3, Vol. 26.
303 See COTTRELL, supra note 29, at 53–82; JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 30–36; WALKER, supra note 9, at
37–38; Kessler, supra note 8, at 1104–11.
304 See Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Frederick P. Keppel, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War (Apr. 8,
1918), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 2, Vol. 15. In congratulating him on his
appointment, Baldwin thanked him for his “unfailing tolerance and understanding.” Id.
305 Frederick P. Keppel, How to Interest the General Public in International Affairs, in PROCEEDINGS OF
SECOND NATIONAL CONFERENCE, AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTES 88 (1911).
306 Letter from Frederick Keppel to Roger N. Baldwin, Assoc. Dir., Am. Union Against Militarism (May
24, 1917), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 6, Vol. 47.
307 COTTRELL, supra note 29, at 54–55.
308 See Kessler, supra note 8, at 1111–23.
309 Letter from Newton Baker to Roger N. Baldwin (July 7, 1917), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra
note 24, Reel 2, Vol. 15. Baldwin’s proposed solution was to confine objectors who refused all service to
detention for the duration of the war, and to assign those men willing to accept non-combatant service to such
service without court-martial. Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Newton Baker (July 13, 1917), microformed
on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 2, vol. 15. It was crucial to Baldwin’s approach that the War
Department announce whatever policy it adopted in order to “promote a more orderly solution of the
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eventually ordered leniency toward individuals whose “personal scruples,”
whether religious or political, informed their opposition to military service.310
In practice, however, objectors of all types, and especially the absolutists,
often suffered in the individual cantonments.311 The military was adamantly
opposed to the AUAM’s program, and it pushed back against sympathetic
executive officials.312 Baker’s policy left immense discretion to the camp
commanders, some of whom were subjecting objectors to brutal treatment and
allowing other inductees to beat them.313 Baldwin tried, but eventually failed,
to position the Bureau as a watchdog group that would communicate with
objectors and report abusive treatment to government officials.314 He
nonetheless remained reluctant to challenge the War Department head-on. In a
September 1917 letter to Felix Frankfurter, Baldwin conveyed his concern that
“the rumors that are coming from the cantonments [would] give rise to an
unfortunate propaganda from several points in the country.”315 In other words,
the NCLB would not itself generate publicity on behalf of the objectors, nor
would it openly criticize the camps for known abuses.316 Rather, Baldwin
raised the specter of damaging propaganda as an incentive to temper abuses
and formulate a more generous policy.317 For a time, Baldwin had reason to

problem.” Id. Baker, however, refused to publicize his orders for leniency. See, e.g., CAPOZZOLA, supra note 7,
at 71.
310 E.g., DEP’T OF WAR, STATEMENT CONCERNING THE TREATMENT OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN
THE ARMY 40–41 (1919).
311 ROBERT H. ZIEGER, AMERICA’S GREAT WAR: WORLD WAR I AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 62
(2000).
312 Kessler, supra note 8, at 1108. The sole exception was John Henry Wigmore, who briefly expressed
openness to a more vigorous accommodation of dissenters. Id. at 1108–09.
313 MURPHY, supra note 7, at 159; WALKER, supra note 9, at 24.
314 COTTRELL, supra note 29, at 64–65; MURPHY, supra note 7, at 158–59.
315 Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Felix Frankfurter, U.S. Dep’t of War (Sept. 29, 1917), microformed
on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 2, Vol. 15.
316 See, e.g., Letter from Roger N. Baldwin, Dir., Nat’l Civil Liberties Bureau, to Felix Frankfurter (Sept.
29, 1917), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 2, Vol. 15 (“I have been putting off all inquirers
with my confident assertion that the War Department had the matter well in hand, and would doubtless arrive
at some conclusion in a few days. We cannot hold out against that pressure very much longer.”); Letter from
Roger N. Baldwin, Dir., Nat’l Civil Liberties Bureau, to Gilson Gardner (Nov. 1, 1917), microformed on
ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 3, Vol. 18 (“Secretary Baker has made a special request of us not to give
publicity to the matter of the conscientious objector now, for the sake of an orderly solution of the whole
matter. The War Department is handling the problem so liberally and sympathetically, even though there are
some cases of brutality, that we are of course complying with that request. Therefore, I will have to hold up the
story I had hoped to send you last week . . . .”).
317 COTTRELL, supra note 29, at 64.
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believe his approach would yield results.318 “We are getting much more liberal
treatment from the War Department,” he wrote, “than we could possibly expect
by throwing the issue into the public press, and into the hands of the patriotic
organizations who are anxious to shoot or export all the objectors.”319
But by the spring of 1918, Baldwin’s decision to tolerate the situation
quietly seemed naïve. Baldwin knew that cruel punishments, including
manacling and solitary confinement, were rampant in the cantonments.320
Matters worsened when reports emerged that the Army was court-martialing
political objectors and meting out excessive sentences.321 Lenetta Cooper of
the American Liberty Defense League, based in Chicago, had complied with
Baldwin’s earlier requests to refrain from publicity.322 In March, she accused
his organization of failure and, worse, of abandoning its constituency.323 After
ten months of work, the conscientious objector was “still considered a slacker
by practically every one,” she told him.324 She reminded Baldwin that her own
group had wanted “to appeal to the people to demand a liberal solution of the
problem”;325 he had begged her not to act, claiming that publicity would
precipitate a broad-based attack on pacifists by the press and would undercut
their aims.326 Cooper acknowledged that popular mobilization would have
318 E.g., Letter from Newton Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War, to Roger N. Baldwin (Oct. 28, 1917),
microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 6, Vol. 47.
319 Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to John S. Codman (Nov. 19, 1917), microformed on ACLU Papers,
supra note 24, Reel 3, Vol. 25; see also Nat’l Civil Liberties Bureau, Confidential Bulletin on the
Conscientious Objector (Jan. 16, 1918), microformed on AUAM Papers, supra note 42, Reel 10:1 (“We
recognize that the Department can not change the law, and that at present it is inopportune to suggest
amendments, providing a more liberal basis of recognition of conscience. It is rather as a practical problem on
which we offer these recommendations, believing that it is the desire of the War Department to avoid the
injustices which would make a controversial issue of liberty of conscience.”).
320 Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Newton D. Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War (Nov. 8, 1917),
microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 2, Vol. 15. Gradually, Baldwin began to lose patience. See,
e.g., id. (“It is perfectly obvious from the reports we are getting that there continues to be a serious
misunderstanding of your orders in regard to conscientious objectors.”); Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to
Newton D. Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War (Nov. 22, 1917), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24,
Reel 2, Vol. 15 (“The reports which we have been getting about the treatment of conscientious objectors at
various cantonments show an alarming increase in the number of cases of brutality and injustice.”).
321 JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 33. One objector was sentenced to death, but his sentence was
subsequently commuted. Id.
322 Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Lenetta Cooper, Am. Liberty Def. League (Dec. 17, 1917),
microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 3, Vol. 17.
323 Letter from Lenetta Cooper, Am. Liberty Def. League, to Roger N. Baldwin (Mar. 12, 1918),
microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 4, Vol. 16.
324 Id.
325 Id.
326 Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Lenetta Cooper, supra note 322.
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been slow, and open criticism of Baker futile, but she felt that
behind-the-scenes negotiations stood no chance of success without broad
popular support.327 Even then, Baldwin stood his ground:
I have felt right along that in the uncertainty of a definite policy by
the government, the best thing we could do was to just bide our time,
and make the whole issue clear when the government’s policy is
announced. That I understand from advices received today will be in
the very near future.328

Sure enough, less than two weeks later President Wilson issued an
executive order permitting objectors to elect alternative service under civilian
command.329 For a brief time, Baldwin felt vindicated.330 The new policy,
however, proved subject to widespread abuse, and Baldwin’s initial enthusiasm
quickly soured.331 Despite a series of clarifying orders from Baker, critics
complained that objectors who refused non-combatant service out of absolutist
convictions were worse off than before.332 Baker appointed a Board of Inquiry
to examine the sincerity of objectors, and the AUAM was enthusiastic about its
members: Major Walter G. Kellogg for the Army, Judge Julian W. Mack (an
AUAM supporter before the war), and Columbia dean Harlan Fisk Stone.333
Notwithstanding its promising personnel, however, the board habitually found
political objectors “insincere.”334
Although the NLCB stubbornly maintained its optimistic veneer, it is likely
that its leaders understood the limits of administrative negotiation. They
327

Letter from Lenetta Cooper to Roger N. Baldwin, supra note 323.
Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Lenetta Cooper (Mar. 14, 1918), microformed on ACLU Papers,
supra note 24, Reel 3, Vol. 16.
329 Exec. Order (Mar. 20, 1918), reprinted in MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS COVERING THE
SECOND TERM OF WOODROW WILSON 8475–77 (Supp. 1921).
330 Letter from John S. Codman to Roger N. Baldwin (Mar. 27, 1918), microformed on ACLU Papers,
supra note 24, Reel 3, Vol. 25 (“If this is the result of your negotiations with the War Department, it certainly
shows the wisdom of the policy which you have adopted of trusting to the Administration’s liberality rather
than trying to force anything through publicity.”). In April 1918, the Adjutant General, on behalf of the
Secretary of War, issued an order to all commanding officers that “no punitive hardship of any kind be
imposed upon conscientious objectors who do not accept assignment to noncombatant service before their
cases shall have been submitted to the Secretary of War.” Letter from H.G. Leonard, Adjutant General of the
Army, to the Commanding Generals of All Departments (Apr. 18, 1918), microformed on ACLU Papers,
supra note 24, Reel 2, Vol. 15.
331 In fact, Baldwin asked Keppel to suspend the order in lieu of its implementation. Telegram from Roger
N. Baldwin to Frederick Keppel (June 11, 1918), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 2, Vol.
15.
332 JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 35.
333 Id. at 39.
334 Id.
328
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adhered to their promise to refrain from negative publicity, but they never
entirely abandoned other avenues of change. In fact, even as the NCLB
pledged unmitigated cooperation with the War Department, it pursued
invalidation of the Selective Service Act on constitutional grounds.335
To be sure, the NCLB understood that its draft-act challenge was unlikely
to succeed. The organization had secured a few reversals of convictions of
anti-war dissenters, but the cases in which judges invalidated speech and
assembly laws on constitutional grounds involved local ordinances, not federal
statutes.336 To the extent judges reviewed convictions under federal wartime
legislation, they relied on statutory interpretation or procedural irregularities,
not constitutional infirmities. Judge Learned Hand’s celebrated decision in
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten337 is the most familiar example. Denial of
second-class mailing privileges to the Masses—a radical political magazine
edited by Max Eastman, Crystal Eastman’s brother—helped steer the NCLB
toward civil liberties work when the Espionage Act first passed.338 In late July,
Judge Hand issued his decision: Congress had not authorized the kind of
censorship at stake in the case, namely, the suppression of the Masses for its
antiwar editorials and political cartoons.339 Even Judge Hand’s cautiously
reasoned statutory analysis succumbed to patriotic fervor, however, and in
early November, the Second Circuit reversed.340 Similar cases followed
throughout the country.341

335

AM. UNION AGAINST MILITARISM, SOME ASPECTS FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN

THE DRAFT ACT (1917), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 5, Vol. 44.
336 E.g., Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Mrs. Leo Simmons, supra note 280 (describing

invalidation of
Indianapolis ordinance).
337 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
338 Id. at 536.
339 Masses Publ’g Co., 244 F. at 537. Judge Hand emphasized that he was not deciding whether Congress
was constitutionally empowered to prohibit “any matter which tends to discourage the successful prosecution
of the war” if it chose to do so; rather, at issue was “solely the question of how far Congress after much
discussion has up to the present time seen fit to exercise a power which may extend to measures not yet even
considered.” Id. at 538. Nonetheless, Judge Hand’s reasoning was later incorporated into the Supreme Court’s
constitutional analysis. Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of the Modern First Amendment
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 722 (1975). On the Masses case, see generally
GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994); Gunther, supra. Burleson’s censorship
practices were upheld by the Supreme Court in Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson. 255 U.S. 407 (1921).
340 Masses Publ’g Co., 246 F. 24.
341 Some federal judges resisted the dominant trend, including George M. Borquin in the District of
Montana and Charles Fremont Amidon in the Eighth Circuit (who would later head the ACLU’s committee on
anti-injunction laws). On the whole, however, judges capitulated to popular pressures. See MURPHY, supra
note 7, at 179–247; STONE, supra note 6, at 415–19.
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More to the point, the NCLB’s sporadic judicial successes during the fall of
1917 involved claims to expressive freedom, not freedom of conscience. The
NCLB’s binders of press clippings bulged with reports of convictions for
failure to register for the draft and of failed constitutional challenges to the
Selective Service Act.342 On one occasion, Judge Hand resisted the prevailing
hysteria by admitting a conscientious objector to bail pending resolution of his
constitutional challenge to conscription.343 But bail, however controversial,
was far from a victory. Two weeks after the indictment, a jury deliberated two
minutes before returning a verdict of guilty, and Judge Martin T. Manton
sentenced the defendant to prison at once.344 Even as lower courts divided over
the reach of administrative censorship, the drafters of the Selective Service Act
were confident that “every possible legal contingency was cared for” and that
no constitutional challenge to conscription could succeed.345 In December
1917, the Supreme Court considered convictions under the Act in Minnesota,
Ohio, Georgia, and New York.346 The solicitor general deemed the claims
“frivolous,” and were it not for widespread press coverage, he would not have
bothered to “appear and refute them.”347
In the conformist climate of fall 1917, then, the NCLB’s constitutional
assault on conscription was largely a symbolic gesture. Still, it was an
important marker of the NCLB’s ambivalent relationship to state power,
judicial review, and constitutional rights. Walter Nelles, the law partner of one
of Baldwin’s Harvard classmates, signed on as NCLB counsel after reading
about the new organization in the New York Times.348 In drafting the NCLB’s
342 E.g., Anti-Registration Pleas Are Ruled out by Tuttle, July 11, 1917 (newspaper clipping),
microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 6, Vol. 46; Broke Draft Law, Get Long Terms, N.Y.
WORLD, Dec. 18, 1917, microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 6, Vol. 46; Conscientious
Objector Sent to County Jail, HOBOKEN OBSERVER, Nov. 20, 1917, microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note
24, Reel 6, Vol. 46; Detroit Socialist Given Year in Jail for Not Registering, N.Y. CALL, Nov. 25, 1917,
microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 6, Vol. 46.
343 Federal Court Opens Way for Draft Act Test, July 17, 1917 (newspaper clipping), microformed on
ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 5, Vol. 43.
344 Convicts Draft Slacker, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1917.
345 Doubts Court Test of the Draft Law, July 22, 1917 (newspaper clipping), microformed on ACLU
Papers, supra note 24, Reel 5, Vol. 43.
346 Draft Cases in Supreme Court, Dec. 13, 1917 (newspaper clipping), microformed on ACLU Papers,
supra note 24, Reel 5, Vol. 43.
347 Argument Ended in Draft Appeals, N.Y. TRIB., Dec. 14, 1917, microformed on ACLU Papers, supra
note 24, Reel 5, Vol. 43.
348 Letter from Walter R. Nelles to Nat’l Civil Liberties Bureau (July 3, 1917), microformed on ACLU
Papers, supra note 24, Reel 3, Vol. 25. Baldwin told Nelles, “I feel we have only begun on a work of real
usefulness, and I hope eventually of some political significance in our national life.” Letter from Roger N.
Baldwin to Walter R. Nelles (Oct. 24, 1917), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 3, Vol. 25.
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amicus brief in the conscription case, Nelles was adamant that the organization
focus its objection on liberty of conscience, not on the less controversial
argument that Congress lacked power to raise a draft and compel service
abroad.349
In that attitude, Nelles joined the company of Harry Weinberger, who had
agreed to represent Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman when they were
indicted under the Selective Service Act in June.350 In trial and on appeal,
Weinberger argued that the narrow exemptions in the statute infringed
religious liberty.351 Defending one anarchist who refused to register out of
opposition to “uniformed murder”—that is, war “waged by governments”352—
he argued that the law’s limited exemptions functionally impeded individual
religious choice; it steered putative objectors to join a particular church “in
order to get the protection of the Constitution which is guaranteed to all.”353
Moreover, he reasoned, by conferring special privileges on members of certain
well-recognized organizations, the conscription statute ran afoul of the
Establishment Clause.354
The NCLB’s amicus brief echoed Weinberger’s claims.355 It recognized
great variation in the convictions and worldviews of conscientious objectors.
“Some base their beliefs and conduct upon their duty towards God; others
349 AM. UNION AGAINST MILITARISM, supra note 335 (noting that the Judge Advocate General and
Attorney General had issued opinions during the previous decades indicating that while service in the militia
could be compelled, service abroad could not).
350 Transcript of Record at 5, Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (No. 681).
351 E.g., id. He also argued that conscription constituted involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth
Amendment, among other claims. Id. at 6 (“[I]t is a combination of Church and state, and so infringes the
religious belief of the people of the United States.”).
352 Id. at 23.
353 Id. at 34. Jacob Panken, the attorney in United States v. Graubard, similarly argued that the law
violated the First Amendment because it discriminated against objectors who were not members of wellrecognized sects. Id. at 11. According to Panken,

[A] man may have a conscientious objection and not belong to that particular church. . . .
....
. . . He may have the belief it is wrong to take life, and because of that he is a conscientious
objector. He may disbelieve in war, and where a conscientious man objects to going to war, and
does not belong to any religious party or organization, that is a discrimination; it is a
discrimination against such persons, and it is a discrimination in favor of such religious
organization.
Id.

354

Id. at 34.
Brief of Walter Nelles as Amicus Curiae, Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918) (No. 656)
[hereinafter NCLB Amicus Brief].
355
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upon their duty towards Man,” Nelles explained.356 But whatever their
motivations, the nation’s “fundamental law,”357 including the First Amendment
as well as the Ninth (which preserved the people’s unenumerated “natural
rights”358), extended them protection. Nelles conceded that in the eighteenth or
early nineteenth centuries, when “[n]early every one’s sacred beliefs had
relation with a Deity,” it might have been reasonable to limit exemptions to
recognized religious sects.359 In the twentieth, by contrast, organized religion
was on the decline.360 The Supreme Court had long since severed the
connection between sect and conscience.361 In recent decades, religion had
altogether “escaped . . . from theology”; modernity had rent the ties between
“right and wrong” and a “putative Maker.”362 Citing William James for the
proposition that atheism, “psychologically considered, is indistinguishable
from religious zeal,”363 Nelles believed it was the “psychological fact, not its
theological suit of clothes, which the First Amendment to the Constitution
protects.”364
Relying on Ex Parte Milligan,365 Nelles rejected the principle, espoused by
such legal luminaries as Elihu Root, that constitutional protections were
subordinate to claims of necessity during times of national crisis.366 To be sure,
“the right to conform conduct to conscience” could occasionally be
curtailed.367 The Supreme Court’s decision in Reynolds v. United States,368
356

Id. at 2.
Id.
358 Id. at 3.
359 Id.
360 Id. at 4.
361 Id. For that point, Nelles cited Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) (“It is often confounded with
the cultus or form of worship of a particular sect, but is distinguishable from the latter. The first
amendment . . . was intended to allow every one under the jurisdiction of the United States to entertain such
notions respecting his relations to his Maker and the duties they impose as may be approved by his judgment
and conscience, and to exhibit his sentiments in such form of worship as he may think proper, not injurious to
the equal rights of others . . . .”).
362 NCLB Amicus Brief, supra note 355, at 5.
363 Id. at 6; WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: A STUDY IN HUMAN NATURE 35
(1902).
364 NCLB Amicus Brief, supra note 355, at 6.
365 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
366 NCLB Amicus Brief, supra note 355, at 9–10. “What is the effect of our entering upon this war? The
effect is that we have surrendered, and are obliged to surrender, a great measure of that liberty which you and I
have been asserting in court during all our lives—power over property, power over person. . . . You cannot
have free democracy and successful war at the same moment.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Elihu Root,
Address to the Conference of Bar Associations). See also To Hell with the Constitution, Says Elihu Root,
Anarchist, NEW AGE (Jan. 5, 1917), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 5, Vol. 43.
367 NCLB Amicus Brief, supra note 355, at 9.
357
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which rejected Mormons’ claim for constitutional exemption from the federal
anti-bigamy law, had allowed for the regulation of conduct that, as Nelles put
it, “outrage[d] the moral sense of the community.”369 On that score, however,
the government lacked a leg to stand on. After all, it was death, not refusal to
kill, that properly “shock[ed] that moral sense.”370
Nelles’s indictment of violence stood out in a brief otherwise notable for its
pluralistic deference. Where others extolled expressive freedom for its
propensity to expose the truth, Nelles thought truth was elusive, if it existed at
all. “[S]ince everything human is fallible,” he argued, “there is no authoritative
criterion of the rightness of anything.”371 Indeed, “the blindest arbitrary
assumption has at least the chance of being as right as reason.”372
Unsurprisingly, Nelles’s relativism failed to persuade the Supreme Court
(whose Chief Justice had interrupted one attorney’s oral argument to rebuke
him for his “unpatriotic” insinuation that the war lacked popular support).373
Like the government’s brief, the Court all but ignored the objectors’ appeal to
liberty of conscience. Indeed, it “pass[ed] without anything but statement the
proposition that an establishment of a religion or an interference with the free
exercise thereof repugnant to the First Amendment resulted from the
exemption clauses of the act,” because it considered the “unsoundness” of the
argument “too apparent to require” anything more.374
In upholding the Selective Service Act, the Court emphasized the
expansive reach of federal power.375 In so doing, it abandoned its solicitude for
368

98 U.S. 145 (1879).
NCLB Amicus Brief, supra note 355, at 9; Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145 (denying exemption from
anti-bigamy laws on religious grounds). On Reynolds, see SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON
QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2002).
370 NCLB Amicus Brief, supra note 355, at 9.
371 Id. at 8.
372 Id.
373 Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918), upholding the Act, was decided on January 7, 1918. Chief
Justice Edward Douglass White’s reprimand of attorney J. Gordon Jones was reported in Justice White
Rebukes Lawyer Attacking Draft, N.Y. TRIB., Dec. 13, 1917, microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24,
Reel 5, Vol. 43.
374 Arver, 245 U.S. at 389–90; see also Government Brief at 82–83, Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S.
480 (1918) (No. 656) (“This provision has nothing in it ‘respecting an establishment of religion.’ The law
recognizes the right of every citizen to choose religious affiliations without restriction. It goes so far as to aid
in the free exercise of those religions which forbid participation in war. Under section 4 also may be exempted
‘those found to be physically or morally deficient’ and those with dependents. It will not be argued that the law
establishes a status of physical or moral deficiency, or of financial dependency; nor that freedom to change
these conditions is prohibited.”).
375 Arver, 245 U.S. at 389.
369
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individual autonomy in cases involving property rights and freedom of
contract. The inconsistency was particularly striking in light of the Court’s
notorious decision in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell just one month
prior.376 In that case, a six-Justice majority upheld an injunction against the
United Mine Workers for attempting to recruit non-union workers, who had
signed yellow-dog contracts in keeping with their “constitutional rights of
personal liberty and private property.” On December 22, 1917—after oral
argument in the conscription cases, but before the Court’s decision was handed
down—the New Republic published an editorial on Hitchman Cole & Coke.
“The decision,” it mused, would “confirm the popular feeling . . . that a
majority of the Supreme Court are endeavoring to enforce their own
reactionary views of public policy, in direct opposition to the more enlightened
views prevailing in legislatures and among the public.”377 It is no wonder that
the NCLB’s constitutional strategy in the draft-act challenge attracted little
Progressive support.
As for conservatives, the American Bar Association and its corporate allies
loudly decried the Administration’s abridgement of “civil liberty” (a concept
the New York Times had recently dismissed as an “obstacle to progress”378). In
fact, the ABA celebrated the unique role of the judiciary in maintaining
“constitutional safeguards to individual rights of property and liberty” and, by
extension, forestalling socialist revolution.379 And yet, the Illinois State Bar
Association captured lawyers’ dominant view when it passed a resolution
deeming it “contrary to the ethics of the profession for members of the Bar to
accept professional employment which will involve their appearance before the
exemption boards . . . for the purpose of securing for individuals or classes,
exemption from the selective draft for service during the war.”380
Conservatives were not yet concerned with preserving personal rights, and they
were unwilling to insulate antiwar advocacy, let alone exemption from

376

245 U.S. 229, 251 (1917).
Opinion, Breaking the Labor Truce, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 22, 1917, at 197, 197.
378 Dr. Frank J. Goodnow Examines and Compares the Constitutions of Leading Nations, with Interesting
Results for Our Own Political System, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1916, at 28 (reviewing FRANK J. GOODNOW,
PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT (1916)); see also supra note 172 and accompanying text.
379 Rome G. Brown et al., Report of the Committee to Oppose Judicial Recall, 3 A.B.A. J. 454, 457
(1917); see also Walter George Smith, Civil Liberty in America, Address by Walter George Smith, 4 A.B.A. J.
551 (1918).
380 Addendum: Employment to Secure Exemption from Draft Unethical, 3 A.B.A. J. 558 (1917).
377
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conscription for political objectors.381 It would take much longer, and stronger
threats to conservative interests, for the ACLU to accomplish that goal.382
In elevating individual conscience over democratic consensus, the draft-act
challenges threatened Progressive ideals; in serving socialist dissenters, they
alienated judicial enthusiasts. In short, the defense of conscientious objectors
in the courts had few advocates during the war. The NCLB’s participation in
the conscription cases impeded the organization’s fundraising and recruitment
efforts. Correspondents complained that “fighting the draft and attempting to
repeal it merely discredits an organization which indulges in the pastime
without doing the slightest good.”383 Even allies who shared the NCLB’s
concern for conscientious objectors rejected the organization’s methods.384 No
less a civil libertarian than Zechariah Chafee accepted the legitimacy of
conscription and chalked up the constitutional challenge to “extreme views.”385
By the spring of 1918, exemptions for inductees were the least of the
NCLB’s concerns. The organization was resisting government repression on
multiple fronts, including the federal prosecution of the entire leadership of the
Industrial Workers of the World.386 As sympathetic officials proved willing to
accommodate individual objectors with religious convictions, the NCLB’s
particular allegiance to political objectors became increasingly evident.387
Perhaps if the NCLB had remained within the AUAM and maintained a more
moderate posture, it might have extracted more concessions from
administration officials. Perhaps the government’s lackluster attitude drove the
381

Id.; see also WEINRIB, supra note 31.
WEINRIB, supra note 31.
383 Letter from Lawrence G. Brooks to Roger N. Baldwin (Sept. 21, 1917), microformed on ACLU
Papers, supra note 24, Reel 4, Vol. 32.
384 E.g., Letter from John S. Codman to Roger N. Baldwin (Oct. 25, 1917), microformed on ACLU
Papers, supra note 24, Reel 3, Vol. 25 (“I have no doubt that I agree with your attitude as to the conscientious
objector and the question would, therefore, come on the draft. What I shall want to know sooner or later is to
what extent your Committee intends to push the question of the constitutionality because I doubt the
expediency of doing this and would not want to be connected with it.”).
385 Chafee, supra note 1, at 937. Chafee reasoned, “The provisions of the Bill of Rights cannot be applied
with absolute literalness but are subject to exceptions. For instance, the prohibition of involuntary servitude in
the Thirteenth Amendment does not prevent military conscription, or the enforcement of a ‘work or fight’
statute.” Id. Chafee evidently considered the Thirteenth Amendment to fall within the Bill of Rights. On the
ambiguous nature of that term prior to World War II, see Gerard N. Magliocca, How Did the Bill of Rights
Become the Bill of Rights (Ind. Univ. Sch. Law, Research Paper No. 2015-30), http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2617811.
386 See WALKER, supra note 9, at 37.
387 Letter from Frederick Keppel, Third Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War, to L. Hollingsworth Wood et
al. (Oct. 2, 1918), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 6, Vol. 47.
382
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NCLB to more radical methods. Either way, the NCLB’s efforts yielded fewer
and fewer practical results.
Early in 1918, official dealings with the NCLB became a liability for the
War Department.388 Colonel R.H. Van Deman, chief of the Intelligence
Section of the War College in Washington, D.C., had launched an investigation
of Baldwin in December 1917.389 By the spring of 1918, the NCLB was under
close observation.390 Keppel told Baldwin in late February that many of
Newton Baker’s “military associates” believed that the NCLB was flirting with
“direct conflict with the government.”391 In response, Baldwin wrote to Major
Nicholas Biddle, an intelligence officer, and—attaching all of the
organization’s printed materials, as well as its mailing list—requested that an
inquiry be made into the NCLB’s activity to clear the organization’s name.392
Baldwin insisted that the NCLB was not doing anything to embarrass the
government’s recruitment effort, and he wrote Van Deman directly with a
promise to cease all potentially objectionable activities.393 Van Deman
nonetheless advised prosecution of Baldwin under the Sedition Act, and
although the NCLB’s activity was eventually deemed lawful, the War
Department severed communications with the group.394
Even then, the NCLB sought desperately to salvage the relationship. In
correspondence with Keppel, Baldwin emphasized that the NCLB was “acting
wholly within the letter of the law and within the spirit of the Secretary’s

388 Letter from Frederick Keppel to Roger N. Baldwin (Feb. 26, 1918), microformed on ACLU Papers,
supra note 24, Reel 2, Vol. 15.
389 COTTRELL, supra note 29, at 66.
390 Id. at 66–67; ROY TALBERT, JR., NEGATIVE INTELLIGENCE: THE ARMY AND THE AMERICAN LEFT,
1917–1941, at 78–81 (1991).
391 Letter from Frederick Keppel to Roger N. Baldwin, supra note 388. Baldwin assumed that the
principal objection was to the conscientious objector work, since the organization’s legal defense work was
“directly communicated to the Department of Justice.” Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Frederick Keppel,
Third Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War (Mar. 1, 1918), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel
2, Vol. 15.
392 Letter from Roger N. Baldwin, Dir., Nat’l Civil Liberties Bureau, to Major Nicholas Biddle (Mar. 8,
1918), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 2, Vol. 15.
393 Letter from Colonel Ralph H. Van Deman, Chief, Military Intelligence Branch, U.S. Dep’t of War, to
Frederick Keppel, Third Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War (Mar. 9, 1918), microformed on ACLU Papers,
supra note 24, Reel 2, Vol. 15.
394 COTTRELL, supra note 29, at 75. L. Hollingsworth Wood, a personal friend of Keppel’s, met with him
for an hour and commented that Keppel “seemed a good deal wrought up over the situation.” Memorandum of
Conference with Third Assistant Sec’y of War Keppel (Aug. 14, 1918), microformed on AUAM Papers, supra
note 42, Reel 10:1; Letter from Frederick Keppel to Roger N. Baldwin (May 19, 1918), microformed on
ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 2, Vol. 15.
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policy.”395 He professed the organization’s willingness “to discontinue any
practices” that the War Department deemed objectionable.396 Shut out of the
inner circles of the War Department, Baldwin grew increasingly frustrated. To
the last, he assured the War Department that he stood ready “now, as at any
time, to discontinue efforts which the Secretary of War may not think to be
helpful”—lest the breakdown in communication “throw the whole matter into
the field of public controversy and . . . undo much of the quiet and effective
work toward a satisfactory solution.”397 And yet, he grew “thoroughly
disgusted with the folks at Washington who have given us such hearty
assurances.”398 Those assurances, he complained, did not translate into tolerant
policy, and “the indictments go on merrily.”399
Ultimately, the space between the NCLB’s position and the War
Department’s with respect to conscientious objectors was insurmountable. The
Wilson Administration proved willing to do much to accommodate objectors
who were unequivocally opposed to participation in war and who were willing
to accept alternative service, even if they were motivated by moral rather than
religious scruples. But the Bureau’s special concern for political objectors,
who were willing to “take part in some wars, as for example social
revolutions,” bears emphasis.400 From the beginning, the NCLB leadership was
particularly concerned with those few stalwart radicals whose
class-consciousness motivated their resistance to a capitalist war, and who
were therefore adjudged insincere.401

395

Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Major Nicholas Biddle, supra note 392.
Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Frederick Keppel (Mar. 13, 1918), microformed on ACLU Papers,
supra note 24, Reel 2, Vol. 15; Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Major Nicholas Biddle, supra note 392;
Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Frederick Keppel, supra note 391.
397 Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Colonel Ralph Van Deman, Chief, Military Intelligence Branch, U.S.
Dep’t of War (Aug. 17, 1918), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 2, Vol. 15.
398 Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Edmund Evans (Mar. 16, 1918), microformed on ACLU Papers,
supra note 24, Reel 3, Vol. 25.
399 Id.
400 Letter from L. Hollingsworth Wood et al., Nat’l Civil Liberties Bureau, to Newton Baker, Sec’y, U.S.
Dep’t of War (Sept. 14, 1918), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 5, Vol. 44; see also Letter
from Roger N. Baldwin to Newton Baker (June 30, 1917), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel
2, Vol. 15 (noting undue limitation of religious exemption).
401 EDWARD M. COFFMANN, THE WAR TO END ALL WARS: THE AMERICAN MILITARY EXPERIENCE IN
WORLD WAR I 76 (1968) (“A major criterion for sincerity was whether or not the man objected only to this
particular war.”); Press Release, Nat’l Civil Liberties Bureau (Jan. 23, 1919), microformed on AUAM Papers,
supra note 42, Reel 10:1 (“The Board had found that their objection to all war which alone entitled objectors
to farm furlough was not sincere or well founded.”).
396
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This was a step that the Wilson Administration was patently unwilling to
make. As Harlan Fiske Stone observed, reflecting after the war on his service
for the Board of Inquiry, it was “conceivable that one might have a moral and
conscientious aversion to participating in the late war with Germany, although
such conscientious objection would not prevent his participating in a war to
exterminate the capitalist and the bourgeois.”402 But the Board was spared the
task of assessing such “casuistic arguments.”403 It was the War Department’s
policy that conscientious objectors be accommodated only if they opposed “all
war on principle.”404 In correspondence with the NCLB, Newton Baker
explained that the appropriate place for political objectors was the
“Disciplinary Barracks.”405 Baker distinguished sharply “between the man
whose fundamental difficulty is the taking of human life, and the man who
stands merely in political opposition to the program which our government is
now carrying out.”406
In the run-up to November’s Armistice, the NLCB leadership conveyed its
frustration in forthright terms. The NCLB faulted the government for its
stubborn insensitivity to the plight of absolutist objectors, who refused
alternative service, and especially to those “political objectors” who were
willing to “take part in some wars, as for example social revolutions.”407
Echoing Norman Angell, its representatives emphasized in a September 1918
letter the “value of minorities in social process” (after all, the “minority of
today may be the majority of tomorrow”) and society’s “incalculable debt to its
heretics.”408 They also emphasized the horrors of war, which “right-thinking
men” would consider justifiable only in legitimate cases of “social
necessity.”409 And they stressed that conscientious objectors would remain a
small minority of eligible men, given the tremendous social pressure to
serve.410 But above all, they celebrated conscience as a purely individual
decision “whether a particular course of action under particular conditions is
402

Harlan F. Stone, The Conscientious Objector, 21 COLUM. UNIV. Q. 253, 267 (1919).
Id.
404 Id.
405 Letter from Newton Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War, to L. Hollingsworth Wood, Chairman, Nat’l
Civil Liberties Bureau (July 15, 1918), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 6, Vol. 47.
406 Id.
407 Letter from L. Hollingsworth Wood et al. to Newton Baker, supra note 400.
408 Id.
409 Id. (“For a man to fight in a war that to him seems unnecessary or unjust may be as keen a torment to
his conscience as for a Quaker, who disbelieves in force for any purpose, to fight in a war he considers wholly
just.”).
410 Id.
403
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morally right or wrong.”411 That the War Department believed the political
objectors were mistaken was irrelevant; the important point was that they were
sincere. Emphasis on “the value of the individual” distinguished American
democracy from the “Prussian doctrine of the total subordination of the
individual to the state.”412
Answering for the War Department, Keppel balked. The suggestion that
political objectors merited exemption, he explained, revealed a “profound
misapprehension” of the principle on which the administration’s policy toward
conscientious objectors was based413—namely, “respect for the scruples of
those who cannot conscientiously take human life.”414 In his letter, Keppel
succinctly elucidated the War Department’s rationale for excluding political
objectors. “The very root and essence of the whole matter is conscientious
aversion to destroying human life,” he explained.415 “The man who is willing
to take human life if, in his judgment, the occasion is sufficiently compelling,
obviously does not come within the shadow of this principle.”416
From the War Department’s perspective, the NCLB’s attitude was more
than merely misguided. “To admit such an exemption as that for which you
contend would be to admit the right of every man to set himself up as judge of
the wisdom of our Government in engaging in the present war,” Keppel
continued.417 “[I]t would be to acknowledge that the Selective Service Law is
binding upon the drafted man only so far as he sees fit to obey it.”418 Newton
Baker had made the same point in explaining why no exemption could be
extended to men of “enemy extraction.”419 Excusing military service on that
basis would open the floodgates to a broad range of exemption claims, from
tax evasion to respecting others’ right to life.420 Any such outcome stood in
direct contrast to Progressive ideals.
According to Keppel, War Department officials had prescribed tolerance
for conscientious objectors only because of the unmistakable moral gravity of
inflicting death. “It has no broader basis, and can have none, as long as
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420

Id.
Id.
Letter from Frederick Keppel to L. Hollingsworth Wood et al., supra note 387.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Letter from Newton Baker to the Judge Advocate General (June 9, 1918)).
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organized government is to endure,” he added.421 The NCLB’s proposal
amounted to “the negation of law, of authority, of government when the
individual is prepared to assert that these collide with his conscience.”422
Following the path the NCLB advocated would undermine the “safety of the
United States.”423
As the end of the war approached, the Wilson Administration worried that
the NCLB itself, not just its clients, threatened state security. The Post Office
deemed fourteen of the organization’s pamphlets non-mailable, despite
doubting that they violated the Espionage Act (Judge Augustus Hand
eventually held them deliverable).424 In late August, government agents began
investigating Baldwin’s activities on behalf of the IWW.425 Nicholas Biddle,
now a lieutenant colonel in the Office of Military Intelligence, dispatched
agents to the NCLB offices to gather evidence for an Espionage Act
prosecution.426 Walter Nelles linked the raid to patrioteering groups and the
IWW trial, as well as the organization’s work on behalf of conscientious
objectors.427 Despite demands for an indictment, the NCLB’s highly placed
connections (especially John Nevin Sayre, brother of President Wilson’s
son-in-law), discouraged the Department of Justice from prosecuting.428
One member of the NCLB leadership, however, was soon to face
prosecution, albeit on different charges. In August 1918, the draft age was
raised from thirty to forty-five, and the thirty-four-year-old Roger Baldwin

421

Id.
Id.
423 Id. Although the letter was not actually written by Keppel, it evidently captured his attitude. Letter
from Frederick Keppel to L. Hollingsworth Wood (Oct. 9, 1918), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note
24, Reel 6, Vol. 47; see also Letter from Newton Baker to L. Hollingsworth Wood, supra note 405 (“I make a
sharp distinction in my mind between the man whose fundamental difficulty is the taking of human life, and
the man who stands merely in political opposition to the program which our government is now carrying
out.”).
424 JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 74–75; Press Release, Nat’l Civil Liberties Bureau (Oct. 17, 1918) (on file
with Swarthmore College Library, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Records of American Civil Liberties
Union, Box 1, Folder 1918).
425 COTTRELL, supra note 29, at 80–81.
426 Id.
427 Letter from L. Hollingsworth Wood to Friends of the Bureau (Sept. 17, 1918), microformed on AUAM
Papers, supra note 42, Reel 10:1 (“No change whatever in the operation of the Bureau is contemplated,
regardless of the results of the examination of our papers.”).
428 COTTRELL, supra note 29, at 82; JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 76–77; Letter from John Nevin Sayre to
Albert DeSilver (Oct. 18, 1918), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 6, Vol. 47 (noting that he
had telephoned his brother, President Wilson’s son-in-law, who had agreed to write to Newton Baker to “put in
a good word”).
422
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became eligible for conscription.429 Baldwin pledged to resign as director of
the NCLB in order to take a “personal stand.”430 In mid-September, he failed to
appear for his physical examination and filed a statement refusing to “perform
any service under compulsion regardless of its character.”431 In October, he
was arrested upon his own request and indicted for violation of the Selective
Service Act.432
On October 30, 1918, Roger Baldwin appeared before Judge Julius Mayer
in the Southern District of New York433—the same judge who had presided
over the July 1917 convictions of Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman for
conspiracy to interfere with the draft.434 In his statement, Baldwin eschewed
arguments about pluralism and the public interest and instead emphasized his
uncompromising commitment to “individual freedom.”435 At the beginning of
the war, Baldwin had tackled the problem of conscientious objectors with the
techniques and enthusiasm of a veteran Progressive reformer. As the NCLB
came under investigation and its clients languished in jail, he grew
disenchanted with state-centered reform. Indeed, he lost faith in the state
altogether.436
In his statement to the court, Baldwin declared himself unequivocally
opposed to war and, consequently, to conscription.437 But his refusal to
perform military service was part of a larger program. He informed the court
that he would resist any attempt by government to control his “choice of
service and ideals.”438 He claimed an absolute right of individual conscience—
a right that superseded national allegiance and trumped government power.439

429

Pub. L. No. 210 (1917), in SELECTIVE SERVICE REGULATIONS 357 (2d ed. 1918).
Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to the Directing Comm. (Aug. 10, 1918), microformed on ACLU
Papers, supra note 24, Reel 3, Vol. 25. He initially intended to refuse to register, but the raid on the NCLB
offices prompted him to delay action until the “critical period” had passed. COTTRELL, supra note 29, at 81.
431 Id. (quoting Roger Baldwin).
432 THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE: THE PROBLEM AS PRESENTED BY THE SENTENCING OF ROGER N.
BALDWIN 6 (1918). He refused bail and helped the Department of Justice to organize the NCLB’s confiscated
files. COTTRELL, supra note 29, at 86.
433 THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE, supra note 432, at 3.
434 Convict Berkman and Miss Goldman: Both off to Prison, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1917.
435 THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE, supra note 432, at 6.
436 His about-face stemmed in large part from his intimate involvement in the IWW defense, described in
WEINRIB, supra note 31.
437 THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE, supra note 432, at 6.
438 Id.
439 Id. Baldwin did not except class war from his statement.
430
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Baldwin was explicit about his rejection of Progressive ideals. He
recounted his childhood and education, as well as his work in St. Louis as a
social worker and reformer.440 He attributed his departure from St. Louis to his
disillusionment with incremental change.441 For the past six years, he had “felt
[himself] heart and soul with the world-wide radical movements for industrial
and political freedom—wherever and however expressed—and more and more
impatient with reform.”442 Echoing the claims of the radical libertarians and
anarchists of the prior decade and, more prominently of John Stuart Mill, he
called for a “social order without any external restraints upon the individual,
save through public opinion and the opinion of friends and neighbors.”443
Although he was espousing a minority position, he believed himself to be part
of a “great revolt surging up from the people—the struggle of the masses
against the rule of the world.”444 And the movement he had joined was a fight
against the “political state itself.”445
To Judge Mayer, Baldwin’s beliefs were incompatible with the very
republican liberties he invoked.446 He advised Baldwin that “the freest
discussion” should be allowed and encouraged “in the processes that lead up to
the enactment of a statute.”447 Once a law was passed, he added, the people
were free to debate “the methods of [its] administration.”448 But democracy
was incompatible with individual disregard for duly enacted laws.449 Although
he was impressed with Baldwin’s sincerity, Judge Mayer sentenced him to one
year in prison, the maximum provided by law—an outcome that Baldwin
accepted with a “friendly smile.”450
Over the coming months, Baldwin’s friends and allies sought to secure him
an executive pardon, but Baldwin refused to leave jail except under a general
440

Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
442 Id. at 9.
443 Id.
444 Id.
445 Id. at 10.
446 Id. at 12.
447 Id. at 13.
448 Id.
449 Id.
450 Baldwin Gets Year for Draft Act Defiance, N.Y. CALL, Oct. 31, 1918, microformed on ACLU Papers,
supra note 24, Reel 6, Vol. 46. Baldwin later recalled that a wide range of groups commended him for his
stand, including the American Association for Organized Charities, the National Municipal League, the
Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the Liberal Club of Harvard, and the League for Democratic
Control. LAMSON, supra note 29, at 111.
441
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amnesty.451 He reiterated his opposition to state authority and affirmed his
commitment to a “social principle more precious . . . than personal freedom,”
namely, the right to follow the dictates of one’s God and conscience, which he
linked to an “ancient principle of individual liberty.”452 In Baldwin’s view,
only a “clean-ought, straight-out recognition of the principle of individual
conscience” would satisfy the demands of “sound public policy.”453 To
Baldwin, in contrast to his Progressive sometime allies, the state was “not a
sacred institution.”454 Baldwin rejected the romantic notion that state policy
reflected a “determined majority opinion.” Rather, the nation’s small cadre of
elected officials represented “the controlling economic interests of the
country.”455 What Baldwin wanted was a “new order of society, freed of the
compulsion and arbitrary restraints of an all supreme State.”456
Baldwin vowed not to leave prison through political favors while hundreds
of his fellow objectors continued to “drag out long, lifeless days behind
bars.”457 In any case, his own time in jail was tolerable, even “profitable.”458
As he told the New York Call, he left prison “more of a radical than [he] went
in.”459 He intended to decline participation in any civic institution—including
voting and jury duty—and to join the “revolutionary labor movement,” since
the world had “passed so-called political democracy” by.460 He acted on his
ideals by joining the IWW, the organization whose opposition to political
action influenced Baldwin’s own anti-statism most profoundly.461 He spent

451 Press Release, Nat’l Civil Liberties Bureau (Mar. 7, 1919), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note
24, Reel 5, Vol. 44.
452 Letter from Roger N. Baldwin, Dir., Nat’l Civil Liberties Bureau, to Albert DeSilver (Mar. 5, 1919),
microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 5, Vol. 44.
453 Id. Consistent with his evolving class concerns, he added, “We want it understood that military
conscription against which our imprisonment is our protest is not far removed from industrial conscription,
which in various sinister forms, the great commercial interests are endeavoring to secure in order to crush the
growing power of labor.” Id.
454 Id.
455 Id.
456 Id.
457 Id.
458 Roger Baldwin Free from Jail, Urges Amnesty for Politicals, N.Y. CALL, July 20, 1919, microformed
on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 6, Vol. 45. See generally COTTRELL, supra note 29, at 94–97. Baldwin
was released on July 19, 1919. Id.
459 Roger Baldwin Free from Jail, Urges Amnesty for Politicals, supra note 458. The New York Call
reported that due to his disdain for “representative government,” he would not join the Socialist Party. Id.; see
also Clipping, N.Y. TELEGRAM, July 20, 1919, microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 6, Vol. 45.
460 Clipping, supra note 459.
461 COTTRELL, supra note 29, at 73. Bill Haywood sponsored him for membership, despite his
reservations about Baldwin’s greater utility as an advocate. Id.

WEINRIB GALLEYSPROOFS2

1114

4/18/2016 2:23 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:1051

several months traveling the country as an itinerant worker before returning to
New York to found the ACLU.462
IV. THE LEGACY OF CONSCIENCE
The emergence of contemporary First Amendment doctrine in the wake of
World War I is an often told, if often oversimplified, story. In the conventional
account, the unprecedented scale of wartime suppression produced a new
coalition of Progressives and liberal lawyers on behalf of expressive
freedom.463 Rather than making the world safe for democracy, the end of
hostilities abroad unleashed a new wave of repression at home.464 Unsettled by
the scale of postwar intolerance, the new civil liberties movement retooled free
speech to protect the public interest and defuse social conflict.465 Judges and
academics allegedly rallied to a marketplace of ideas, where the best ideas
would eventually prevail.466 The same aversion to enforced conformity carried
over to religious freedom, albeit more slowly, and over the ensuing decades,
the reach of the First Amendment’s religion clauses expanded as well.467
This conventional story is partly true. Clearly, the war and the ensuing Red
Scare prompted reevaluation of the importance of the First Amendment.468
Organization and advocacy on behalf of civil liberties were in shambles at the
close of the war, but as the wartime exigencies dissipated and repression
continued, many Americans within and outside the political and legal
establishments began to espouse greater tolerance for difference, and stronger

462

Id. at 108–11.
For a summary of this “mainstay of scholarly popular culture, handed down from author to author with
little reexamination of the original sources,” see GRABER, supra note 5, at 4–6. See also MURPHY, supra note
7, at 29–30.
464 GRABER, supra note 5, at 4.
465 Id.
466 The notion of the “marketplace of ideas” is ordinarily ascribed to Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”). Legal scholars have long critiqued the
marketplace model. E.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L.
REV. 964, 974–78 (1978); Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 6–13.
467 See, e.g., 12 WIECEK, supra note 12, at 213, 220 (concluding that between the Supreme Court’s 1940
incorporation of the Free Exercise Clause (which marked its entry into religious freedom cases) and 1953, the
Court “usually chose religious freedom”).
468 MURPHY, supra note 7, at 15–18 (describing the notable efforts by contemporary critics to grapple
with the wartime repression).
463
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adherence to the rule of law.469 In the history of civil liberties, World War I is
an undeniable flashpoint.
What the most familiar interwar figures demanded in the realm of personal
rights was, however, little more than a return to normalcy. The proponents of
free speech during and immediately after the war drew from tropes and tactics
developed by Progressives over the past two decades. Of course, they
reassessed the priority of expressive freedom vis-à-vis other Progressive
values; official lawlessness and vigilante violence, among other concerning
developments, had revealed the high cost of conformist propaganda.470 Many
interwar civil liberties advocates responded to institutional developments,
including the dramatic expansion of administrative power.471 Above all, a few
judges and Justices—including some very important ones, like Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. and Louis Brandeis—came to recognize a role for the judiciary in
insulating free speech from democratic overreaching (though they remained
dissenters throughout the 1920s).472 Nonetheless, the most prominent theories
of civil liberties in 1920 borrowed heavily from their prewar precursors.
The ACLU’s vision of civil liberties was an exception. If there was a single
salient feature of its founders’ wartime experience, it was the pervasiveness of
failure. To varying degrees, every office of government succumbed to patriotic
fervor.473 More than anything, the war shattered the confidence of the ACLU
leadership in administrative expertise and centralized state power, rendering
the courts no worse (that is, equally poor) a candidate for civil liberties
enforcement than the tainted political branches. When it was founded in 1920,
the ACLU rejected all three as tools of civil liberties enforcement, opting

469 Perhaps the best-known example is the Report on the Illegal Practices of the United States Department
of Justice, signed by twelve prominent lawyers and scholars, including Felix Frankfurter, Zechariah Chafee,
Ernst Freund, and Roscoe Pound. R.G. BROWN ET. AL., NAT’L. POPULAR GOV’T LEAGUE, TO THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE: REPORT UPON THE ILLEGAL PRACTICES OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (1921).
470 On the relationship between official lawlessness, vigilante violence, and civil liberties, see generally
CAPOZZOLA, supra note 7.
471 Id. at 210. On interwar efforts to grapple with the expansion of administrative power, see DANIEL R.
ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900–1940 (2014);
Daniel R. Ernst, Ernst Freund, Felix Frankfurter and the American Rechtsstaat: A Transatlantic Shipwreck,
1894–1932, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 171 (2009).
472 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920); Schaefer v.
United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). On Justice Holmes’s
conversion, see HEALY, supra note 7; POLENBERG, supra note 8; RABBAN, supra note 5, at 346–54; STONE,
supra note 5, at 198–211.
473 WALKER, supra note 9, at 24–25.
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instead for the direct action tactics of the IWW and its other wartime clients.474
That is, it folded both expressive and religious freedom into a new,
state-skeptical civil liberties agenda, which sought to insulate the labor
struggle—including labor’s most powerful economic weapons, the boycott and
strike—against government intervention.475 “We realize that these standards of
civil liberty cannot be attained as abstract principles or as constitutional
guarantees,” it explained in an early statement.476 “Economic or political
power is necessary to assert and maintain all ‘rights.’ In the midst of any
conflict they are not granted by the side holding the economic . . . power.”477
More to the point, “the property interests of the country [were] so completely
in control of our political life as to establish what [was] in effect a class
government—a government by and for business.”478 The ACLU was
disinclined to trust in state power when it believed that “[p]olitical
democracy,” outside of a handful of communities, “[did] not exist.”479
World War I taught the ACLU that unpopular minorities could not rely on
state moderation even when their friends occupied positions of power. But the
NCLB leadership learned another important lesson, as well. It learned that
claims for expressive freedom (as well as procedural rights) were more
acceptable than claims for exemption on the basis of conscience. Both had
yielded, of course, to the exigencies of war. But the two types of failure were
different in kind. Judges and public officials who were sympathetic to free
speech rejected exemption claims not only as a function of wartime interest
balancing, but also as a fundamental threat to Progressive values.480 Simply
put, Progressives considered claims for expressive freedom—even
court-centered and constitutional ones—to be more palatable than
conscience-based carve-outs from generally applicable laws.
The modern vision of civil liberties emerged slowly and haltingly, and the
ACLU that engineered it bore little resemblance to its wartime precursor or to
its present-day heir. Between the great coal and steel strikes of 1919 and the
474 WEINRIB, supra note 31. It also emphasized grass-roots agitation. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, THE FIGHT FOR FREE SPEECH 28 (1921) (“We are confronted with a situation throughout the country in
which we must depend more and more upon publicity and less upon contests in the courts.”).
475 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 474, at 16 (“The right of workers to organize . . . and to strike,
should never be infringed by law.”).
476 Id. at 18.
477 Id.
478 Id. at 4.
479 Id.
480 See supra notes 446–50.

WEINRIB GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

4/18/2016 2:23 PM

FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE IN WAR TIME

1117

early New Deal, when labor militancy was at a relative low, the organization
engaged in its most influential work. Working in comparatively
uncontroversial fields (like academic freedom and sex education) and through
less threatening methods (including legal defenses based on sufficiency of the
evidence), it grafted a state-skeptical defense of labor’s right to organize and
strike onto a conservative model of judicial enforcement.481 That is, the
modern First Amendment was not Zechariah Chafee’s First Amendment alone.
It drew support both from judicial enthusiasts skeptical of radical speech and
from Progressive pluralists otherwise antagonistic toward the federal courts.482
In the domain of conscience, however, the old Progressive hostility toward
individual rights endured, and consensus proved harder to attain. During the
1920s, conservatives decried the expanding reach of state power, a
phenomenon it associated with Prohibition almost as much as restrictive
economic laws.483 Some explicitly analogized to religious freedom. Shortly
after the Volstead Act took effect, Columbia president Nicholas Murray Butler
cautioned that
[t]he use of the power of the state to enforce some particular rule of
conduct, which those to whom it appeals describe as moral, may
easily differ only in form and not in fact from the long since
abandoned use of the power of the state to enforce conformity in
religious belief and worship.484

Incensed by the intrusion, he cast “[p]rivate morals and private conduct” as
“matters for the conscience of the individual” rather than majoritarian
regulation.485 A few years later, he lamented a “spineless corporate opinion
which . . . aims to reduce all individuality, whether of mind or character, to a
gelatinous and wobbling mass.”486
Apprehensions of this type fueled conservative support for the ACLU’s
early forays into religious freedom. In its 1923 decision in Meyer v. Nebraska,
the Supreme Court invalidated a state law restricting foreign-language

481

See WEINRIB, supra note 31.
Id.
483 E.g., A. Vernon Thomas, Giddings for Freedom!, UNITY, Oct. 9, 1919, at 83, 88 (“Thousands of
American citizens . . . consented to the involuntary dispatch of their fellows to the European charnel-house and
now whine piteously, mouthing such scared words as ‘freedom of conscience,’ because they, in turn, are the
victims of coercion in regard to the consumption of alcoholic drinks.”).
484 Nicholas Murray Butler, The Changing Foundations of Government, 8 A.B.A. J. 7, 10 (1922).
485 Id. at 10–11.
486 Butler Denounces “New Barbarians,” N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1925, at 3.
482
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instruction in the schools.487 In an opinion which presumed that substantive
due process encompassed the right “to worship God according to the dictates
of one’s conscience,” the majority identified education as a matter of “supreme
importance” and deemed the law an unconstitutional abridgement of “rights
long freely enjoyed.”488 In a striking contrast to the Court’s free speech cases,
it was Justice Holmes who dissented—reluctant, as in cases involving property
rights—to substitute the Court’s judgment for the state of Nebraska’s.489
When Meyer was decided, the ACLU considered it an “unimportant”
case.490 Still, the organization’s leadership appreciated its prospective
importance as a litigation tool. Indeed, the ACLU criticized the compulsory
education statute at issue in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,491 an Oregon initiative
measure partly justified by Progressive confidence in equality through
acculturation.492 William S. U’Ren, an eminent Oregon Progressive, assured
the ACLU’s executive committee that Oregon’s governor was a “liberal” and
that the law posed no threat to “civil or religious liberty”;493 on the contrary, it
would raise the quality of public education for all Oregon children.494 The
ACLU was unconvinced. Like the Court (this time, unanimous), it rejected the
“power of the State to standardize its children.”495 Although its principal
motivation was class consciousness rather than cultural or religious pluralism,
it cast the Oregon act as incompatible with “the right to worship according to
the dictates of one’s conscience.”496
In the mid-1920s, the ACLU became embroiled in the battle over
evolution, most famously in Dayton, Tennessee, where it defended John
Thomas Scopes in a test case of the state’s prohibition on teaching evolution in

487

262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
Id. at 399, 400, 403.
489 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
490 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE RECORD OF THE FIGHT FOR FREE SPEECH IN 1923, at 5 (1924).
491 268 U.S. 510.
492 The Oregon law reflected a cooperative campaign between Progressives committed to public education
and anti-Catholics associated with the Ku Klux Klan. See generally PAULA ABRAMS, CROSS PURPOSES: PIERCE
V. SOCIETY OF SISTERS AND THE STRUGGLE OVER COMPULSORY PUBLIC EDUCATION (2009).
493 Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to William S. U’Ren (Jan. 4, 1923), microformed on ACLU Papers,
supra note 24, Reel 34, Vol. 245.
494 Letter from William S. U’Ren to Roger N. Baldwin (Dec. 6, 1922), microformed on ACLU Papers,
supra note 24, Reel 34, Vol. 245
495 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
496 Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to William S. U’Ren, supra note 493. The ACLU initially became
interested in Pierce and other academic-freedom cases because of the Lusk Committee’s attack on radical
teachers and on the socialist Rand School of Social Science in New York. See WEINRIB, supra note 31.
488
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state-funded schools.497 The ACLU raised a litany of claims under the state and
federal constitutions, including an argument that the law established
Christianity in general and Evangelism in particular.498 As the state framed it,
however, the central issue in the trial was whether a popular majority could
dictate the curriculum in the public schools. The law’s defenders described that
authority as “fundamentally legislative” and insisted the courts could not cabin
it.499 To the ACLU, by contrast, the police power did not extend to
standardizing thought. The anti-evolution laws were of a piece with
compulsory Bible reading and with attacks on radical teachers. “All of them,”
it insisted, “involve precisely the same issues as the laws punishing opinion
passed during the war,” and with the anti-syndicalism laws that followed it.
That is, all of them reflected a growing attempt “to regulate public opinion and
to penalize minority and heretical views”—which, in the ACLU’s opinion,
justified invalidation on constitutional grounds.500
The ACLU’s position found adherents among respected public officials.
The former Progressive governor and future Supreme Court Justice Charles
Evans Hughes conveyed a similar sense of the limits of legislative authority in
a 1925 address as president of the American Bar Association.501 Hughes
regarded regulation as necessary to social progress and trusted the state to
protect its citizens from disease, unhealthy economic practices (equivocally
defined), and careless drivers.502 At the same time, he endorsed the freedom
“to worship God according to the dictates of [one’s] own conscience,”503 and
he proclaimed “the immunity of the domain of conscience” from government
control.504 The Tennessee evolution law crossed the line because it constrained
“the pursuit of knowledge . . . [by] aiming at the protection of creed or

497 Scopes v. State, 278 S.W. 57 (Tenn. 1925). On the Scopes trial, see RAY GINGER, SIX DAYS OR
FOREVER: TENNESSEE V. JOHN THOMAS SCOPES (1958); EDWARD J. LARSON, SUMMER FOR THE GODS: THE
SCOPES TRIAL AND AMERICA’S CONTINUING DEBATE OVER SCIENCE AND RELIGION (1997).
498 Statement of Facts, Assignment of Errors, Brief and Argument in Behalf of John Thomas Scopes,
Scopes, 278 S.W. 57 (No. 2) [hereinfter Scopes Supreme Court Brief], microformed on ACLU Papers, supra
note 24, Reel 38, Vol. 274.
499 Reply Brief and Argument for the State of Tennessee at 15, Scopes, 278 S.W. 57 (No. 2). The
Tennessee court upheld the law but reversed Scopes’s conviction on a technicality, foreclosing review by the
U.S. Supreme Court. Scopes v. State, 278 S.W. 57, 58 (Tenn. 1925)
500 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE TENNESSEE EVOLUTION CASE (1925), microformed on ACLU
Papers, supra note 24, Reel 44, Vol. 299.
501 Charles E. Hughes, Liberty and Law, 11 A.B.A. J. 563, 564 (1925).
502 Id. at 563, 564.
503 Id. at 565.
504 Id. at 567.
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dogma.”505 Like the ACLU, Hughes framed cases like Meyer, Pierce, and
Scopes in relation to “freedom of learning” as the “vital breath of democracy
and progress.”506 It is no wonder that the organization had hoped to have
Hughes, rather than Clarence Darrow, argue the Scopes case on appeal.507
In short, as the ACLU built its civil liberties coalition, it occasionally
invoked individual conscience and religious freedom as motivating principles.
The laws it challenged, however, involved deliberate efforts by majorities to
enforce uniformity of thought, not neutral regulations that burdened
idiosyncratic beliefs.508 That distinction mattered to commentators. One article
in the American Bar Association Journal impugned the constitutionality of the
Tennessee anti-evolution law on Establishment Clause grounds. Indeed, it went
so far as to imply a right for an instructor “who conscientiously believes in
evolution” to teach “what he believes to be true.”509 But the limits of the
article’s analysis are as telling as its surprising sweep. The author took for
granted that the liberty of conscience protected by the Constitution did not
“give a right to a Jew to refuse to testify in court on Saturday, or the right to
work on Sunday, or to a Quaker the right to stay home from the war, or to a
teacher the right to teach Pacifism in the schools.”510 After all, he reasoned,
“[t]he state must protect itself, administer justice, and conserve the public
health.”511 The Tennessee law was suspect only because its purpose was to
preserve religion rather than “public safety.”512 Americans could not insulate
their ordinary conduct from government regulation by investing it with
religious meaning, let alone by invoking moral or political opposition to its
goals.
Moreover, for many potential ACLU supporters, even the most egregious
orthodoxies were insufficient to warrant judicial intervention, as opposed to
legislative toleration or administrative moderation. Among the skeptics—
505

Id.
Id. at 566.
507 Letter from Forrest Bailey to Clarence Darrow (Sept. 14, 1925), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra
note 24, Reel 38, Vol. 274.
508 In addition to these examples, the ACLU opposed compulsory flag salutes (discussed below);
compulsory Bible reading in the schools, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, FREE SPEECH 1925–1926: THE WORK
OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 21 (1926) [hereinafter FREE SPEECH 1925–1926]; blasphemy, AM.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE FIGHT FOR CIVIL LIBERTY: THE STORY OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 1928–29, at 10–11 (1929); and laws barring atheists from testimony, id. at 10.
509 Blewett Lee, Anti-Evolution Laws Unconstitutional, 11 A.B.A. J. 417, 419 (1925).
510 Id.
511 Id.
512 Id. at 419–20.
506
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despite its sympathy for academic freedom and its distaste for the Tennessee
evolution law—was that old Progressive outlet the New Republic. “Why
should the Civil Liberties Union have consented to charge the State of
Tennessee with disobeying the Constitution in order legally to exonerate Mr.
Scopes?” one article poignantly asked. “They should have participated in the
case, if at all, for the purpose of fastening the responsibility for vindicating Mr.
Scopes, not on the Supreme Court of the United States, but on the legislature
and people of Tennessee.”513 Scopes had “intentionally violate[d] a foolish
law”; the appropriate course was to publicize the injustice of conviction under
the statute, not to challenge its constitutionality. It was one thing to invite
prosecution to promote democratic debate and repeal of undesirable statutes.
But “[t]o invoke the ultimate magic and majesty of the Supreme Court in order
to enable Mr. Scopes to escape punishment [was] merely to confuse the issue
in the popular mind.”514
The implausibility of a broader program for judicial accommodation of
conscience was evident in the ACLU’s interwar challenges to a series of
decisions refusing citizenship to alien pacifists. In 1929, the Supreme Court
handed down a decision denying citizenship to Rosika Schwimmer, a
fifty-year-old atheist, on the basis of her stated refusal to bear arms. According
to the ACLU, which paid Schimmer’s legal expenses,515 no Supreme Court
case since the war had “violate[d] the old traditions more squarely” than
Schwimmer v. United States.”516 Although Schwimmer’s lawyer emphasized
statutory interpretation and the Court did not contemplate a Free Exercise
claim, the ACLU clearly understood the case as an heir to its wartime attack on
the draft. The United States was “founded on principles of religious freedom
and liberty of conscience,” an ACLU pamphlet insisted.517 In fact, the
government’s generous accommodation of conscientious objectors during
World War I had recognized as much.518
To the Court, by contrast, the wartime experience cut the opposite way. In
refusing to comply with the laws of the United States, pacifists and
conscientious objectors had evinced a “lack of attachment to the principles of
513

The Conduct of the Scopes Trial, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 19, 1925, at 331, 332.
Id.
515 See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE CASE OF ROSIKA SCHWIMMER: ALIEN PACIFISTS NOT WANTED!
4 (1929).
516 Id. at 1.
517 Id. (“Our law recognized that in a conflict between a citizen’s duty to his God and his duty to his State,
God should prevail.”).
518 Id.
514
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the Constitution,” which the Naturalization Act required as a condition of
citizenship. Schwimmer was an outspoken pacifist, and Justice Pierce Butler
noted for the majority that she was “disposed to exert her power to influence
others.”519 It was that aspect of that case that most troubled Justice Holmes,
who (along with Justices Brandeis and Edward Terry Sanford) dissented.520
Some of Schwimmer’s beliefs “might excite popular prejudice,” he
acknowledged, “but[,] if there is any principle of the Constitution that more
imperatively calls for attachment than any other, it is the principle of free
thought—not free thought for those who agree with us, but freedom for the
thought that we hate.”521
The ACLU regarded the Schwimmer decision as a call to action.522 In
Congress, it unsuccessfully pursued legislation to admit pacifists to
citizenship.523 Meanwhile, it sought test cases involving “members of religious
sects historically opposed to war, and individual religious objectors,” in order
to raise squarely the religious freedom question that was muted in
Schwimmer.524 Two years later, two cases made their way to the Supreme
Court, both involving would-be citizens whose qualms about bearing arms
were religious in nature.525 This time, the briefs expressly argued that “the
constitutional protection of religious freedom does embrace conscientious
scruples against bearing arms in a war.”526 In United States v. Macintosh and
United States v. Bland, five-Justice majorities upheld the denial of citizenship.

519 Id. at 3; see also Transcript of Record at 11–13, United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929)
(No. 484) (“I am an uncompromising pacifist for whom even Jane Addams is not enough of a pacifist. I am an
absolute atheist. . . . I am always ready to tell anyone who wants to hear it that I am an uncompromising
pacifist and will not fight.”).
520 Id. at 654 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
521 Id. at 654–55.
522 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 515, at 3.
523 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE FIGHT FOR CIVIL LIBERTY, 1930–1931, at 12 (1931).
524 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE STORY OF CIVIL LIBERTY, 1929–1930, at 9 (1930).
525 United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636, 636 (1931); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623
(1931).
526 Brief for Respondent at 34–35, Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (No. 504), 1931 WL 32245. The brief
invoked the First and Ninth Amendments. Id. at 26. The applicant in Macintosh, Douglas Clyde Macintosh,
was Dwight Professor of Theology at Yale. Id. at 4. A Canadian by birth, he indicated that he would bear arms
only if he believed it to be morally justified. Id. at 5. John W. Davis (of the law firm now known as Davis Polk
& Wardwell), who served as Solicitor General during the Woodrow Wilson Administration and ran against
Calvin Coolidge as the 1924 Democratic presidential nominee, represented Macintosh without fee. Id. In
United States v. Bland, the Second Circuit (reversing the District Court) had held that Marie Averil Bland was
entitled to be admitted to citizenship. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (No. 505), 1930
WL 30012. Bland, also Canadian, had indicated that she would refuse to bear arms under any circumstances.
Id. at 1.
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Writing for the majority in Macintosh, Justice George Sutherland cast
Americans as a “Christian people” even while he insisted that “submission and
obedience to the laws of the land” were consistent with the “will of God.”527
Sutherland rejected as “astonishing” the notion of a constitutional right not to
bear arms.528 “Of course, there is no such principle of the Constitution,” he
wrote. “The conscientious objector is relieved from the obligation to bear arms
in obedience to no constitutional provision, express or implied, but because,
and only because, it has accorded with the policy of Congress thus to relieve
him.”529
Indeed, for the dissent as well as the majority, the relevant question was
whether Congress had been as forbearing in its naturalization laws as it was in
imposing conscription. Justice Hughes wrote the dissenting opinion, which
bore traces of his 1925 statement to the ABA. He began by clarifying the
narrowness of the issue before the Court. The case did not involve the power of
Congress to compel military service, nor to specify conditions for
naturalization, even onerous ones. The question, rather, was whether Congress
had in fact elected to condition naturalization on a promise to bear arms.530
And it mattered to Hughes that no statute had expressly done so.531 Hughes
declined to infer intent to exclude conscientious objectors from the general
words of the Naturalization Act because he believed such a construction was
“directly opposed to the spirit of our institutions and to the historic practice of

527

Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 625.
Id. at 623.
529 Id.
530 Id. at 627 (Hughes, J., dissenting).
531 The Naturalization Act of 1906, §§ 3–4, ch. 3592, 34 Stat. 596 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 372), specified
the conditions for admission to citizenship and conferred jurisdiction to naturalize aliens on the district courts
of the United States. Section 4 required the applicant to
528

declare on oath in open court that he will support the Constitution of the United States, and that
he absolutely and entirely renounces and adjures all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly by name to the prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty of which he was before a citizen or subject; that he will support and defend the
Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear
true faith and allegiance to the same.
Id. § 4.
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the Congress.”532 The Court’s decision amounted to a usurpation by “judicial
decision” of a “legislative function.”533
To be sure, what troubled Hughes was more than specious statutory
interpretation, and he acknowledged that the scope of freedom of conscience
was a function of constitutional law was well as legislative policy.534 The
naturalization cases turned on an applicant’s willingness to swear an oath,
which necessarily implicated the dictates of conscience535—and “in the forum
of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the state ha[d] always been
maintained.”536 To extract an oath conflicting with religious scruples was a
grave undertaking. Congress had wisely interpreted the oath of office in a
manner that accommodated conscientious objectors to war, and there was
every reason to extend that tolerant spirit to the requirements for
naturalization.537 At the same time, “within the domain of power,” government
was free to “enforce obedience to laws regardless of scruples.”538 In short,
Hughes’s dissent was hardly an endorsement of exemptions from neutral laws.
In an amicus brief in Macintosh,539 the American Friends Service
Committee echoed Norman Thomas’s wartime efforts to extend the
Progressive theory of free speech to religious freedom.540 The notion that the
United States “demands unqualified subjection, so that the ‘majority’ of the
‘people’ shall rule in all spheres and on all issues” was tantamount to the
“Prussian philosophy of the State,” it argued.541 The more “liberal” approach
promoted by conscientious objectors would enhance the legitimacy of the state,

532

Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 627–28 (Hughes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 628.
534 Id. at 634.
535 In 1926, Roger Baldwin himself secured a commitment from the State Department to issue him a
passport subject to a qualified oath pledging to defend the United States against its enemies “as far as [his]
conscience [would] allow.” Letter from M. Huddle, Chief, Passport Division, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Roger N.
Baldwin, Am. Civil Liberties Union (Oct. 22, 1926), reproduced in Brief on Behalf of Petitioner-Appellee at
19–29, United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931) (No. 505), 1930 WL 30012.
536 Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 633 (Hughes, J., dissenting).
537 Id. at 631.
538 Id. at 633.
539 Brief on Behalf of American Friends Service Committee, Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (No. 504), 1931
WL 32245.
540 GRABER, supra note 5, at 122–64.
541 Brief on Behalf of American Friends Service Committee at 8–9, Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (No. 504),
1931 WL 32245; Thomas, supra note 73, at 394 (“It is the essence of democracy to believe that the state exists
for the wellbeing of individuals; it is the essence of Prussianism to believe that individuals exist for the service
of some unreal metaphysical entity called the state.”).
533
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not undermine its power.542 Hughes was deeply sympathetic to this Progressive
defense of First Amendment freedoms. Within weeks of the Court’s decision
in United States v. Macintosh, he authored majority opinions in two iconic
First Amendment cases upholding expressive freedom.543 He nonetheless
maintained that “[w]hen one’s belief collides with the power of the state, the
latter is supreme within its sphere, and submission or punishment follows.”544
Over the course of the 1920s, the limitations of the ACLU’s assault on state
authority became increasingly evident. In 1929, the executive committee asked
the national committee to approve an expansion of the organization’s
activity.545 Since its founding, it recounted in a letter, the ACLU had defended
freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and it had “used the phrase ‘civil
liberties’ as expressive of those three rights.”546 Conspicuously missing from
the description of the organization’s program was any mention of freedom of
conscience, which had figured so prominently in the wartime agenda of the
NCLB.547
In its letter to the national committee, the ACLU’s leadership proposed
several areas of increased activity, including assistance to racial minorities,
immigrants, criminal defendants, and religious minorities.548 Among the
controversial suggestions was one of special significance: “Aid in the
campaign against compulsory military training.”549 One of its most forceful
opponents was Karl Llewellyn, who thought it unduly entangled the ACLU in
radical causes and interfered with “a matter rather of policy in governmental
organization than of liberties of the citizen.”550 Felix Frankfurter, too, initially
542 Brief on Behalf of American Friends Service Committee at 12, Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (No. 504),
1931 WL 32245.
543 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
544 Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 633.
545 Letter from Roger N. Baldwin, Am. Civil Liberties Union, to the Members of the Nat’l Comm. (Feb.
14, 1929), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 63, Vol. 360.
546 Id. It added the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, though “only incidentally.” Id.
547 See id.
548 Id.
549 Id.
550 Letter from Karl Llewellyn, Professor, Colum. Univ. Sch. of Law, to the Am. Civil Liberties Union
(Apr. 15, 1929), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 63, Vol. 360 (“The proposed extension of
the activities of the Union seems to me highly desirable, with the exception of Item 7.”). Baldwin responded
that opposition to compulsory military training followed from liberty of conscience and was “in line with our
general conception of civil liberty.” Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Karl Llewellyn (Apr. 18, 1929),
microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 63, Vol. 360. He noted that the ACLU had previously
offered “to defend anybody in the courts who, on conscientious grounds, refuses to take the military training”
in colleges where military training was mandatory. Id.
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resisted the proposal, though he eventually backed down.551 In a statement that
reveals the interwar reconfiguration of the organization’s ambitions,
Frankfurter told Baldwin that he was
emphatically against assuming responsibility for the protection of
negroes, the promotion of pacific ideals, the resistance of economic
penetration in Latin-America, etc., etc., etc., except in so far as
activities or opinions in regard to the foregoing or any other item,
like birth control, raise questions of freedom of speech, press and
assembly.552

In other words, a civil liberties organization properly pursued full and open
discussion of appropriate state policy, not particular policy ends, let alone
exemptions from those policies once they were enacted.
In response to a flood of criticism of this sort, the executive committee
resolved not to take on “opposition to compulsory military training as a
violation of liberty of conscience, instead of as now, opposition only to
interference with agitation against it.”553 In 1934, the Supreme Court
unanimously rejected a challenge to a California law requiring University of
California students to participate in military training.554 John Beardsley,
longtime chairman of the ACLU’s Southern California Branch, argued the case
in the Supreme Court.555 According to the national office, the Court’s decision
“end[ed] the campaign to secure legal exemption for conscientious objectors
where either law or college regulations require it.”556 When Congress enacted a
peacetime draft in 1940, the ACLU declined to oppose it, though it did

551 Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Roger N. Baldwin (Feb. 16, 1929), microformed on ACLU Papers,
supra note 24, Reel 63, Vol. 360 (“I should like to express dissent, and vigorously so, from the proposed
extension.”). After correspondence with Baldwin, however, he accepted the ACLU’s proposal to oppose
compulsory military training if it made “explicit the ‘ground of liberty of conscience.’” Letter from Felix
Frankfurter to Roger N. Baldwin (Mar. 5, 1929), microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 63, Vol.
360.
552 Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Roger N. Baldwin (Feb. 21, 1929), microformed on ACLU Papers,
supra note 24, Reel 63, Vol. 360.
553 Letter from Roger N. Baldwin, on behalf of the Exec. Comm., to the Nat’l Comm. (Apr. 5, 1929),
microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 63, Vol. 360 (referencing sedition bills and legislative
proposals for universal conscription).
554 Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 265 (1934). While that case also involved
freedom of the schools, the principal purpose of compulsory military training was to promote national
readiness, not conformity with patriotic ideals. Id. at 260. On Hamilton, see Case, supra note 10, at 478–80.
555 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, LAND OF THE FREE: THE STORY OF THE FIGHT FOR CIVIL LIBERTY,
1934–35, at 50 (1935).
556 Id. at 11.
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advocate broad statutory exemptions for conscientious objectors.557 Two years
later the organization took the unlikely step of backing the administration’s
proposal to conscript all adults into compulsory civilian service.558
A final ACLU enterprise of the interwar period clarifies the organization’s
underlying concerns. Beginning in the mid-1920s, the ACLU actively
defended Jehovah’s Witnesses in their refusal to salute the American flag.559
Like oaths of allegiance, the flag salute implicated ideological orthodoxy, not
the economy or public health. Although the ACLU described the flag salute
cases in terms of “religious liberty,” the organization pursued them out of
concern for “freedom in the schools” (the same interest that informed its
positions in Meyer, Pierce, and Scopes) as much as, if not more than, “freedom
of conscience.”560 Even in that limited domain, the courts that considered the
issue prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Minersville School District v.
Gobitis561 typically rejected the notion that a religious conviction could
“interfere with the state’s enactments for its safety, preservation or welfare.”562
As for advocates and scholars, many believed the children’s scruples
should be balanced against state interests, and the flag salute cases squarely
raised the question whether courts or legislatures should do the balancing.563
Despite his sympathy for liberty of conscience as a policy matter, Felix
Frankfurter famously allocated that responsibility to the political branches as a
newly appointed Justice of the Supreme Court.564
557

Walker, supra note 9, at 149–50. The organization did, however, advocate for broad exemptions. Id.
Id. at 152. The ACLU’s support for the administration on these issues must, however, be read in the
context of its strong anti-fascism, as well as its strong political ties to Roosevelt. Id. at 139.
559 FREE SPEECH 1925–1926, supra note 508, at 22–23. For discussion of the flag-salute cases (including
the pledge of allegiance), see SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW: RELIGIOUS VOICES AND
THE CONSTITUTION IN MODERN AMERICA 15–55 (2010); NUSSBAUM, supra note 21, at 199–214; Leah
Weinryb-Grohsgal, Reinventing Civil Liberties: Religious Groups, Organized Litigation, and the Rights
Revolution (2011) (Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University).
560 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, HOW GOES THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE STORY OF THE FIGHT FOR CIVIL
LIBERTY, 1935–1936, at 39 (1936); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ETERNAL VIGILANCE! THE STORY OF CIVIL
LIBERTY, 1937–1938, at 61 (1938). In fact, the 1939 Annual Report listed flag salute cases under “Freedom in
Schools and Colleges” rather than “Religious Freedom.” AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE BILL OF RIGHTS
150 YEARS AFTER: THE STORY OF CIVIL LIBERTY, 1938–1939, at 34, 46 (1939) [hereinafter 150 YEARS
AFTER].
561 310 U.S. 586, 591 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626
(1943).
562 150 YEARS AFTER, supra note 560, at 46 (quoting New York court).
563 See, e.g., Louis Lusky, The Compulsory Flag Salute in the Supreme Court, BULL, June 15, 1940 (on
file with Dartmouth College Library, Rauner Special Collection Library, Papers of Grenville Clark, Box 86,
Folder 4).
564 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 595.
558
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By the late 1930s, the ACLU had helped to engineer a new understanding
of the First Amendment speech clauses—one that insulated some conduct
(including, for a time, labor picketing and strikes) as well as more conventional
expression.565 The new vision bore a strong connection to the property rights
and contractual freedom the AUAM’s leadership had so strongly decried.
Businesses employed the revised First Amendment to dismantle New Deal
regulatory constraints, sometimes with the ACLU’s approval.566 In a 1936
article, John Dewey—by then, a member of the ACLU—described the
competing justifications that were often intermingled in a theoretical morass of
civil liberties claims.567 On one account, civil liberties were valued for their
“contribution . . . to the welfare of the community.”568 The “dominant
philosophy,” by contrast, had “sprung from fear of government and of
organized control.”569 Under that model, freedom of conscience was a natural
right, prior to and independent of the state.570
And yet, liberals and conservatives alike stopped short of the NCLB’s
wartime appeals to conscience as a license for exemption from ordinary laws.
At the ACLU’s urging, the newly formed Committee on the Bill of Rights of
the American Bar Association filed an amicus brief in the Gobitis case.571
After much agonizing, the committee opposed the law as an unconstitutional
measure, as committee chair Grenville Clark put it, “to induce loyalty by
coercion.”572 At the same time, there was a general unwillingness on the
committee to “permit every crack-pot to exercise untrammeled his definition of
freedom of conscience,” lest liberty degenerate into “anarchy.”573 In Clark’s
formulation,
565 I develop this argument in Laura Weinrib, The Liberal Compromise: Civil Liberties, Labor, and the
Limits of State Power, 1917–1940 (2011) (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University); WEINRIB, supra note 31.
566 For example, after agonized debate, the ACLU defended the asserted First Amendment right of
employers to distribute anti-union literature to their employees. See NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.2d 905
(6th Cir. 1940); WEINRIB, supra note 31 .
567 John Dewey, Liberalism and Civil Liberties, 2 SOC. FRONTIER 137, 137 (1936).
568 Id.
569 Id.
570 Dewey favored the former, and he considered it inevitable in modern society that “merely individual
claims [would] be forced to give way in practice to social claims.” Id.
571 Brief for Am. Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Minersville Sch. Dist.
v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (No. 690), 1940 WL 71209.
572 Letter from Grenville Clark to George I. Haight (Mar. 25, 1940), in Clark Papers, supra note 563, Box
79, Folder 32.
573 Letter from George Haight to Grenville Clark (Mar. 26, 1939) (on file with Dartmouth College
Library, Rauner Special Collection Library, Papers of Grenville Clark, Box 79, Folder 32); Letter from
Grenville Clark to George I. Haight, supra note 572 (“I have no more sympathy than you have with permitting
‘every crackpot to exercise untrammeled his definition of freedom of conscience.’”).
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Neither an assertion of religious scruples nor a general claim of
“individual liberty” should avail to nullify a statute requiring
vaccination (this is a matter of public health) or perhaps, in the future,
the fingerprinting of children or the whole population, if it becomes
reasonably apparent that this would materially aid the reduction of
crime (this involves internal safety and order); or again to nullify
laws prohibiting acts against the prevailing public morals, such as
free love or plural marriages (this involves the public morals); or
again to nullify laws for national service in case of war or domestic
emergency, such as conscription or universal military training (these
may well become essential to the national existence as they may
already be necessary in England).574

For the time being, the domain in which conscience operated to authorize
exemptions was vanishingly small. Indeed, it was practically coextensive with
the right of free speech—a development that explains why so many formative
religious freedom cases involved religious proselytizing and literature
distribution, beginning with the first case incorporating the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment into the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth.575
As war again occupied the national stage, even critics of the Court’s
decision in Gobitis did not mean “to suggest that conscientious scruples can
stand against all compulsion to do positive acts”; where the “public need for
coerced and insincere saluting of the flag by little children” appeared to be
trivial, Thomas Reed Powell pointedly explained, the “public need for armed
defense may well be regarded as the most pressing public need of all.”576 That
the contemporaneous law-review literature overwhelmingly regarded Gobitis
as wrongly decided reflects the nature of compulsory flag salutes as unabashed
attempts to enforce conformity. It is no accident that the Supreme Court’s
decision in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (overruling
Gobitis) relied on a theory of compelled speech—forbidding the state from
574 Letter from Grenville Clark to Douglas Arant (Mar. 31, 1939) (on file with Dartmouth College
Library, Rauner Special Collection Library, Papers of Grenville Clark, Box 77, Folder 8).
575 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). For analysis of the relationship between free exercise
and free speech, see William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression,
67 MINN. L. REV. 545 (1983).
576 Thomas Reed Powell, Conscience and the Constitution, in DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL UNITY 29
(William T. Hutchinson ed., 1941). Administration of conscription during World War II provoked tensions
among conservatives and within the Roosevelt administration between emerging support for judicial
enforcement of civil liberties and deference to the expanding national security state. See Jeremy K. Kessler,
From the New Deal to the Next Draft: Conscription, Conscientious Objection, and the Decline of
Administrative Autonomy (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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prescribing “what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, or other matter of
opinion”—as opposed to freedom of conscience.577 Even Harlan Fisk Stone,
twenty-five years after serving on the War Department’s Board of Inquiry
during World War I, believed that in an “organized society, the majority must
rule, and that consequently I must obey some laws of which I do not
approve.”578 No wonder, then, that he based his lonely dissent in Gobitis on the
“freedom of the individual from compulsion as to what he shall think and what
he shall say,” not what he shall do.579
CONCLUSION
By the 1940s, liberty of conscience was firmly ensconced as a
constitutional value—indeed, President Franklin D. Roosevelt considered it
part of “our national birthright”580—but its reach was modest and its meaning
far less controversial than the capacious shield against state power the NCLB
had once endorsed. Liberty did not encompass an individual right to forswear
state compulsion. As Attorney General Frank Murphy explained, it meant “that
little group of Mennonites or Mormons or Quakers worshipping in their own
churches in the way that their consciences tell them is right.”581 Even Norman
Thomas reframed his longstanding commitment to “freedom of conscience” as
a right to “argue freely according to conscience.”582
In the universe of possible claims for exemption from neutrally applicable
laws, it is difficult to imagine one less palatable than the NCLB’s. At the
height of national fervor for the First World War, the fledgling organization
asserted a right to avoid compulsory military service on the basis of political
opposition to a particular war—a war declared by Congress, endorsed by
popular majorities, and justified as serving democratic ends. What is most

577

319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
CAPOZOLLA, supra note 7, at 82.
579 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting), overruled by
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
580 FRANK MURPHY, IN DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACY (quoting Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt, President
of the U.S., to the Am. Council on Public Affairs (Dec. 21, 1939)) (on file with Dartmouth College Library,
Rauner Special Collection Library, Papers of Grenville Clark, Box 80, Folder 112).
581 MURPHY, supra note 580.
582 Norman Thomas, Remarks at Journal Square Meeting, Free Speech in Jersey City (June 12, 1930),
microformed on ACLU Papers, supra note 24, Reel 177, Vol. 2134. In this he echoed John Milton who, in his
famous free speech tract the Areopagatica, valued the “liberty . . . to argue freely according to conscience,
above all liberty.” JOHN MILTON, COMPLETE POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE 746 (Merritt Y. Hughes ed., 1957).
578
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surprising about the NLCB’s wartime exertions is that they attained any
traction at all.
Perhaps if civil liberties advocates had begun with claims to free speech
and gradually worked toward freedom of conscience, their justification for
exemptions might have taken root. Similarly, one might imagine that a more
modest claim (in an area less tied to military necessity, or on behalf of more
sympathetic claimants) could have succeeded where the NCLB’s ambitious
program failed. The audacity of the NCLB’s approach is neatly captured in
Judge Julius Mayer’s statement upon sentencing Roger Baldwin for failure to
yield to the draft. “I cannot emphasize too strongly that in my view . . . this war
[could] not have been successful and in a self-respecting way carried on by the
United States Government if such an attitude as yours had prevailed,” he told
Baldwin, in a nod to the vital government interests at stake.583
Half a century elapsed—and massive social and cultural transformations
reshaped American attitudes toward war, civil liberties, and the state—before
arguments of the kind the NCLB espoused persuaded a majority of the Court.
In United Sates v. Seeger and Welsh v. United States, as Americans again were
drafted into military service and deployed overseas, the Supreme Court
expanded the grounds for conscientious objection to encompass ethical and
moral beliefs, albeit as a matter of statutory interpretation rather than
constitutional law.584 The ACLU was unabashedly activist in its opposition to
Vietnam,585 and it is no wonder that Roger Baldwin celebrated the Court’s
concession to conscience.586
For a time, the Court was also receptive to claims for exemption on First
Amendment grounds. Its 1963 decision in Sherbert v. Verner extended to the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment the same “compelling state

583

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE, supra note 432, at 14.
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). For a
discussion of the expansion of religious exemption in these cases, see NUSSBAUM, supra note 21, at 171–72.
Antecedents of these developments were already evident at the administrative level and within the lower courts
during World War II. See Kessler, supra note 576.
585 See JUDY KUTULAS, THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION & THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM,
1930–1960, at 215–16 (2006).
586 Roger Baldwin, Introduction to AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
ANNUAL REPORTS v (1970) (“Refusal to serve in unjust wars like Vietnam on grounds of conscience helps
expand the right of conscience.”).
584
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interest” requirement it had fashioned for free speech.587 Nine years later, in
Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court offered its most expansive reading of the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.588 Even in Yoder, it declined to
extend the constitutional protection of freedom of conscience to political or
moral claims; it cautiously clarified that “[a] way of life, however virtuous and
admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation . . .
if it is based on purely secular considerations.”589 Still, the Court declared that
“[o]nly those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”590
Despite Yoder’s lofty language, constitutional claims for exemptions rarely
succeeded in practice.591 The few successful cases generally involved denial of

587 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (holding that South Carolina’s denial of unemployment benefits to a Seventh
Day Adventist whose employment was terminated due to her refusal to work on Saturdays violated the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause).
588 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972) (unanimously exempting Amish children from compulsory school
attendance law). For an overview of scholarship on Yoder, see Josh Chafetz, Social Reproduction and
Religious Reproduction: A Democratic-Communitarian Analysis of the Yoder Problem, 15 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 263 (2006).
589 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215; see also Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833–34 (1989);
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 812 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that under the Free Exercise
Clause, “religiously motivated claims of conscience may give rise to constitutional rights that other
strongly-held beliefs do not”). The Religious Freedom Restoration Act likewise extends only to laws that
burden “a person’s exercise of religion,” defined as “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or
central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2, 2000cc–5 (2012). By contrast, many specific
statutory exemptions extend to non-religious moral exemptions. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b) (providing
exemption for health care workers otherwise obligated to perform abortion or sterilization procedures on the
basis of “religious beliefs or moral convictions”); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-22(j)(3)(B), 1396u-2(b)(3)(B)
(providing exemption for managed care providers from obligation to provide counseling or referrals in cases of
moral or religious objection); 18 U.S.C. § 3597(b) (providing exemption from participation in executions “if
such participation is contrary to the moral or religious convictions of the employee”). For a recent overview
and analysis of statutory exemptions, see NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 10, at 2533–65.
590 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
591 See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1246 (1994) (“[O]nly in one
case outside of Sherbert v. Verner and its unemployment benefits progeny had the Court actually appeared to
act on that principle: in Wisconsin v. Yoder, it held that Wisconsin’s stake in requiring all children to pursue a
recognized program of education until the age of sixteen was not sufficient to justify the state’s interference
with the religiously motivated commitment of the Amish to integrate children into their working society at the
age of fourteen. Everywhere else there were strong indications that the Court could not in fact live with the
broad dictum of Sherbert.”); Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743, 756
(1992) (“[E]xcept for Wisconsin v. Yoder and a quirky string of unemployment compensation cases, the
government always prevailed in these cases.”).
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unemployment benefits under circumstances very similar to Sherbert.592 Yoder
itself—as in Meyer, Pierce, and Scopes half a century earlier—involved a
state’s effort to control childhood education, a domain in which the dangers of
enforced conformity and the erasure of competing cultural values appeared
particularly acute. And in 1990, the Court officially abandoned the so-called
Sherbert–Yoder test.593 In his majority opinion in Employment Division v.
Smith,594 Justice Antonin Scalia explicitly repudiated the analogy with
expressive freedom that had purportedly justified the Court’s exacting scrutiny.
The two contexts, he explained, were “not remotely comparable.”595 On the
contrary, to recognize “a private right to ignore generally applicable laws”
would create a “constitutional anomaly.”596
Whatever its doctrinal status, however, freedom of conscience was firmly
ensconced in American constitutional culture by the time Smith was decided.
Advocates, politicians, and many academics decried the Court’s decision.597
Congress responded with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,598 a
legislative effort “to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert
v. Verner . . . and Wisconsin v. Yoder.”599 Congressional support for RFRA
was practically unanimous, and President Bill Clinton—“voic[ing] wonder” at
the unusual “alliance of forces that are often at odds across religious or
ideological lines”—enthusiastically signed the law.600 Among the bill’s
592 Lupu, supra note 591, at 756. To the extent these cases constrained states’ abilities to control
children’s education, they recognized the rights of parents as opposed to children’s rights. See Emily Buss,
What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 53 (1999).
593 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
594 Id.
595 Id. at 886.
596 Id. The holding in Smith did not, however, render the Free Exercise Clause inapplicable to laws
targeting particular religious practices, as in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993).
597 Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is
Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 440 (1994) (“Academics, civil rights lawyers, and politicians
excoriated Smith. Denunciations came from both the left and the right. A spate of law review articles attacked
the majority and sympathized with the dissents.”).
598 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4),
invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
the Supreme Court held that RFRA exceeded Congress’ enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment
insofar as it constrained the states. In 2000, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act, which prohibits a state or local government from regulating land use in a way that imposes a
substantial burden on religious exercise in the absence of a compelling government interest. Pub. L. No.
106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000CC to 2000cc-5 (2012)).
599 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1).
600 Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 1993),
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/17/us/clinton-signs-law-protecting-religious-practices.html.
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staunchest supporters was the ACLU, whose president, testifying before
Congress, criticized the Court for “departing so dramatically from traditional
constitutional principles”601 and celebrated RFRA for “restor[ing] religious
liberty to its rightful place as a preferred value and a fundamental right within
the American constitutional system.”602
The ACLU’s euphoric moment was, however, short-lived. At the end of the
twentieth century, the changing nature of demands for exemptions under
RFRA and its state counterparts began to trouble the organization.603 An
escalation in the rhetoric of religious freedom and liberty of conscience
corresponded with a proliferation of claims related to same-sex marriage and
reproductive rights.604 RFRA, the ACLU complained, was “used as a sword to
discriminate against women, gay and transgender people and others.”605
In recent years, individuals and organizations hostile to the contraception
mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act have demanded
sweeping exemptions on the basis of religious beliefs606 and, in some cases,
“moral” opposition as well.607 Vendors have asserted religious objections to
state and local anti-discrimination laws,608 and a county clerk famously defied
a federal court order requiring her to issue marriage licenses to same-sex
couples following the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges.609
The ACLU has criticized the newest set of challenges to the ACA’s
contraception mandate for endeavoring to deprive women of “a benefit

601 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearing on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 63 (1991) (statement of Nadine Strossen,
President, National Board of Directors, American Civil Liberties Union).
602 Id. at 65.
603 Louise Melling, Opinion, ACLU: Why We Can No Longer Support the Federal ‘Religious Freedom’
Law, WASH. POST (June 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/congress-should-amend-theabused-religious-freedom-restoration-act/2015/06/25/ee6aaa46-19d8-11e5-ab92-c75ae6ab94b5_story.html.
604 See supra note 10.
605 Melling, supra note 603.
606 E.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). This Term, the Supreme Court will
decide a set of cases involving religious nonprofits claiming exemption from the contraception mandate under
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015) (mem.) (granting certiorari).
607 Complaint, March for Life v. Burwell, No. 1:14-CV-01149 (U.S. July 7, 2014); March for Life v.
Burwell, No. 1:14-CV-01149 (RJL), 2015 WL 5139099, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2015) (recognizing a right to
exemption asserted by a non-religious, pro-life organization “whose employees share in, and advocate for, a
particular moral philosophy”).
608 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 10, at 2519.
609 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). On Kim Davis, see, for example, Alan Blinder & Tamar Lewin, Clerk in
Kentucky Chooses Jail over Deal on Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/09/04/us/kim-davis-same-sex-marriage.html.
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guaranteed by law.”610 Although proponents of exemptions link their campaign
to a “long and rich tradition of religious freedom,”611 critics have hastened to
emphasize the distance between current claims and their historical
antecedents.612
In his introduction to a bound volume of the ACLU’s annual reports
released in 1970, the same year that Welsh v. United States was decided, Roger
Baldwin celebrated the disruptive capacity of conscientious objection. “In the
name of liberty, we support disobedience to laws we think unconstitutional or
contrary to our principles,” he wrote.613 “The history of civil liberties is
marked by the acts of courageous men and women who put moral claims of
conscience ahead of obedience to law, and who by their acts, often at the price
of their freedom, helped win legal recognition of their claims.”614 Baldwin’s
certitude echoes today in a generalized First Amendment attack on the
regulatory state.615 In an irony that would have bemused the labor advocates of
the NCLB, the Supreme Court this Term divided evenly over a constitutional
challenge to public-sector agency fee arrangements, which require
non-members of a union to contribute to the costs of collective bargaining and

610 Supreme Court Accepts Challenges to Affordable Care Act’s Contraceptive Coverage Requirement,
ACLU (Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/news/supreme-court-accepts-challenges-affordable-care-actscontraceptive-coverage-requirement.
611 Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson et al. to F. Gary Simpson, State Senator, Del. (May 1, 2013),
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/delaware-letter.pdf (cited and discussed in Case, supra note 10, at 464
n.2, 476 n.49); cf. Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2 (arguing that
Smith “is probably wrong as a matter of original intent”). For an analysis of the role of history in interpretation
of the religion clauses, see Hans Leaman, History and Its Role in Supreme Court Decision Making on
Religion, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 766–68 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2006).
612 E.g., NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 10, at 2521 (distinguishing complicity-based conscience claims
from the “[c]onscience claims [that] have long played a crucial role in our ethical, political, and religious
lives”); Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas for Religious Exemptions in
Hobby Lobby’s Wake, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1897, 1903 (2015) (attributing to the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby
decision an “unprecedented reverence for religious freedom”).
613 Baldwin, supra note 586, at v.
614 Id.
615 Scholarship on the “Lochnerization” of the First Amendment’s Speech Clause stretches back decades.
See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment,
1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 384; Morton Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change, Legal Fundamentalism
Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 109 (1993) (discussing “The Lochnerization of the First
Amendment”). On a similar trend in religious freedom cases, see Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism,
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (2015). Elsewhere, I argue that the roots of First Amendment Lochnerism were laid
in the late 1930s, as judicial review of personal liberties emerged as an alternative to freedom of contract and
property rights. WEINRIB, supra note 31; Weinrib, supra note 38.
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thereby—according to the California public school teacher for whom the case
was named—render them “troubled in their conscience.”616
The NCLB, of course, could not have anticipated the world of RFRA, the
Affordable Care Act, and Obergefell v. Hodges. It would not have worried, as
the ACLU does today, that exemptions from generally applicable laws might
be made “to force employees to pay a price for their employer’s faith.”617 After
all, at the height of the Lochner era, employers’ constitutional and common
law property rights ensured that employers could hire, fire, and allocate or
deny benefits with almost perfect impunity. Liberty of contract was
constitutionally secure, and there was little reason to worry that businesses
would discriminate on the basis of religious freedom instead.
And yet, for those Progressives who had confronted the costs of
countermajoritarian constitutionalism head on, there was ample reason to
interrogate an extension of individual rights. It is a neat historical accident that
in 1905, as attorney general of New York, Julius M. Mayer had unsuccessfully
defended the maximum-hours law at issue in Lochner v. New York before the
Supreme Court.618 Perhaps it is unsurprising, then, that Judge Mayer proved
unreceptive to Baldwin’s uncompromising insistence on individual autonomy.
To Mayer, Baldwin’s refusal to submit to state power threatened the very basis
of democratic government. “I think such an attitude would have led inevitably
to disorder and finally to the destruction of a Government, which with all of
the imperfections that may attach to human government, has proved itself, as I
view it, to be a real people’s Government,” Judge Mayer reflected.619 The
success of American democracy was “evidenced by the millions upon millions
of men who voluntarily obey the laws—and some of them requiring great
sacrifice—which, as enacted by the legislature, embody the judgment of the
people at large.”620

616 Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. 14-915, 2016 WL 1191684 (U.S. Mar. 29, 2016) (per curiam)
(affirming by an equally divided court); Emma Brown, Two Teachers Explain Why They Want to Take Down
Their Union, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/education/wp/2015/08/11/
two-teachers-explain-why-they-want-to-take-down-their-union/.
617 Melling, supra note 603.
618 Mayer’s cursory brief has prompted speculation that he considered Lochner to be either an easy case or
a relatively unimportant case (in contrast to the Franchise Tax Cases, on which he was working at the same
time). BERNSTEIN, supra note 133, at 32. It is also possible that he was unenthusiastic about defending New
York’s law. PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER V. NEW YORK
112 (1990).
619 THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE, supra note 432, at 14.
620 Id.
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At the dawn of the modern First Amendment, claims for exemption by
conscientious objectors found few defenders among even the staunchest
supporters of free speech. As the ACLU embarked on its interwar project of
promoting labor’s rights, a growing cadre of lawyers, scholars, public officials,
and judges proved receptive to the organization’s appeal to expressive
freedom. Most nonetheless maintained, with Judge Mayer, that to countenance
exemption from democratic laws was to endanger democracy itself.

